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Chapter 1
Introduction
"In this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes."
Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790)
1.1 Motivation and research objective
Uncertainty is part of life as the quote of Benjamin Franklin clearly states. A
distinction should be made between uncertainty and risk. Uncertainty includes all
facts in life that do not have a certain outcome and cannot be measured. Risk1 is
the measurable counterpart of uncertainty (Knight (2002)). This thesis is focused on
risk, and more specically on credit risk. The risks companies face can be classied
broadly into two types of risks, business risks and nancial risks. Business risks are
the risks that are part of the core business of a company and which they use to
create added value for stakeholders. Financial risks are the risks that are not based
on the primary function of the company, but to which the company is exposed by the
environment she has her activities in (Jorion (2007) and Du¢ e & Singleton (2003)).
A nancial intermediary is an economic agent who specializes in the activities of
buying and selling (at the same time) nancial claims (Freixas & Rochet (2008)).
Because the primary function of nancial institutions is to manage nancial risks
actively, the distinction between business and nancial risks is not apparent for
nancial institutions. The risks nancial institutions face can be subdivided into
1Another denition of risk can be found in the book by Jorion (2007), where risk is dened as
"the volatility of unexpected outcomes, which can represent the value of assets, equity, or earnings".
This denition has more focus on nancial risks and does not explicitly mention that risks have to
be measurable, but it does so implicitly. We will use the denition of Knight (2002) in this thesis.
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four categories, market risk, liquidity risk, operational risk and credit risk2. The
denitions used by regulators and academics concerning credit risk are diverse. The
denition of Jorion (2007) is most appealing for this thesis "Credit risk is the risk of
nancial loss owing to counterparty failure to perform its contractual obligations".
Credit risk can originate from three sources3:
 default risk also known as counterparty risk. The risk of defaulting by the
borrower, measured by the probability of default;
 recovery risk. The risk of recovery of the original loan amount after the bor-
rower has defaulted, measured by the loss given default or the recovery rate;
 credit exposure risk. The risk of the height of the loan amount outstanding on
the moment of default of the borrower, measured by the exposure at default,
limited by the credit limit;
Full mitigation of credit risk is in theory only possible through a complete con-
tingent contract between the borrower and a nancial institution. In practise and
by denition4 nancial contracts are incomplete and asymmetric information gives
rise to adverse selection (hidden information) and moral hazard (hidden actions).
Financial institutions try to control the amount of credit risk in their loan portfolio
by the implementation of a nancial contract with the borrower. A nancial con-
tract between a borrower and a lender commonly states the interest rate, covenants,
collateral and a credit limit. Compliance of the borrower to the conditions of this
nancial contract is enforced through screening and monitoring.
The research objective of this thesis is to analyze credit risk in the nancial sector
in three specic forms
 to explore the option to mitigate credit risks through countercyclical provi-
sioning for loan loss reserves (chapter two and three);
2Market risk, liquidity risk, operational risk and credit risk are all idiosyncratic risks, which
have the property that the risks can be mitigated (in theory) by diversication. Systemic risk stands
opposite to these risks and is usually dened as any risk that may a¤ect the nancial system as a
whole (de Bandt & Hartmann (2000)). Systemic risk may result in contagion where the failure of
one bank may propogate the entire banking industry (Freixas & Rochet (2008)).
3The credit risk on a loan can be quantied through the expected loss measure, being probability
of default times the loss given default times the exposure at default.
4A complete contingent contract would specify in every possible state of nature and at every
interim date the amount of repayment, the interest rate on remaining debt, the value of collateral
and the actions undertaken by the borrower. By denition a complete contingent contract only
exists in a world with full information on every state of nature about the implications of this state
for the borrower and the nancial institution. But in a perfect market, without information voids,
there would be no need for nancial intermediaries.
1.2 Overview of the thesis 3
 to analyze interest setting and pricing behavior by asset based lenders in an
asymmetric, dynamic market with low risk and high risk borrowers. We ana-
lyze how asset based lenders integrate the di¤erent risk proles of borrowers
in their interest setting (chapter four);
 to empirically analyze the distribution of recovery rates of defaulted bonds
(chapter ve);
The remainder of this introduction proceeds as follows. The next section gives
an overview of the thesis and in section three I briey discuss the contribution of
this thesis to current literature.
1.2 Overview of the thesis
This thesis analyzes credit risk from three di¤erent perspectives. Chapter two and
three focus on one specic form to mitigate credit risks, that is to form counter-
cyclical provisions for loan losses. Chapter four analyzes how asset based lenders
integrate credit risk in their interest rate in a dynamic market with asymmetric in-
formation and competition. In chapter ve we focus on a specic part of credit risk,
namely the distribution of recovery rates of defaulted bonds.
Chapter two introduces a new method of forming loan loss provisions for banks
and links this provisioning method to liquidity requirements. This method is com-
pared to current provisioning methods in literature and current regulation for banks,
in the form of IFRS, Basel II and III. We discuss two loan loss provisioning meth-
ods in this chapter, Spanish statistical provisioning and Italian dynamic provision-
ing. The Spanish statistical provisioning method tones down the cyclical e¤ect of
loan loss provisioning and the Italian dynamic provisioning behaves acyclical5. We
present a new method of countercyclical provisioning for loan losses to optimize the
use of detailed loan loss knowledge within the banks and minimize subjectivity in
provisioning. The minimization of subjectivity benets the veriability of the used
provisions by banks and restricts the cyclicality. The new provisioning method takes
into account the di¤erent distributions of high risk and low risk assets within the
banks and recommends to use a multiplier : The multiplier  is determined by the
nancial regulator to improve objectivity. This multiplier will tone down provision-
5The dotations to the loan loss provision do not depend on the macro-economic cycle.
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ing in a recession and raise provisioning in an upturn of the business cycle. The
multiplier di¤ers from the multiplier Repullo et al. (2010) suggest. They propose
a multiplier for all capital requirements, that is based on the comparison of current
GDP growth to its long term trend. The multiplier we propose should not be used
for the total amount of capital, but for the provisions of the specic bank. Our
multiplier takes into consideration the risk prole the di¤erent banks have. Also our
provisioning form does not propose the use of a specic business cycle indicator to
form this countercyclical provision. We are of the opinion that the business cycle
indicators that are best suited for each separate country may di¤er. Transferring
part of this loan loss provision () to a Financial Market Stability Fund, governed
by the nancial regulator, gives recognition to the correlation between the solvency
position and liquidity position of a bank. A Financial Market Stability Fund is a
policy measure for a nancial regulator to control the credit channel and money sup-
ply. Both Basel III and IFRS are not opposed supplementary measures by nancial
regulators. Although academic literature (Diamond & Rajan (2005)) recognizes the
interaction between liquidity and solvency of banks, regulation like Basel III and
IFRS do not incorporate this interaction in their requirements. The implementation
of a Financial Market Stability Fund does recognize the correlation between the
liquidity position and the solvency position of a bank and provides a veriable and
more objective method to ensure nancial stability.
Chapter three tests known business cycle indicators in their ability to predict
the amount of credit risk in the nancial sector. The purpose of this analysis is
to nd a business cycle indicator or a combination of business cycle indicators that
can be used to form countercyclical provisions (the proposal we introduce in chapter
two). Credit risk is always present in the loan portfolio of a nancial institution,
but when the economic environment is in an upturn, credit risk is undervalued. In
contrast credit risk is overvalued by the nancial institution, when a recession arrives.
The subjectivity of the valuation of credit risk, is one of the causes of procyclical
behavior of nancial institutions. In this chapter we use the number of bankruptcies
as a percentage of domestic credit as a proxy for the amount of credit risk present
in the nancial sector in a country. We consider multiple business cycle indicators
in their ability to forecast this proxy. We use lagged, autoregressive OLS regressions
to test the correlation between the business cycle indicators and the proxy for credit
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risk. We run out-of-sample forecasts to determine the accuracy of the business cycle
indicators to predict this proxy for credit risk. We use data concerning business
cycle indicators and the number of bankruptcies in The Netherlands and The United
States of America for the regressions and the forecasts. The time series of the Euro
area are unfortunately too short to perform statistical tests on. We nd that a
combination of the credit-to-GDP gap and a stock exchange indicator, gives the
best forecasts for our proxy. The use of only the credit-to-GDP gap to determine
the height of the countercyclical provision, as Drehmann et al. (2010) propose,
works poorly for our proxy. One-lagged indicators give the best forecasts for our
proxy in The Netherlands, whereas in the United States of America, two-lagged
indicators give the best results. The forecasts and regressions for The Netherlands
give better results than those for the United States of America. We presume (without
any further evidence) that this result might be caused by the use of our proxy
(the number of bankruptcies as a percentage of domestic credit), that seems better
applicable to the European funding behavior of corporations that the US corporate
funding behavior, in accordance with Hackethal & Schmidt (2005). Even though the
number of observations of our proxy is very limited and only available on a yearly
base, the results are signicant. A good indicator for the amount of credit risk in the
nancial sector is essential to construct a useful countercyclical provision for loan
losses.
In chapter four we analyze the interest setting by asset based lenders in a dy-
namic market with an inelastic demand for loans. We dene a dynamic market as a
market where borrowers exit the market, as a result of default, and new borrowers
enter the market. This chapter characterizes the complete set of Nash equilibria in
a duopoly with incomplete information and learning in this dynamic market. This
chapter recognizes cohorts of borrowers with a high risk prole, cohorts of borrowers
with a low risk prole and two asset based lenders. The borrowersmarket is char-
acterized by adverse selection of high risk borrowers and the lack of a pure strategy
equilibrium. We nd that the division of borrowers can be modelled for all phases
according to a dened series. Separate markets arise in which neither of the asset
based lenders has an informational advantage (new borrowersmarket) or one of the
asset based lenders has an informational advantage (inside asset based lender). The
asset based lender gains positive informational gains on the low risk borrowers in
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the market in which he has an informational advantage. The mixed strategy of the
outside asset based lender has rst order stochastic dominance over the mixed strat-
egy of the inside asset based lender. The average interest rate the inside asset based
lender o¤ers is lower than the average interest rate the outside based lender o¤ers
over the whole range of interest rates of the mixed distribution. The mixed strategy
equilibria for each new phase depends on the number of borrowers in the market,
their risk prole and the probability of default of these borrowers. An increase in the
amount of high risk borrowers on the market, increases adverse selection. As a result
of the increased adverse selection, the informational gains for the inside asset based
lender increase. The informational gains increase because the value of information
with regard to the risk prole of the borrowers becomes more valuable. We nd that
the probability of switching for low risk borrowers depends on the relative size and
riskiness of the low risk borrowers in comparison to the total market. We also nd
that the interest rate o¤ered to low risk borrowers increases when the probability of
default for the high risk borrowers increases.
Chapter ve describes the distribution of recovery rates for defaulted commercial
bonds that defaulted in the period 1981-2011. We analyze which bond characteristics
inuence the distribution of recovery rates. We model the di¤erent subsamples,
according to these characteristics separately. We use the bond prices of all publicly
available bond data of defaulted companies in the period 1981-2011 as proxies for the
recovery rates of these bonds. We analyze whether the empirical subsamples are best
modelled through a theoretical Beta distribution, a truncated normal or a truncated
Weibull distribution. We test the goodness of t of the theoretical distributions
to the empirical data with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic and Cramer-von
Mises test statistic. In accordance with Schuermann (2004) we nd that a bond with
a default date in a NBER recession period has a signicant di¤erent recovery rate
than a bond with a default date in a NBER non-recession period. Contrary to the
analysis of Schuermann (2004) our analysis shows that collateral does not appear to
be of signicant inuence on the bond recovery rate. We also analyze the percentage
lifetime of the bond, this characteristic gives an indication of the timeperiod of the
bond between issue date and default date in comparison to the duration of the bond
(the numerator of this variable corresponds to the time to default). The percentage
lifetime of a bond is always in between 0 and 1. A defaulted bond with a very
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low percentage lifetime is a bond that defaulted quite soon after it was issued in
comparison to its duration. The percentage lifetime is of signicant inuence on
the bond recovery rate. We subsample the recovery rates according to their bond
characteristics (NBER recession default date, percentage lifetime and collateral).
We use the di¤erent subsamples to determine the goodness of t of the theoretical
distributions. We nd that the di¤erent subsamples of the distribution of recovery
rates of defaulted bonds are best modelled as a truncated Weibull distribution. The
goodness of t of the empirical data to the Weibull distribution increases, if the
empirical data is separated according to the signicant bond characteristics.
1.3 Contribution to current literature
Credit risk has been the subject of research dating back to Black & Scholes (1973),
Wilcox (1973) and Merton (1974). Credit risk does not only impact nancial institu-
tions, but also nancial markets and the economy as a whole. The current nancial
crisis has shown us that there are still voids in our knowledge concerning the inu-
ence and impact of credit risk. This thesis tries to o¤er a humble contribution to
our knowledge on credit risk.
Chapter two presents a new method of countercyclical provisioning for loan losses
to optimize the use of detailed loan loss knowledge within the banks and minimize
subjectivity in provisioning. The minimization of subjectivity benets the veria-
bility of the used provisions by banks and restricts the cyclicality. Transferring part
of this loan loss provision () to a Financial Market Stability Fund, governed by the
nancial regulator, gives recognition to the correlation between the solvency posi-
tion and liquidity position of a bank. A Financial Market Stability Fund is a policy
measure for a nancial regulator to control the credit channel and money supply.
Although academic literature (Diamond & Rajan (2005)) recognizes the interaction
between liquidity and solvency of banks, current loan loss provisioning literature
does not model the interaction between bank solvency and liquidity. Our proposal
for a Financial Market Stability Fund has the following advantages in comparison
to current loan loss provisioning models in literature:
 The provisioning form we propose behaves counter-cyclical, instead of toning
down the pro-cyclical behavior of banks concerning loan loss provisions (de
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Lis et al. (2000)) or implementing an a-cyclical form of loan loss provisioning
(Burroni et al. (2009));
 Our provisioning form places emphasis on the inuence of loan losses on bank
prots in a recession (as is shown by Bolt et al. (2011)) of the economic
cycle as a disrupting factor of nancial stability. Repullo et al. (2010) use a
multiplier to adapt equity, we use a multiplier to enlarge or reduce the loan
loss provisions;
 The use of a Financial Market Stability Fund links the risk-prole of the banks
loan portfolio, their solvency position and the banks liquidity position. Cur-
rent loan loss provisioning literature does not link the risk-prole of the banks
loan portfolio to their liquidity position, even though loan losses do inevitably
cause friction within the liquidity forecast of a bank.
We also discuss the impact a Financial Market Stability Fund on current year
report regulation, IFRS, and bank regulation in the form of Basel II and III in
contrast to existing literature.
Chapter three analyzes business cycle indicators that are best t to predict the
amount of credit risk in the nancial sector. The analysis of business cycle indicators
has a long history. The classical techniques were developed by the National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER) and can be found in the articles of Mitchell (1913,
1927), Mitchell & Burns (1938) and Burns & Mitchell (1946). The classical theory
of business cycles is focussed on the identication of the business cycle and the
interaction between the indicators and the business cycle. We contribute to the
current literature of countercyclical provisioning by the use of a di¤erent proxy
for the amount of credit risk in the nancial sector. We also contribute by using
a di¤erent econometric approach to test the suitability of the business indicators
for countercyclical provisioning. This chapter takes into consideration that bank
protability is driven by loan losses and inuenced by credit risk in a recession in
conformity with Bolt et al. (2011) and uses an ex post proxy for the determination
of the amount of credit risk present in the nancial market. Our method of research
is much less sophisticated than the already present econometric methods in current
literature (for example McNeil & Wendin (2007), Figlewski (2006), Koopman et al.
(2009), and others). This chapter di¤ers in two aspects from this strand of literature.
Firstly the goal of this chapter is not to nd an optimal method for predicting the
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probability of default of a loan portfolio or determining the systemic risk factors
present within the corporate default rates. The goal of this chapter is to determine
an indicator that can be used in a method for countercyclical provisioning by banks.
We therefor use an o¤-the-shelf regression and an out-of-sample forecast method and
do not integrate rm-specic or bank-specic determinants in our model. The second
aspect that di¤ers in our approach is the comparison between the indicators and our
proxy in The Netherlands and The United States of America. In the conclusion we
give a preview of how the indicators can be used to form a countercyclical provision.
Asset based lending is not a subject of extensive academic research. Asset based
lending is characterized by an inelastic demand for loans and is situated in between
transaction based lending and relationship lending. Small businesses with a high
risk prole are the prime borrowers of asset based lenders. Current literature an-
alyzes the consequences of relationship banking (Boot (2000), Houston and James
(2001), Berger and Udell (2006)) and transaction based lending (Boot & Thakor
(2000)). The close monitoring of asset based lenders brings about a steep learning
curve concerning the risk prole of their borrowers, see Rajan & Winton (1995).
The combination of learning by monitoring and short term contracts ensures that
asset based lenders can easily adapt the loan terms based on the information they
receive. The combination of a dynamic borrowersmarket (where borrowers enter
and default), an inelastic demand for loans and the use of convenants and collat-
eral distinguishes asset based lenders from other nancial institutions. An analysis
of the combination of these market, borrower and lender characteristics is, to our
knowledge, not present in current literature. We contribute to current literature
by characterizing the complete set of Nash equilibria in a duopoly with incomplete
information, learning and a dynamic borrowersmarket. In our model there are
cohorts of borrowers with a high risk prole, cohorts of borrowers with a low risk
prole and two asset based lenders. The market is characterized by adverse selection
of high risk borrowers and the lack of a pure strategy equilibrium. We contribute
to current literature through the analysis of the division of high risk and low risk
borrowers over the di¤erent periods in which asset based lenders o¤er interest rates.
We nd that the probability of switching for low risk borrowers depends on the rel-
ative size and riskiness of the low risk borrowers in comparison to the total market.
We also nd that the interest rate o¤ered to low risk borrowers increases when the
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probability of default for the high risk borrowers increases.
The probability of default has received, in comparison to the other components
of credit risk, most attention in academic literature (amongst others Wilcox (1971)
and Scott (1981)). Only fairly recent the attention has shifted towards the analysis
of the loss given default (amongst others Gupton et al. (2000), Gupton and Stein
(2002) and Altman et al. (2003)). Our analysis contributes to current literature
in two aspects. The rst aspect concerns the percentage lifetime characteristic of
a defaulted bond that is included in our analysis. The percentage lifetime of a
defaulted bond gives an indication of the timeperiod between the default date and the
issue date of the bond in comparison to its duration (the numerator of this variable is
referred to in literature as the time to default). The percentage lifetime of defaulted
bonds is of signicant inuence on the distribution of recovery rates. This result
implies a (signicant) correlation between the time to default in comparison to bond
duration and the loss given default of bonds. To our knowledge this correlation is not
yet been analyzed in literature. The second aspect of our analysis that contributes
to current literature is the result that the recovery rates of defaulted bonds are best
modelled through a truncated Weibull distribution.
Chapter 2
Financial Market Stability Fund
This policy chapter introduces a new method of countercyclical loan loss provisioning
for banks. This method takes into account the link between the solvency and liquidity
position of banks1.
2.1 Introduction
"Conservatism of Dutch banks damages their shareholders. The stub-
bornness of the banks, which they use to hold on to their secrecy con-
cerning the size of their VAR-provisions2, prevents a clear assessment of
the nancial power of banks."
Above mentioned quote is from a Dutch newspaper, De Volkskrant (1995, 03-
24), revealing the time frame in which essential decisions were made concerning
accounting standards, transparency of banks and risk management. The quote was
at the start of the dismissal of the formation of provisions for general banking risks
(the so called VAR-provisions) by Dutch banks. The intransparency concerning
these provisions and the use of these provisions for "income-smoothing" were seen
as detrimental for shareholder value and other stakeholders. As a consequence VAR-
provisions were no longer permitted. This and other "shareholder value enhancing"
changes increased the gearing in the banking sector. In view of the current nancial
1I would like to thank André Lucas, Maarten Pronk and Job Swank for their valuable comments
on earlier versions of this chapter.
2This abbreviation stands for "voorziening algemene risicos" (provision general banking risks)
or in plain Dutch "de stroppenpot". We refer to appendix 2A for the original quote.
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turmoil the call for the strengthening of the balance sheets of banks has risen and
so have the opportunities to avoid the disadvantages of the former VAR-provisions.
In the available literature there is no general agreement on the denition of -
nancial stability. By some authors it is linked to the economys performance (Chant
(2003)), the absence of crises or instability (Crockett (1996) and Norwegian Central
Bank (2003)) or the e¢ cient performance of the nancial system (Deutsche Bun-
desbank (2003)). The aspect of nancial stability that we focus on, is managing of
nancial risks and absorbing shocks by the nancial system (Houben et al. (2004)).
One policy instrument that can be used to mitigate risks and absorb shocks is in-
stalling a nancial safety net for banks. Countercyclical provisions for loan losses
and the introduction of a liquidity requirement that is linked to the solvency position
of the bank can be part of this nancial safetynet.
Banks are known to show procyclical behavior (p.e. Borio et al. (2001), Berger
& Udell (2006) and Bikker & Metzemakers (2005)): they expand lending activities
and value the risks involved as low in an expansion stage of the economy and they
tighten credit supply and value the risks involved as high in a recession. Counter-
cyclical provisioning can counteract the procyclical behavior of banks. Whilst some
academic papers show increased liquidity can increase banking instability (Wag-
ner (2006)), others claim liquidity requirements may be more e¤ective than capital
bu¤ers (Cifuentes et al. (2005)). In this chapter we discuss the inuence of the
liquidity requirements on the solvency of banks. We also show that our proposal for
a Financial Market Stability Fund can counteract the procyclical behavior of banks
and provide a nancial safety net.
This chapter introduces a new method of forming loan loss provisions for banks
and links this provisioning method to liquidity requirements. We present a new
method of countercyclical provisioning for loan losses in this chapter to optimize the
use of detailed loan loss knowledge within the banks and minimize subjectivity in
provisioning. The minimization of subjectivity benets the veriability of the used
provisions by banks and restricts the cyclicality. The new provisioning method takes
into account the di¤erent distributions of high risk and low risk assets within the
banks and recommends to use a multiplier , that is established by the nancial reg-
ulator. This multiplier will tone down provisioning in a downturn of the cycle and
raise provisioning in an upturn of the cycle. Our multiplier takes into consideration
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the risk prole the di¤erent banks have. Transferring part of this loan loss provision
() to a Financial Market Stability Fund, governed by the nancial regulator, gives
recognition to the correlation between the solvency position and liquidity position
of a bank. A Financial Market Stability Fund is a policy measure for a nancial
regulator to control the credit channel and money supply. Although academic lit-
erature (Diamond & Rajan, 2005) recognizes the interaction between liquidity and
solvency of banks, current loan loss provisioning literature does not model the in-
teraction between bank solvency and liquidity. Our proposal for a Financial Market
Stability Fund has the following advantages in comparison to the current loan loss
provisioning models in literature:
 The provisioning form we propose behaves counter-cyclical, instead of toning
down the pro-cyclical behavior of banks concerning loan loss provisions (de
Lis et al. (2000)) or implementing an a-cyclical form of loan loss provisioning
(Burroni et al. (2009));
 Our provisioning form places emphasis on the inuence of loan losses on bank
prots in a downturn (as is shown by Bolt et al. (2011)) of the economic cycle
as a disrupting factor of nancial stability, contrary to adapting equity capital
(Repullo et al. (2010)). We use a multiplier to enlarge or reduce the loan loss
provisions;
 The use of a Financial Market Stability Fund links the risk-prole of the banks
loan portfolio, their solvency position and the banks liquidity position. Cur-
rent loan loss provisioning literature does not link the risk-prole of the banks
loan portfolio to their liquidity position, even though loan losses do inevitably
cause friction within the liquidity forecast of a bank;
We also discuss the impact a Financial Market Stability Fund on current year
report regulation, IFRS, and bank regulation in the form of Basel II and III in
contrast to existing literature.
This chapter is structured as follows: section two discusses related literature.
Section three describes the basic theoretical model that is used in this chapter and
section four introduces a new form of countercyclical provisioning for banks. Section
ve compares Spanish statistical provisioning and Italian dynamic provisioning to
the new provisioning model described in section four. The next section introduces a
new form of regulation to link the solvency position of banks to their liquidity posi-
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tion. Section seven shows the implications of the new provision form on IFRS, Basel
II and Basel III. The nal section of this chapter concludes and gives indications for
further research.
2.2 Related literature
The related literature for this chapter can be divided in two strands of literature.
The rst strand concerns recently published regulation for banks and the second
strand of literature concerns the procyclicality of and provisioning for loan losses by
nancial institutions.
Basel III (2010) was published in December 2010 and suggests additive measures
to ensure nancial stability. The additive measures include limiting the denitions of
tier-1 and tier-2 capital, the introduction of a Capital Conservation Bu¤er and two
liquidity measures. Also a countercyclical capital bu¤er was introduced in Basel III.
The aim of this countercyclical bu¤er is to ensure that the capital requirements take
into account the macro-nancial environment in which banks operate. Although
Basel III only recently (December 2010) introduced the countercyclical bu¤er, in
academic literature countercyclical capital requirements and the procyclicality of
banks has already been a debated subject, well before the publication of Basel III.
Daesik & Santomero (1988) analyze the e¤ect of bank capital regulation on risk
behavior of banks. They conclude that risk-weighted capital reduces risky bank be-
havior if the risk weights are based on the expected return, their variance-covariance
structure and the upperbound of insolvency risk. Rochet (1992) reaches a similar
conclusion. If banks behave as utility maximizing portfolio managers, risk based
capital requirements are a relevant instrument but only if the risk weights are pro-
portional to the systemic risks of the assets. De Lis et al. (2000) acknowledge
the procyclical behavior of bank lending and introduce a new (statistical) provi-
sioning method for Spanish banks (this method is discussed in this chapter). After
the introduction of Basel II (2006) many academic papers focus on the possibility of
procyclical behavior due to Basel II. Pederzolli & Torricelli (2005) propose a forward-
looking model for time-varying capital requirements, with this model they want to
counteract the procyclicality of Basel II on capital requirements. Repullo & Suarez
(2009) show in a dynamic equilibrium model that Basel II bu¤ers are insu¢ cient
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to prevent a signicant contraction in the supply of credit at the arrival of a reces-
sion. The combination of relationship lending and the frictions in banksaccess to
equity markets has the potential to cause signicant cyclical swings in the supply of
credit. Caprio (2010) examines the countercyclical provisioning method in Spain and
Colombia and concludes that these methods are not capable of preventing an asset
bubble. Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010) try to determine if the measures in
Basel III could prevent another crisis. They conclude that Basel III has some helpful
proposals, but also some major concerns with regard to the use of regulatory arbi-
trage by banks and the use of the shadow banking system. Drehmann et al. (2010)
nd that a system-wide approach for countercyclical provisioning would be better
than bank-specic. De Lis & Herrero (2010) empirically compare the countercyclical
provisioning methods of Spain (implemented in 2000), Colombia (implemented in
2007) and Peru (implemented in 2008). They advocate a rule-based system with
the use of both provisioning and additional capital to strengthen banksbalance
sheets. Marcucci and Quagliariello (2009) analyze the e¤ect of the business cycle
on bank credit risk. They nd that not only the e¤ects of the business cycle are
more pronounced during recessions, but cyclicality is also higher for those banks
with riskier portfolios. Bolt et al. (2011) establish the drivers for bank protability
in a recession and in an upturn of the business cycle. In an economic downturn bank
protability is primarily driven by loan losses and in an economic upturn historical
long-term interest rates determine the result. Both these results advocate the use
of countercyclical provisioning. Repullo and Saurina (2011) empirically assess the
application of the credit-to-GDP gap to form countercyclical provisions for the UK.
They conclude that the use of the credit-to-GDP gap might not dampen the pro-
cyclicality of bank capital regulation and may even exacerbate it. They also discuss
some measures that might have a di¤erent outcome, for example a multiplier where
they compare current GDP growth to its long term average to establish a multiplier
for the capital requirements.
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2.3 Balance sheet restrictions and a capital re-
quirement
As the basis for our analysis, we use the model of Peek & Rosengren (1995) to
analyze the inuence of the di¤erent provisioning methods on solvency position of a
bank3. We use a one-period model and assume that no provisioning for loan losses
has occurred in the previous period4. We also assume that a bank cannot obtain any
new equity. The bank is presumed to have one sort of asset: loans (Lt), consisting
of good (low-risk) loans and bad (high-risk) loans where x is the ratio of good loans
in comparison to the total amount of loans. The liability side of the balance sheet
of the bank consists of equity (Et), loan loss provisions (Rt) and deposits (Dt). The
balance sheet constraint requires the asset side of the balance sheet to be equal to
the liability side of the balance sheet:
xLt + (1  x)Lt = Et +Rt +Dt (2.1)
We use the same hypothesis as Peek & Rosengren (1995) that in the loan market
and deposit market the amount of deposits and loans the bank can attain, depends
on the interest rate they o¤er borrowers (rL) and depositors (rD) in comparison to
the mean rate in the market (rL,rD). The amount of loans and deposits a bank can
attract are given by the following functions:
Lt = g(rL; rL) (2.2)
Dt = f(rD; rD) (2.3)
The Basel Committee demands a capital asset ratio () based on the risk-weighted
assets. The Basel Committee assigns di¤erent risk weights5 to the di¤erent loan
groups. The good loans have a risk weight of 0:5 (this is the risk weight Basel II
assigns to A+ to A  loans) and the bad loans have a risk weight of 1:5 (this is the
3Peek & Rosengren (1995) use this theoretical model to show that a loss of banking capital
resulting in binding capital requirements will cause a bank to behave di¤erently than it would if
the requirements were not binding. They also use the model to distinguish between the e¤ects of
loan demand shocks and bank capital constraints.
4See appendix 2B for a list of notation and variables.
5Paragraph 66 of "International convergence of capital measurement and capital standards" A
Revised Framework Comprehensive version, June 2006, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision;
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risk-weight Basel II assigns to loans below BB ). Basel III demands a total capital
requirement of   0:086. The capital requirement is given as follows:
Et + eRt   [0:5xLt + 1:5(1  x)Lt]
or
Et + eRt  (1:5  x)Lt (2.4)
Not all loan loss provisions (Rt) are included in the capital requirement of Basel III,
those that are included are depicted by eRt, where eRt < Rt. According to the Basel
accord a general loan loss provision can be ascribed to Tier-2 capital7. A loan loss
provision qualies for Tier-2 capital if it is held against future, presently unidentied
losses and if it is freely available to meet loan losses which subsequently materialize8.
A specic loan loss provision based on ex post credit risk does not qualify as Tier-2
capital. We assume that banks maximize prots (t) and the prots are assumed to
be the di¤erence between the interest income on loans (rLLt) and the interest costs
on deposits (rDDt) and the costs of provisioning (Rt)9. The bank prot is stated:
t = rLLt  Rt   rDDt (2.5)
The maximization problem of bank prot can be stated as a Lagrangian, where
the Lagrangian multiplier  is associated with the capital ratio constraint. If we
substitute equations (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4) in equation (2.5) the prot maximizing
problem is stated:
max = [rLg(rL; rL)  rDf(rD; rD)] Rt + 
h
Et + eRt   (1:5  x)Lti (2.6)
where the height of the provision Rt depends on the applied provisioning method.
We assume that the capital ratio is binding, that is  6= 0. The capital requirement
6The Basel Committee demands a minimum total capital requirement of 8% of the risk-weighted
assets at all times for 2013-2019 (Annex 4). The minimum total capital consists of Tier-1 capital
and Tier-2 capital (page 12 part 1).
7Paragraph 60 and 61 of "Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks
and banking systems", December 2010, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision;
8General loan loss provisions can only be included in Tier-2 capital up to a maximum of 1.25
percentage points of credit risk-weighted risk assets calculated under the standardised approach.
In this chapter we assume the general loan loss provisions remain under this threshold of 1.25
percentage points.
9We assume that in the previous period no provisioning has taken place.
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 is of negative inuence on bank prot, as is shown in equation (2.6). Prot
maximization and a binding capital constraint of   0:08, will bring about that
the bank keeps the total capital ratio at its minimum (that is  = 0:08). Without
provisioning (Rt = 0) and with a binding capital ratio, the solvency of the bank is
stated as follows:
Et   (1:5  x)Lt = 0
Et=Dt =
(1:5  x)
1  (1:5  x) (2.7)
The ratio equity-debt in that case does not only depend on the capital asset ratio,
, but also on the ratio good and bad loans (x).
In the di¤erent models for countercyclical provisioning discussed in the next
sections di¤erent forms of credit risk are recognized:
1. ex ante credit risk (based on historical data): this is the risk of default of
a specic loan subset or the total amount of loans. The measurement of this form
of credit risk is based on the historical data of the bank (banks should within their
measurement of these risks at least include a period that contains a recession and
an upturn of the economy). When the bank issues a loan she can already, based on
the historical data, determine the ex ante credit risk of the loan.
2. ex post credit risk (based on historical data): this is the risk that occurs when
impairing loans during the term of the loan. The probability of default increases
when it appears that the issuer of the loan has nancial distress, has an actual breach
of contract or another incurred act that raises the probability of default. Ex post
credit risk can only be determined after the event has occurred concerning a specic
loan or subset of loans.
3. estimated credit risk (based on forecasts): the bank makes an estimate of the
expected credit risk based on the current loan portfolio, macro economic factors and
the nancial forecast.
The di¤erent provisioning methods discussed in this chapter, use these di¤erent
concepts of credit risk for provisioning purposes. These di¤erent credit risk concepts
contain overlap if used simultaneously.
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2.4 Proposed new form of countercyclical provi-
sioning
In this section a revised model for countercyclical provisioning based on the basic
model mentioned in section three is introduced. Gideon et al. (2009) distinguish two
categories of loan loss provisions: specic provisions, made for debts that have been
identied as impaired or non-performing, and general provisions, made for those
debts that may turn out to be non-performing based on historical data. Because the
estimated credit risk is based on forecasts and estimates of future data, this specic
credit risk indicator is very sensitive for subjective views. If banks were to determine
the estimated credit risk for themselves, it is very likely that they will give a low
estimation of this risk factor in a upturn of the economy and a high estimate in a
recession. Thus applying this form of credit risk calculation to determine provisions
for loan losses will only amplify the cyclicality of provisioning for loan losses. Banks
with adequate risk management systems (also needed for the IRB approach of Basel
II, paragraph 7) are able to determine ex ante credit risk with historical data at
least containing one recent economic cycle (through-the-cycle-rating-systems). This
ex ante credit risk, represented by the coe¢ cient g, is not loan specic and states
that a certain percentage of all the loans on the balance sheet of the banks will
default (or result in a loss). A generic loan loss provision, based on ex ante credit
risk approximations is stated as follows:
GRt = g  Lt
where GRt is the generic loan loss provision, g the ex ante credit risk coe¢ cient
and Lt the total amount of loans on the balance sheet of the bank. The amount
that periodically has to be added or released in the prot and loss account for this
provision is:
GPt = GRt  GRt 1
where GPt is the reservation for the generic loan loss provision in the prot and loss
account. An addition to or release of the provision is dependent on the coe¢ cient g
of the current and the previous year and the total amount of loans on the balance
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sheet current and previous year. If the economy is in an upturn and the coe¢ cient g
remains unchanged, it is likely that the amount of outstanding loans on the balance
sheet of the bank rises and therefore the generic loan loss provision should also
rise. It is important that the coe¢ cient g is based on a through-the-cycle-rating-
system. For a new bank with little or no historical data (more likely to appear in
an upturn of the economy), there are no references available to determine g and the
nancial regulator should act as a determinative institution (based on data from
other banks). For banks that apply the internal-rating based approach of Basel III
and have a through-the-cycle-rating-system, the coe¢ cient g is the probability of
default (PD) times the loss given default (LGD).
The ex post credit risk coe¢ cient e is based on current and historical data. This
coe¢ cient is based on the loans that the bank has yet labeled as badloans because
of incurred acts (such as at this moment the issuer of the loan is already for three
months in default, deteriorated nancial situation of the issuer of the loan, etc.).
The ex post credit risk is represented by the coe¢ cient e and the specic loan loss
provision (provision for loan losses on bad loans) is stated as follows:
BRt = e  (1  x)Lt
where BRt is the specic loan loss provision, e is the ex post credit risk coe¢ cient
and (1 x)Lt the amount of bad loans on the balance sheet of the bank. The amount
that periodically has to be reserved in the prot and loss account for this provision
is:
BPt = BRt  BRt 1 +OL
where BPt is the reservation for the specic loan loss provision in the prot and
loss account and OL are the occurred losses on loans during that period that were
written o¤ from the provision. When the amount of bad loans on the balance sheet
reduces (possibly in an upturn of the economy), this has a positive e¤ect on prot.
It may be clear that there is some overlap in the two provisions: the generic loan
loss provision is formed for not-yet-apparent bad loans, so when these loans become
apparent bad loans and they are partly or fully provisioned for (in the bad loan loss
provision), they were partly already provisioned for in the generic loan loss provision.
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So far nothing di¤ers from the Statistical Provisioning method of Spain (de Lis et
al. (2000)). Are the two above-mentioned provisions cyclical?
 The generic loan loss provision: g, based on the ex ante credit risk coe¢ cient
should not di¤er in an upturn of the economy or a recession. This coe¢ cient is
xed and is determined by historical data of the bank concerning a complete
economic cycle. The total amount of loans usually increases during an upturn
of the economy and declines during a recession. So the absolute provision will
increase during an upturn of the economy, but the percentage of the provision
in comparison to the total amount of outstanding loans will not di¤er. The
generic loan loss provision is not cyclical.
 The specic loan loss provision: the amount of bad loans (1   x)Lt increases
during a recession. The coe¢ cient e, the ex post credit risk coe¢ cient, might
also be cyclical, because during a recession not only the probability of default
increases, but also the loss given default (determined by the ex post credit risk
e¢ cient) increases. The parameter, (1 x)Lt, as well as the coe¢ cient e of the
provision BRt are cyclical. The bad loan loss provision will behave cyclical:
increase in a recession and decrease in an upturn of the economy.
One solution to counter this cyclical pattern of the bad loan loss provision would
be to let the nancial regulator establish a variable by which both provisions are
to be multiplied (the multiplier ). The nancial regulator should be able to show
an index which reects the relative position of the current economy in the business
cycle. The countercyclical provision should be larger in good times ( > 1) and
smaller in bad times (0 <  < 1). The provisions should be altered in accordance
with this business cycle. We refer to the use of a credit-to-GDP gap measure in
Basel III10 or chapter three of this thesis. The credit-to-GDP gap can be used to
determine the multiplier , an index for the relative position of the current economic
conditions in the business cycle. Using a multiplier  2 [0; 1] decreases the calculated
loan loss provisions of banks. Using a multiplier  > 1 increases the calculated loan
loss provisions of banks. The multiplier,  2 [0; 1], decreases the calculated loan loss
provisions in a recession and increases,  > 1, the loan loss provisions in an upturn
of the economy.
The advantage of using a multiplier is that the expertise within the banks, con-
10Guidance for national authorities operating the countercyclical capital bu¤er, december 2010,
Basel Committee
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cerning the risk prole of their loan portfolio, can be fully utilized to determine the
height of both provisions and the supervisor only adjusts for the economic cycle.
The use of a multiplier takes into account the riskprole of the loan portfolio of
a bank, banks with a high riskprole have to provision more than banks with low
riskprole. The inuence of the multiplier on the balance sheet of the bank is:
GRt =   (g  Lt)
BRt =   [e  (1  x)Lt]
If we apply this provisioning method to our model, the following representation of
the loan loss provisions on the balance sheet can be given:
Rt = gLt + e(1  x)Lt
= (g + e  ex)Lt (2.8)
If we substitute equation (2.8) into (2.1), the amount of loans are as follows:
Lt =
Et +Dt
1  (g + e  ex) (2.9)
Banks adapt the size of their loan portfolio to meet the Basel III requirements. If
the requirements or provisions increase, the banks start deleveraging to reduce the
size of their loan portfolio. If the requirements or provisions decrease, banks can
expand their loanportfolio. Because the specic loan loss provision (BRt) cannot
be accounted for as capital by the Basel Accord in contrast to the general loan loss
provision (GRt), an alteration of the capital ratio occurs. If we substitute equation
(2.9) into equation (2.6) and if we assume that the capital ratio is binding (that is
 6= 0), the solvency11 of the bank is:
Et + gLt   (1:5  x)Lt = 0
Et=Dt =
(1:5  x)  g
1  (1  x)e   (1:5  x) (2.10)
11We determine the inuence of the di¤erent provisioning methods on solvency by determining
the inuence of the provisioning methods on the ratio Et=Dt. This ratio does not include the
provisions that are accounted for as Tier-2 capital ( eRt).
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The multiplier inuences the solvency of the bank at the margin:
@Et=Dt
@
=
[g + (1  x)e](1:5  x)  g
[1  (1  x)e   (1:5  x)]2
The denominator of this ratio is always positive, the numerator is negative if
g <
 (1  x)e(1:5  x)
(1:5  x)  1 . The e¤ect of the multiplier on the banks solvency,
if the bank only has good loans (x = 1) and a minimum capital requirement of
 = 0:08 is used, is
@Et=Dt
@
=
 g
1  0:5 < 0, if 0 < g < 1 and  = 0:08 (2.11)
The correlation between the multiplier and the solvency of the bank is negative if
g 2 [0; 1] and  = 0:08. This implies that if the multiplier moves upwards (from a
recession, where 0 <  < 1; towards an upturn of the economy, where  > 1), the
solvency of the bank deteriorates and when the multiplier decreases (the economy
moves from an upturn, where  > 1 to a recession, where 0 <  < 1), the bank
solvency improves. The solvency for a bank with only good loans moves in the
opposite direction of the economic cycle. When the multiplier increases, the bank
has to increase her generic loan loss provisions. The generic loan loss provisions
are accounted for as Tier-2 capital. The prot maximizing behavior of the bank
will keep the capital requirement at  = 0:08 (we refer to equation (2.6)), therefor
a substitution e¤ect occurs: the banker substitutes Tier-1 equity with the Tier-2
generic loan loss reserve. An increase in the multiplier as a consequence of prot
maximizing behavior, deteriorates the solvency position of the bank.
The e¤ect of the multiplier  on the solvency of a bank with a lot of bad loans
(x = 0) is:
@Et=Dt
@
=
1:5(g + e)  g
[1  e   1:5]2 (2.12)
The impact of a change in the multiplier  on the solvency position of a bank with a
lot of bad loans is less obvious. If we apply the Basel capital requirement of  = 0:08,
the e¤ect of the multiplier on solvency of the bank with bad loans is positive if:
@Et=Dt
@
=
1:5(g + e)  g
[1  e   1:5]2 > 0, if g <
1:5
1  1:5e and  = 0:08 (2.13)
The condition g < 1:5
1 1:5e is met, if we apply the parameters of de Lis et al. (2000)
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concerning ex ante credit risk, 0:005  g  0:01, and ex post credit risk, 0:1 
e  112. The correlation between the multiplier and the solvency of a bank with bad
loans is positive under the mentioned conditions.
This seems a remarkable result, but this result is caused by two opposing forces.
It is important to emphasize that in our model banks adapt their loan amount
accordingly to their funding options. If the multiplier  in our model increases
(the economy moves from a recession, where 0 <  < 1; towards an upturn, where
 > 1), the general loan loss reserve GRt and the specic loan loss reserve BRt
increase. The increase in the general loan loss reserve causes the same substitution
e¤ect as is present for banks with only good loans: the banks replace their equity
capital (Et decreases) with the Tier-2 general loan loss reserve to meet the minimum
capital requirement of equation (2.6). An e¤ect that is not present in the portfolio
of banks with only good loans (x = 1) is the following. The specic loan loss reserve
is not accounted for as Tier-2 capital. The increase in the specic loan loss reserve
causes the bank with a lot of bad loans to adapt their loan amount accordingly: the
bank with a lot of bad loans starts deleveraging (decrease in Lt and Dt). So if the
multiplier moves upwards (the economy moves from a recession, where 0 <  < 1;
towards an upturn, where  > 1) banks with a lot of bad loans are forced to sell part
of their loan portfolio (deleverage). We refer to this e¤ect as the deleverage-e¤ect.
Where a bank with only good loans (x = 1) is only a¤ected by the substitution-e¤ect
(as a consequence of the general loan loss reserve), the bad bank endures two e¤ects
as a result of a change in the multiplier : the substitution-e¤ect (as a consequence
of the general loan loss reserve) and the deleverage-e¤ect (as a consequence of the
specic loan loss reserve)13. The substitution-e¤ect caused by an increase in the
general loan loss reserve is dominated by the deleverage-e¤ect caused by the increase
of the specic loan loss reserve14 as a result an increase of the multiplier  has a
positive e¤ect on the solvency of banks with only bad loans.
12If we plug in  = 0:08 and the lower boundary of e (e = 0:1) in the condition g < 1:51 1:5e
of equation (2.13), this results in g < 0:0136. Because the upper boundary of g according to the
conditions of de Lis et al.(2000) is 1%, the condition g < 1:51 1:5e is always met if 0:005  g  0:01
and 0:1  e  1.
13This also implies that there is a bank with a ratio of good and bad loans x = , where the
multiplier does not inuence the solvency of the bank because the negative substitution-e¤ect is
equal to the positive deleverage-e¤ect. We did not calculate this  in this chapter.
14In the numerator of equation (2.13) the impact of the general loan loss reserve is less (1:5g g)
than the impact of the specic loan loss reserve (1:5e) under the conditions that 0:005  g  0:01,
and ex post credit risk, 0:1  e  1.
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To conclude we state that in a recession the provisions are (gradually) downsized
or underestimated through the multiplier , this has a positive e¤ect on the prot-
and loss account and limits deleveraging by banks15. During a recession the occurred
losses, OL, will increase and will therefore downsize prot. In an upturn of the
economy the provisions are increased or overestimated through the multiplier ,
this has a negative e¤ect on prot and will insure a larger loan loss provision. The
multiplier downsizes the cyclical behavior of banks and ensures a higher provision
in upturns of the economy and a lower provision in a recession, while distinguishing
between banks with a lot of bad loans and banks with a lot of good loans.
2.5 Review of other models for countercyclical
provisioning
2.5.1 Statistical provisioning for loan losses in Spain (de Lis
et al. (2000))
De Lis et al. (2000) present a new form of provisioning for loan losses, named
statistical provisioning:
"The statistical provision is aimed at a proper accounting recognition
of ex ante credit risk. Expected loan losses exist from the moment a loan
is granted. This should be reected in the risk premium included in
the price of credit and hence in the income stream coming from the
loan since its very beginning. Therefore it seems logical to build up the
corresponding provision for loan losses also at that time."
De Lis et al. (2000) recognize three sorts of provisions for loan losses. The rst
one is a general provision (GRt), which reserves a xed amount depending on the
total amount of outstanding loans (Lt). The general provision is not dependent on
the downturn of upturn of the economic cycle (p.e. in a downturn of the economic
15If we move into a recession the multiplier decreases, causing a decrease in general and specic
loan loss reserve. This will result in more free reserves for bad banks to fund their loan portfolio
(or to counter the increased risk prole of their borrowers). This should counter their cyclical
behavior, where the downfall of the economy increases the risk prole of their loan portfolio and
banks are inclined to start deleveraging. The multiplier counters this cyclical behavior of banks.
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cycle, the amount of outstanding loans will not di¤er as a consequence of the re-
cession, but the acknowledged risks on these outstanding loans will). The general
provision on the balance sheet can be illustrated as follows:
GRt = g  Lt
where Lt stands for total loans and g for the parameter (between 0,5% and 1%).
The annual addition to the provision in the prot& loss account can be shown as
follows:
GPt = g L
where GP is the annual addition to the provision and L is Lt   Lt 1;
The second provision is a specic provision (SRt) which aims at covering impaired
assets (ex post credit risk). The specic provision is procyclical: as the recession
appears, impaired assets will increase and therefore the specic provision will need
to increase. The specic provision on the balance sheet can be illustrated as follows:
SRt = e  (1  x)Lt
where (1  x)Lt are the impaired high risk loans and e is the parameter for ex post
credit risk (between 10% and 100%). The annual addition to the provision on the
prot & loss account can be given as follows:
SPt = e  (1  x)L
where SPt is the annual addition to the provision.
The third provision is the statistical provision StRt. The statistical provision is
intended to anticipate the next economic cycle rather than to reect past ones. Banks
can base the statistical provision on their internal models or a standard approach
to estimate Loss Given Default (LGD) and the Probability of Default (PD) in
accordance with the Basel II Approach. The working paper of Banco de Espana
uses other determinants, but the implication is identical: nancial products are
given a certain risk label corresponding with a certain percentage of provisioning
(p.e. high risk, credit card balances implies 1.5% provisioning). The percentages
vary from 0% to 1.5% provisioning depending on the risk category of the loan. The
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statistical provision on the balance sheet can be illustrated as follows:
StRt = StPt + StRt 1
with a limit of 0  StRt  3LRt, where LRt stands for Latent Risk of outstanding
loan amount. The annual addition to the provision on the prot & loss account can
be given as follows:
StPt = LRt   SPt = (s  Lt)  (1  x)L
where LRt stands for Latent Risk of outstanding loan amount and s for the average
coe¢ cient for the statistical provision (between 0% and 1.5%) and StPt = LRt SPt
where StPt is the annual addition to the specic provision. Above-mentioned formula
raises the specic provision (SRt) when the expected loss on the outstanding loans
(LRt) is higher than provisioned for and decreases the specic provision (SRt) when
the expected loss on the outstanding loans (LRt) is lower than provisioned for.
If we would apply this provisioning method to our model, the following repre-
sentation can be given for the loan loss provision on the balance sheet:
Rt = gLt + e(1  x)Lt + sLt   e(1  x)Lt (2.14)
= (g + s)Lt
Notice that the specic loan loss provision for bad loans has no e¤ect on the total
amount of the loan loss provisions (so regardless of the riskprole of a loan portfolio,
the same amount is reserved). If we substitute equation (2.14) into (2.1), the amount
of loans can be stated as follows:
Lt =
Et +Dt
1  (g + s) (2.15)
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If we substitute equation (2.15) into equation (2.6) and if we assume that the capital
ratio is binding (that is  6= 0), the solvency16 of the bank is:
Et +Rt   (1:5  x)Lt = 0 (2.16)
Et=Dt =
(1:5  x)  (g + s)
1  (1:5  x)
E¤ect of a change in the statistical provision on solvency of the bank at the margin
is:
@(Et=Dt)
@s
=
 1
1  (1:5  x) < 0 if x 2 [0; 1] and  = 0:08 (2.17)
An increase in the requested height of the statistical provision (an increase in s)
has a negative e¤ect on the solvency of the bank. The negative e¤ect is larger for
banks with more bad loans (when x moves towards 0 a bank has increasingly more
bad loans). If the amount of statistical provision increases, which also accounts for
the demanded capital requirement of the Basel committee, equation (2.4), the bank
might have a tendency to keep a lower amount of equity on her balance sheet in
comparison to the case without provisioning, equation (2.7). A substitution e¤ect
takes place.
Some remarks concerning this provisioning method are:
1. The di¤erent coe¢ cients represent the di¤erent risks that are recognized: g
stands for the ex ante credit risk, e represents the ex post credit risk and s
stands for the estimated credit risk. Although not specically mentioned in
de Lis et al. (2000), it is essential that the estimated credit risk is not under
the inuence of bank managers themselves. Because of the biased vision of the
banks concerning risk, this will not ensure the countercyclical e¤ects of the
provision. If the coe¢ cient concerning the estimated credit risk coe¢ cient (s)
is left to decide to bank institutions, the disaster myopia of banks will remain.
2. The provisions for losses on loans the balance sheet can be represented as
follows:
TRt = GRt + SRt + StRt
= (g + s)Lt + eL
B
t 1 + StRt 1;
16We determine the inuence of the di¤erent provisioning methods on solvency by determining
the inuence of the provisioning methods on the ratio Et=Dt. This ratio does not include the
provisions that are accounted for as Tier-2 capital ( eRt).
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In the formula only the percentage of impaired high risk loans from period
t   1 is accounted for on the balance sheet. This may have some downside
e¤ects. If in the last year a bank has not done very well and has sold more
loans with a higher risk prole in period t than in previous years, the result
of this raise in high risk loans will not be visible until two periods afterwards
(when that period of the raise becomes t   1). The balance sheet does not
provide a fair view of the current needed provisions for bad loans and o¤ers
banks a possibility to postpone foreseen losses on bad loans.
3. The coe¢ cients concerning ex ante risk (g) and estimated credit risk (s) are
used to provision an amount of the current outstanding loans per balance
sheet date. When g is determined by a through-the-cycle calculation and s is
determined based on a forecast, the coe¢ cients g and s will include some of
the same probabilities of default and losses.
4. Prot and loss account: the total amount of the addition to or release of the
provisions on the balance sheet:
TPt = GPt + SPt + StPt
= (g + s)Lt   gLt 1;
The addition to or release of the total amount of provisions in the prot and
loss account is maximized to 2.5% (maximum of g is 1%, maximum of s is 1,5%)
of the change in the outstanding loan amount. The provision concerning the
coe¢ cient s does not concern the di¤erence between the outstanding amount
of loans previous year and current year, but each year the provision is build up
from scratch concerning the total amount of outstanding loans current year.
Also the ex post risk e and the amount of bad loans is not included in the
periodic addition or release. Theoretically the amount on the balance sheet
concerning e(1   x)Lt 1 will always be zero (because there is no build up of
the provision in the prot and loss account). The bank does not include her ex
post risk and the specic risks of her bad loans in her prot and loss account
or her balance sheet. Only the change in the total loan amount determines the
addition to or release of the total provision. The proportion of bad loans does
not inuence her balance sheet or prot and loss accounts. As a result banks
with a lot of bad loans have the same provision as banks with primarily good
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loans. This does not seem very desirable.
2.5.2 Dynamic provisioning (Burroni et al. (2009))
Burroni et al. (2009) base their model of dynamic provisioning on the concept of
expected losses. They specically mention that this concept of expected losses is not
based on the IRB-approach of Basel II, whereas in the IRB-approach the expected
losses are based on the current Loss Given Default and Probability of Default. The
expected losses in their model are based on long-term averages of losses recorded
in the past. It is mentioned that when a bank adopts through-the-cycle-rating
systems for her calculations concerning Loss Given Default and the Probability of
Default, the denition for the expected losses in this model will denitely approach
the denition as is mentioned in the IRB-approach. Burroni et al. (2009) state that
the dynamic provision for banks is given by:
DPt = ( L)  SPt (2.18)
where  is the average long-run expected losses, L is the ow of new loans and
SPt is the ow of specic provisions. Equation (2.18) concerns the income statement
and not the balance sheet. The balance sheet will show a specic provision, which
is not explicitly mentioned in Burroni et al. (2009), but it appears that the specic
provision is formed for impaired losses (ex post credit risk). The total provisions on
the balance sheet (TRt) is the sum of the dynamic provision (DRt) and the specic
provision (SRt) and can be stated as follows:
TRt = DRt + SRt
TRt =   Lt
where  is the average long-run expected losses and Lt is the total amount of loans
on the balance sheet. The dynamic provision on the balance sheet can then be given
as follows:
DRt = (  Lt)  SRt
In a recession (when the specic provision SRt will be high because of impaired
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losses) there will be less or no build up of the dynamic provision. In an upturn of
the economy, when the specic provision is low, there will be a higher build up of
the provisions until it reaches the limit of   Lt.
If we would apply this provisioning method to our model of section (2.3), the
loan loss provision on the balance sheet is:
Rt = aLt (2.19)
If we substitute equation (2.19) into (2.1), the amount of loans is:
Lt =
Et +Dt
1  a (2.20)
If we substitute equation (2.20) into equation (2.6) and if we assume that the capital
ratio is binding (that is  6= 0), the solvency17 of the bank is:
Et +Rt   (1:5  x)Lt = 0
Et=Dt =
(1:5  x)  a
1  (1:5  x) (2.21)
The inuence of the coe¢ cient a on the solvency position of the bank is at the
margin is:
@(Et=Dt)
@a
=
 1
1  (1:5  x) < 0 if x 2 [0; 1] and  = 0:08 (2.22)
An increase in the requested height of the statistical provision (an increase in a)
has a negative e¤ect on the solvency of the bank. The negative e¤ect is larger
for banks with more bad loans (when x moves towards 0 a bank has increasingly
more bad loans). The e¤ect on solvency does not di¤er between the statistical
provision, equation (2.17), and the dynamic provision, equation (2.22). If the amount
of statistical or dynamic provision increases, which also accounts for the demanded
capital requirement of the Basel committee, equation (2.4), the bank might have a
tendency to keep a lower amount of equity on her balance sheet in comparison to
the case without provisioning, equation (2.7). A substitution e¤ect takes place.
17We determine the inuence of the di¤erent provisioning methods on solvency by determining
the inuence of the provisioning methods on the ratio Et=Dt. This ratio does not include the
provisions that are accounted for as Tier-2 capital ( eRt).
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Some remarks concerning this provisioning method can be made:
1. The amount of total provisions (TRt) in comparison to the total amount of
outstanding loans (Lt) does not change over the years (unless the coe¢ cient 
changes). The total provision therefore is not dynamic, but xed as a percent-
age of the outstanding loans over the years. The coe¢ cient  represents pro-
visioning through the cycle and will therefor have a static coe¢ cient through
the cycle. But the loan portfolio of a bank is not static and the risk prole
of this loan portfolio over time might change. This provisioning method does
not take into account the changes in the risk prole of the loan portfolio of the
specic bank.
2. The dotation to the provisions for loan losses is over time equal to   Lt,
regardless of the current macro-economic cycle. This type of provisioning
is acyclical (regardless of macro-economic cycle) in stead of countercyclical
(moving opposite of the macro-economic cycle).
If we compare the e¤ect of the di¤erent provisioning methods (new provisioning
method, statistical provisioning method and dynamic provisioning method) on the
solvency of banks, it is clear that the e¤ect of the parameter of the statistical pro-
vision, equation (2.17) and the dynamic provision, equation (2.22) is very similar.
For banks with a lot of bad loans (x = 0) the e¤ect of the statistical or dynamic
provision is
@(Et=Dt)
@s
=
@(Et=Dt)
@a
=
 1
1  1:5 < 0 if  = 0:08 (2.23)
where for the proposed new provisioning method the e¤ect of the multiplier for a
bank with a lot of bad loans (x = 0) is:
@Et=Dt
@
=
1:5(g + e)  g
[1  e   1:5]2 > 0, if g <
1:5
1  1:5e and  = 0:08
The e¤ect of the statistical and dynamic provisioning method on the solvency of a
bank with bad loans is driven by the substitution e¤ect, where an increase of the
additive (!) dynamic and statistical provision increase Tier-2 capital, which can
substitute (partly) Tier-1 equity capital. Our provisioning method does not demand
an additive provision but enlarges or reduces the general loan loss and specic loan
loss provision that are yet present within the bank. A bank with a lot of bad loans
is therefor forced, when the economy moves from a downturn to an upturn (and
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the multiplier increases) to sell o¤ part of its loan portfolio. Deleveraging at that
moment should prevent the bank with a lot of bad loans to do so at a point in time
when the recession is at its peak. If we compare the impact of the provisioning
forms on the solvency of banks with a lot of good loans (x = 1), the e¤ect of the
statistical and dynamic provision on the solvency of banks with a lot of good loans
is:
@(Et=Dt)
@s
=
@(Et=Dt)
@a
=
 1
1  0:5 < 0 if  = 0:08
The impact of the new provisioning form on the solvency of banks with a lot of good
loans is:
@Et=Dt
@
=
 g
1  0:5 < 0, if 0 < g < 1 and  = 0:08
it is clear that the impact of the new provisioning form on the solvency of banks with
a lot of good loans (x = 1) is less than the impact of the statistical and dynamic
provisioning form, if g is less than 1. In stead of levelling the impact of a counter-
cyclical provision over the banks with di¤erent risk proles, the new provisioning
form places emphasis on the banks with the more risky portfolios. This is in con-
formity with Marcucci and Quagliariello (2009), who show that the procyclicality of
nancial institutions is higher for those nancial institutions that have riskier port-
folios. During the current nancial crisis we also observed that nancial institutions
with a high risk prole (with a lot of bad loans) appeared to have larger liquidity
and solvency problems18.
2.6 Linking solvency to liquidity: Financial Mar-
ket Stability Fund
The inuence of provisioning on the solvency of banks is quite clear. You oblige
banks to nance (a part of) their (yet apparent or still not yet apparent) losses
present within the outstanding loans on the asset side with their own capital (in
the form of a provision) instead of leverage. The losses on loans, yet provisioned
for, will not have a prot & loss account e¤ect19 anymore. But the liquidity fore-
18Amongst others Cornett et al (2011) who show that banks with illiquid assets are more bound
to deleveraging.
19This is only true if the realized losses are equal to the expected losses (where the provision is
based on). If the realized losses are larger than the expected losses included in the provision, there
will be a negative a¤ect on the prot & loss acount.
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casts based on these assets will show a gap in the (near) future, when the expected
downpayments and interest payments of the outstanding loans do not generate the
cash that was expected. Academic literature acknowledges the interaction between
the liquidity and the solvency position within banks (Diamond & Rajan (2005)).
As a consequence regulation concerning banks should not only include solvency and
liquidity regulation on a stand alone base, but recognize the correlation between the
two and implement this correlation into regulation.
Our proposal is to implement a Financial Market Stability Fund, managed by the
nancial regulator, where banks are obliged to deposit a ratio of  of their loan loss
provisions. This option has no implications for the use of IFRS, because in return
for their dotation to the fund, the banks receive a nancial asset (concerning the
Financial Market Stability Fund) on their balance sheet. These dotations are to be
tax-neutral and the receivable can only be cashed in by the bank when the nancial
stability of the bank is at stake.
The amount to be dotated to a Financial Market Stability Fund is the factor 
of the general loan loss provision and the bad loan loss provision, where 0 <  < 1.
The dotation has no prot and loss e¤ect for the bank and the nancial regulator.
The nancial regulator will receive di¤erent accounts payable on her balance sheet.
This also has a macro-economic e¤ect:
 in an upswing of the economy, the provisions for loan losses increase and the
money supply will decrease (because part of the provisions, , are parked at
the Financial Market Stability Fund). A decrease in the money supply triggers
deation in the long run. In a upturn of the economy the increase in loan loss
provisions will therefore have a stabilizing e¤ect.
 in a recession, the provisions for loan losses decrease and the money supply
will increase (because part of the provisions, , are released by the Financial
Market Stability Fund). An increase in the money supply triggers ination
in the long run. The decrease of the provisions for loan losses will have a
stabilizing e¤ect on the economy in a recession.
There are some advantages of this method over a stand alone provisioning method:
1. The nancial regulator has the option in case of nancial distress at one bank
to support that bank out of the funds of the other banks, when it appears that
the nancial asset of the distressed bank is not su¢ cient.
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2. When the Financial Market Stability Fund does not cover any interest on top
of the dotations of the banks, she indirectly makes banks pay for future help
that might be needed by them (they pay for the put-option of always receiving
government support when they are struck by nancial distress);
3. The nancial regulator can use the liquidity that is raised by the Financial
Market Stability Fund for other short-term purposes (perhaps investments in
better risk management systems for banks to further minimize risk) and also
has another instrument to control the overall amount of money in the nancial
market. The e¤ect of the Financial Market Stability Fund on the economy is
stabilizing (in a upturn the money supply will decrease and in a downturn the
money supply will increase);
If we would apply this method to our theoretical model of section (2.4), this
implies that the bank has to keep an amount of Rt on the asset side of her balance
sheet, which cannot be invested in loans. The balance sheet constraint would be
altered into:
xLt + (1  x)Lt + Rt = Et +Rt +Dt
Lt = Et + (1  )Rt +Dt (2.24)
The impact of this liquidity restriction on the solvency of a bank is (substitute
equation (2.24) into equation (2.6) and solve for  6= 0):
Et=Dt =
(1:5  x)  (1  )g
1  (1  x)e   (1:5  x)  g
@(Et=Dt)
@
=
[1  (1  x)e   g] g
[1  (1  x)e   (1:5  x)  g]2 (2.25)
The impact of the dotation  on the solvency of a bank depends on the size of
the parameters and the risk prole of the loan portfolio of the bank. If the bank
has no bad loans in her loan portfolio (x = 1), the numerator of equation (2.25) is
[1 + g] g. The numerator and denominator of equation (2.25) are both positive. If
the bank has only bad loans in her loan portfolio(x = 0), the numerator of equation
(2.25) is [1  (e+ g)] g. If (e+ g)  > 1 the impact of  on solvency is negative.
For a bad bank (e+ g)  will most likely be larger than one, if  is larger than one.
So the inuence of  on the solvency of a bad bank can be negative most likely in
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an upturn of the economy if  > 1. The positive e¤ect of  is caused by the fact
that the money that is placed at the Central Bank, cannot be used by the nancial
institution to supply loans. The impact of  on the amount of loans is20:
@Lt
@
=
  [Et +Dt] [(g + e  ex)]
[1  (1  )(g + e  ex)]2
The impact of  on the amount of loans is negative if we apply the parameters of
de Lis et al. (2000) concerning ex ante credit risk, 0:005  g  0:01, and ex post
credit risk, 0:1  e  1; and [Et +Dt] ; [(g + e  ex)] > 0. The impact on the loan
portfolio is higher for banks with a lot of bad loans21. A downfall in the amount
of loans, also causes a downfall in the height of the needed provisions. A downfall
of loan loss provisions causes an increase in the free reserves. Free reserves are
accounted for as Tier-1 capital, where general loan loss reserves are accounted for as
Tier 2 capital. The bad loan loss provisions are not accounted for as capital at all,
whereas the free reserves are. The dotation of a part of the loan loss provisions at
the Central Bank links liquidity to solvency within the banks. It also poses liquidity
and solvency restrictions on the risky behavior of banks. These restrictions should
limit the consequences of high idiosyncratic risks within banks in case of a macro
economic recession. These measures have a positive contribution to the nancial
stability of a country.
2.7 Implications for IFRS and Basel III
2.7.1 IFRS implications
The government cannot impose a countercyclical provision for loan losses under the
current IFRS rules. In this subsection we will discuss how, hypothetically speaking,
countercyclical provisioning could be embedded within the IFRS rules and where
problems would arise22. The countercyclical provision as is mentioned in the previous
sections, should be seen as an "additive capital requirement". The implementation
of this countercyclical provision should not have any e¤ect on protability.
20We substitute equation (2.24) into equation (2.8).
21If x = 0, the denominator has a larger impact on the derivative. This causes a larger negative
e¤ect for banks with a lot of bad loans.
22Given the hypothetical nature of the IFRS application, this paragraph may not reect the
views of the committee members on this topic.
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IAS 37 states the reporting standards for provisions, contingent liabilities and
contingent assets. According to IAS 37.10 the key denition of a liability is a present
obligation as a result of past events, where settlement is expected to result in an out-
ow of resources (payment). A contingent liability is dened as a possible obligation
depending on whether some uncertain future event occurs, or a present obligation
but payment is not probable or the amount cannot be measured reliably. IAS 37.86
states that a possible obligation (a contingent liability) is disclosed but not accrued.
However, disclosure is not required if payment is remote. IAS 37.2 denes provi-
sions as liabilities of uncertain timing or amount. The distinction between a liability,
contingent liability and a provision is the amount of uncertainty. A liability o¤ers
the most certainty, whereas a provision o¤ers less certainty (uncertainty concerning
timing or amount) and a contingent liability o¤ers least certainty (uncertainty con-
cerning timing and amount). Where in these denitions do our loan loss provisions
t? IFRS does not treat the loan loss provisions as are mentioned in our proposal
in section (2.4) equally, but makes a distinction between specic loan loss provisions
and general loan loss provisions. We will discuss the IFRS implications of these loan
loss reserves separately.
The specic loan loss provision BRt (based on the ex post credit risk parameter)
is treated by IFRS not as a provision but as the result of an impairment23 of the
loans according to IAS 39 and exposure draft IFRS 9. This impairment result is not
placed at the liability side of the balance sheet, but is deducted from the loan value
on the asset side of the balance sheet. The loans, Lt, are valued at amortized cost24
and presented on the balance sheet after deduction of the specic loan loss provision
23IAS 39.AG84-93: "If there is objective evidence that an impairment loss on loans and receiv-
ables or held-to-maturity investments carried at amortized cost has been incurred the amount of
the loss is measured as the di¤erence between the assets carrying amount and the present value of
estimated future cash ows (excluding future credit losses that have not been incurred) discounted
at the nancial assets original e¤ective interest rate (ie the e¤ective interest rate computed at
initial recognition). The carrying amount of the asset shall be reduced either directly or through
use of an allowance account. The amount of the loss shall be recognized in prot or loss."
24We assume that the loans fullll the conditions that are mentioned in IFRS 9.4.2 for valuation
at amortized costs: "A nancial asset qualies for amortised cost measurement only if it meets
both of the following conditions: the asset is held within a business model whose objective is to
hold assets in order to collect contractual cashows; and the contractual terms of the nancial asset
give rise on specied dates to cashows that are solely payments of principal and interest on the
principal amount outstanding. If the loans do not meet these conditions, they have to be valued
at fair value.
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(BRt)25. Disclosure is necessary in accordance with IFRS 726. We would like to
note that the character of the specic loan loss reserve (without the adjustment of
a multiplier ) behaves cyclical. In a recession the impairment of the loan portfolio
of a nancial institution will be large, whereas in an upturn of the economic cycle
the impairment will be small.
It is clear that our general loan loss reserve, GRt, does contain uncertainty, so
the denition of a liability does not t this loan loss reserve. Is the general loan loss
provision GRt (based on the ex ante credit risk parameter) a provision in the sense
of IAS 37? IAS 37.2 states that provisions can only be recognized when, and only
when the following conditions are met:
1. an entity has a present obligation (legal or constructive) as a result of a past
event;
2. it is probable (i.e. more likely than not) that an outow of resources embodying
economic benets will be required to settle the obligation; and
3. a reliable estimate can be made of the amount of the obligation.
These three conditions for the recognition of a provision are more strict than
those for the recognition of a liability (present obligation as a result of past events
and settlement is expected to result in an outow of resources). The rst condition
concerns two requirements: there has to be a present obligation and this obligation
has to be the result of a past event. A constructive obligation of the rst condition is
hard to prove. Enforced regulation by the nancial regulator would institute a legal
obligation for banks to implement our proposed method of loan loss provisioning. A
legal obligation would ensure that one part of the rst condition of IAS 37.2 is met.
In our opinion the general loan loss reserve, provisions for losses that are yet present
25We are well aware that implementation of IFRS 9 may have another e¤ect. The exposure draft
of IFRS 9 imposed a new method for impairing loans and other nancial instruments: the expected
cash ow approach. This expected cashow approach acknowledges and takes into account expected
future credit losses on loans. The currently used incurred loss model does not take into account
expected losses as a result of future events, no matter how likely. A disadvantage of this approach is
that it incorporates managements estimates based on past and future loss events on existing loans
(paragraph 33, FEE-EFRAC paper December 2009). When impairment is based on managements
opinion concerning future loss events, management myopia might arise. The disadvantages are
clearly visible: this instrument might by used by management for incomesmoothing and it has
a high likelihood of procyclicality. The procyclicality will especially arise if through-the-cycle
calculations are not used (for example because of a lack of historical data). The use of this method
will induce more subjectivity, and therefor more cyclicality and less veriability, into the reporting
system of banks and the nancial stability of the entire nancial system.
26IFRS 7 has the objective to prescribe appropriate presentation and disclosure standards for
banks and similar nancial institutions, which supplements the requirements of other Standards.
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within the current loan portfolio which are the result of a past event (that past event
is the issuance of the loan or the signing of the loan contract). But we are aware that
the "present obligation as a result of a past event"-denition should also be based
on contractual terms (more specic: the contract duration) of the loans present and
the period that is used to determine the ex ante credit risk parameter27. The second
condition that concerns the probability of an outow of resources, is questionable
in combination with our proposal. The future event of a defaulting loan will not
cause an outow of resources, but it will cause a loss and a lower amount of inow
of resources (for the defaulted borrower can no longer pay the interest and the
loan amount back). Without provisioning a defaulted loan has a negative e¤ect on
the solvency, protability and liquidity of a bank. The goal of installing a general
loan loss reserve is to tone down the e¤ect of these defaults on bank liquidity and
solvency. Even though loan losses do not cause an outow of resources, IAS 37.66-
68 also allows the recognition of a provision for an onerous loss-making contract28.
Present obligations arising under onerous contracts are recognized as provisions. So
if a bank has a loan contract that will result in a loss (and not an outow of resources,
but a reduction in the inow of resources) and have a negative e¤ect on liquidity,
according to IAS 37.66-68 this could hypothetically fulll the recognition criteria
for a provision. The third condition states that a reliable estimate of the obligation
should be made. The general loan loss reserve, GRt, uses the ex ante credit risk
coe¢ cient, which is based on the historical data of the bank (banks should within
their measurement of these risks at least include a period that contains a recession
and an upturn of the economy). When the bank issues a loan she can already, based
on the historical data, determine the ex ante credit risk of the loan. These historical
data should give the bank a reliable estimate of the loan losses that are present in the
portfolio. We are of the opinion that a general loan loss provision would satisfy the
three conditions for recognition of IAS 37.2, if enforced regulation by the nancial
regulator would institute a legal obligation. We like to emphasize that our proposal
27If the contract duration of the present loans of a nancial institution is relatively short, the
present obligation does not result from a past event. The loan losses that are then captured by
the general loan loss provision, are meant for loans that have a contract signing ate that lies in the
future. In this chapter we assume that contract duration and the determination of the ex ante risk
parameter concern teh same time period.
28We refer to the website http://www.iasplus.com/en/standards/standard36. An onerous con-
tract is considered to exist if the bank has a contract under which the unavoidable costs of meeting
the contractual obligations exceed the economic benets estimated to be received. A loss-making
contract that is.
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for a Financial Market Stability Fund has no e¤ect on the statement of income or
the prot & loss account of nancial institutions.
The nancial asset that is imposed in our proposal by the Financial Market
Stability Fund ((GRt +BRt)), is not inuenced by IFRS and should be recognized
on the asset side of the balance sheet as a nancial asset.
The multiplier  inuences the height of the provision, to an extent where there
is no direct link anymore between the underlying obligations (g Lt and e  (1 x)Lt)
and the height of the provision. The multiplier therefore challenges the second and
third recognition criterion of IAS 37.2: there is no direct link anymore between
the loan losses (and the lower amount of inow of resources) and the provision
height. The reliable estimate of condition three of IAS 37.2 is inuenced by the
multiplier and unless the nancial regulator enforces the multiplier, there is no legal
or constructive obligation to form the provision in this matter. The VAR provisions
of our quote in the introduction of this chapter are not recognized by IFRS on the
balance sheet29. Without a legal obligation by the nancial regulator, keeping a
VAR-provision only leads to disclosure of this provision and not recognition on the
balance sheet. The implementation of a Financial Market Stability Fund might not
change this procedure because of the inuence of the multiplier, but would ensure
that nancial institutions take into account the liquidity e¤ect of loan losses on their
balance sheet. The IFRS rules are not formulated to pursue macro economic goals.
2.7.2 Basel III implications
The current nancial crisis forced the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to
revise the Basel II Capital Accord, leading to the introduction of Basel III (2010).
Applying the revised model for countercyclical provisioning and a Financial Market
Stability Fund has the following consequences for the application of the Basel II and
III Accords:
 The size of the provision is not only determined by the banks, but also by the
nancial regulator (when determining  based on the macro economic cycle).
The nancial regulator therefore has a large inuence on the tier-2 capital
29IAS30.50 mentions that any amount set aside for general banking risks, including future
losses and other unforseeable risks or contingencies shall be separately disclosed as appropriations
of retained earnings. The reduction of this amount will result in an increase in the retained earnings
and will not have a prot- and loss e¤ect.
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of banks. Lowering or raising the general provision directly inuences tier-2
capital of the bank. Basel III requires the total capital ratio to be equal or
larger than 10.5% as of 1st of January 2019. As a consequence it might be
possible that the haircut of the nancial regulator (0 <  < 1) causes a bank
to have a total capital ratio that is below the required 10.5%. In an upturn
of the economy the nancial regulator will raise the general provision ( > 1)
and theoretically it might occur that the amount of tier-2 capital of a specic
bank will be larger than the amount of tier-1 capital.
 The countercyclical bu¤er will vary in between zero and 2.5%30 of the risk
weighted assets and the Committee diverts the responsibility for holding this
bu¤er to the national authorities. The Committee points out that the bu¤er
is not meant to be used as an instrument to manage economic cycles or asset
prices (page 3). They do acknowledge that the bu¤er might have implications
for monetary and scal policies. It is quite remarkable that a countercycli-
cal bu¤er for banks is not meant to be used to manage economic cycles. This
seems to contradict the very core of this measure and leaves the reader guessing
what would be the use of a countercyclical bu¤er according to the Commit-
tee. The di¤erence between our proposition for loan loss provisioning and the
countercyclical bu¤er of the Basel Committee is that the Basel Committee
uses the countercyclical bu¤er additive to other provisions and varying from
zero to 2.5%. Our form of provisioning multiplies the yet apparent loan loss
provisions inducing a decline or an increase of the overall provisions on the
balance sheet.
 In Basel III the Committee also introduces a global liquidity standard: a
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (hereafter: LCR) and a Net Stable Funding Ratio
(hereafter: NSF). The LCR is meant to promote more resilience to liquidity
disruptions over a thirty-day horizon and the NSF is meant to ensure that a
bank links the horizon of its liabilities to the horizon of its assets and reduce
the reliance on short term nancing. The Committee includes Central Bank
reserves as liquid assets to the extent that they can be drawn down in times
of stress. This would t the dotations to a Financial Market Stability Fund.
These dotations could then be included in the determination of the LCR and
30We refer to the Guidance of the Basel Committee (2010), which introduces a countercyclical
bu¤er in more detail.
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the NSF for Basel III.
Whether or not the Financial Market Stability Fund would meet the Basel III
requirements would depend on the multiplier chosen by the nancial regulator. The
correlation between solvency and liquidity positions of banks is not yet implemented
in the current regulation for banks in the form of IFRS and Basel III. While recent
nancial crises and academic literature (Diamond & Rajan, 2005) have shown that
this correlation is present, implementing measures that recognize this correlation
requires legal a¢ rmation. Not only accounting and micro-economic goals should
be achieved by the regulation of Basel III and central banks, but also the macro-
economic goal of nancial stability. As the current nancial crisis has obviously
shown.
2.8 Conclusion
This chapter introduces a new method of forming loan loss provisions for banks and
links this provisioning method to liquidity requirements. This method is compared
to current provisioning methods in literature and current regulation for banks. We
present a new method of countercyclical provisioning for loan losses to optimize the
use of detailed loan loss knowledge within the banks and minimize subjectivity in
provisioning. The minimization of subjectivity benets the veriability of the used
provisions by banks and restricts the cyclicality. The new provisioning method takes
into account the di¤erent distributions of high risk and low risk assets within the
banks and recommends to use a multiplier , that is established by the nancial
regulator. This multiplier will tone down provisioning in a downturn of the cycle
and raise provisioning in an upturn of the cycle. Transferring part of these loan loss
provisions () to a Financial Market Stability Fund, governed by the nancial regu-
lator, gives recognition to the correlation between the solvency position and liquidity
position of a bank. A Financial Market Stability Fund is a policy measure for a -
nancial regulator to control the credit channel and money supply. Both Basel III and
IFRS are not opposed supplementary measures by nancial regulators. Although
academic literature (Diamond & Rajan, 2005) recognizes the interaction between
liquidity and solvency of banks, Basel III does not incorporate this interaction in
their requirements. The implementation of a Financial Market Stability Fund does
2.8 Conclusion 43
recognize the correlation between the liquidity position and the solvency position
of a bank and provides a veriable and more objective method to ensure nancial
stability.
One disadvantage concerning regulatory capital requirements, that remains for
all provisioning methods, should not be named unmentioned. This disadvantage
is well-known in accounting and is also mentioned by Laeven & Majnoni (2001),
that is "income smoothing" by banks. There are several incentives for a bank to
turn to the smoothing of income over several years. The incentives may have a tax
origin (Rozycki, 1997) or the motivation to inuence risk perceptives (Greenwald and
Sinkey, 1988). Therefore it is even more important that all the coe¢ cients that are
used (; e and g) can be determined as objective as possible and can be veried by
auditors and the nancial regulator. The preference for forming provisions should
therefore not be based on forecasts and forwardlooking expected losses, for these
methods can be biased and manipulated (because they are not easy to verify) to
become income-smoothing tools.
Complementary empirical research is necessary to determine the e¤ect of a Fi-
nancial Market Stability Fund and this new method of provisioning on nancial
stability. Empirical research would benet the determination of the multiplier ()
by the nancial regulator. And as Arnold (2009) also mentions the role of account-
ing standards, like IFRS, and the nancial crisis should be further investigated.
This also includes the di¤erentiation of the di¤erent loan loss provisions by Basel II
(tier-2 and not tier-2 capital) and the inuence of this di¤erentiation on the balance
sheets of banks. Another research subject can be found in quantifying the trade-o¤
between resilience and e¢ ciency, if policies aimed at nancial stability (like a Finan-
cial Market Stability Fund) are implemented by regulators (Schinasi (2004)). This
chapter does not include an analysis of the costs and benets for individual banks
or the trade o¤ between resilience and e¢ ciency of a nancial system, though this
analysis is very much needed to determine the consequences of new regulation.
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2.A Appendix - Quote introduction
The quote used in the introduction of this chapter originates from the Dutch news-
paper De Volkskrant (1995, 03-24) and can be found at the website:
http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2844/Archief/archief/article/detail/398209/
1995/03/24/Iris-schat-stroppenpot-banken-op-15-miljard.dhtml
The original quote in Dutch from the article named "Iris schat stroppenpot
banken op 15 miljard":
"Het conservatisme van de Nederlandse banken benadeelt hun aan-
deelhouders. De hardnekkigheid waarmee de banken nog vasthouden aan
de geheimhouding over de omvang van hun stroppenpottenverhindert
een zuivere beoordeling van de nanciële kracht van de banken. Van
der Feen de Lille heeft de totale omvang van de vrije VAR (voorzien-
ing algemene risicos) van alle Nederlandse banken berekend op 15 mil-
jard gulden. Dat is het saldo van toevoegingen en onttrekkingen dat de
banken in de loop der jaren hebben opgebouwd. Deze reservepot is in de
loop van de jaren gevuld uit de winst voor belastingen. Over de inhoud
moeten de banken daarom ooit belasting betalen. De nettowaarde van
de reservepot komt op 9,8 miljard gulden."
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2.B Appendix - Notation
 Et = equity
 Dt = deposits
 Lt = loans
 x = ratio of good loans in comparison to the total amount of loans
 Rt = loan loss provisions
 eRt = loan loss provisions that can be included in the Basel capital requirement
 rD = interest rate on deposits
 rL = interest rate on loans
 rD = mean interest rate on deposits in the market
 rL = mean interest rate on loans in the market
  = Basel required capital ratio on risk weighted assets
 t = prot
 g = parameter general provision for loan losses
 e = parameter specic provision for loan losses
 s = parameter statistical provision for loan losses
 a = parameter dynamic provision for loan losses
  = multiplier for loan loss provisions

Chapter 3
Empirical indicators of credit risk
The goal of this chapter is to nd an empirical indicator that can be used to determine
a multiplier  for loan loss provisions to execute our proposal for a Financial Market
Stability of chapter two1
3.1 Introduction
The current nancial crisis forced the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to
revise the Basel II Capital Accord to increase nancial stability in future. This re-
sulted in December 2010 in the introduction of Basel III (2010). One new measure
proposed in the Basel III Accord is the installation of a countercyclical capital bu¤er.
The countercyclical bu¤er is designed to ensure that banking sector capital require-
ments take into account the macro-nancial environment in which banks operate.
The Basel III Accord itself remains rather at a distance concerning the details of
this countercyclical provisioning method. In chapter two of this thesis we propose a
new method to model these countercyclical provisions. In this chapter we would like
to determine the multiplier that can be used by a nancial regulator to implement
this new proposal for countercyclical provisioning.
Hackethal & Schmidt (2005) show there is an essential di¤erence between the
nancial resources corporations use in Europe (Germany in this case) and the United
States to fund their activities. In Europe (we refer to the picture from Hackthal &
Schmidt (2005)) corporations primarily use bank loans to nance their activities, in
1I would like to thank Anne Opschoor, Lorenzo Pozzi, André Lucas and Job Swank for their
helpfull comments and advice on this chapter.
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the United States corporations depend more on non-banking nancial institutions
(NBFI) and the bond market to fund their activities. The di¤erence in funding of
corporations between Europe and the United States of America might inuence our
search for an indicator for credit risk within the banking sector.
Picture from Hackethal & Schmidt (2004)
concerning external long term nancing (average
1995-2000)
In this chapter we use the number of bankruptcies as a percentage of domestic
credit as a proxy for the amount of credit risk present in the nancial sector in a
country. We consider multiple business cycle indicators in their ability to forecast
this proxy. We use lagged, autoregressive OLS regressions to test the correlation
between the business cycle indicators and the proxy for credit risk. We run out-of-
sample forecasts to determine the accuracy of the business cycle indicators to predict
this proxy for credit risk. We use data concerning business cycle indicators and the
number of bankruptcies in The Netherlands and The United States of America for
the regressions and the forecasts. The time series of the Euro area are unfortunately
too short to perform statistical tests on. We nd that a combination of the credit-
to-GDP gap and a stock exchange indicator, gives the best forecasts for our proxy.
The use of only the credit-to-GDP gap to determine the height of the countercyclical
provision, as Drehmann et al. (2010) propose, works poorly for our proxy. One-
lagged indicators give the best forecasts for our proxy in The Netherlands, whereas
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in the United States of America, two-lagged indicators give the best results. The
forecasts and regressions for The Netherlands give better results than those for the
United States of America. We presume (without any further evidence) that this
result might be caused by the use of our proxy (the number of bankruptcies as a
percentage of domestic credit), that seems better applicable to the European funding
behavior of corporations that the US corporate funding behavior, in accordance with
Hackethal & Schmidt (2005). Even though the number of observations of our proxy
is very limited and only available on a yearly base, the results are robust. A good
indicator for the amount of credit risk in the nancial sector is essential to construct
a useful countercyclical provision for loan losses.
We contribute to the current literature of countercyclical provisioning by the use
of a di¤erent proxy for the amount of credit risk in the nancial sector. We also
contribute by using a di¤erent econometric approach to test the suitability of the
business indicators for countercyclical provisioning. This chapter takes into consid-
eration that bank protability is driven by loan losses and inuenced by credit risk
in a recession in conformity with Bolt et al. (2011) and uses an ex post proxy for
the determination of the amount of credit risk present in the nancial market. Our
method of research is much less sophisticated than the already present econometric
methods in current literature (for example McNeil & Wendin (2007), Figlewski et
al. (2006), Koopman et al. (2009), and others). This chapter di¤ers in two as-
pects from this strand of literature. Firstly the goal of this chapter is not to nd
an optimal method for predicting the probability of default of a loan portfolio or
determining the systemic risk factors present within the corporate default rates. The
goal of this chapter is to determine an indicator that can be used in a method for
countercyclical provisioning by banks. We therefor use an o¤-the-shelf regression
and an out-of-sample forecast method and do not integrate rm-specic or bank-
specic determinants in our model. The second aspect that di¤ers in our approach
is the comparison between the indicators and our proxy in The Netherlands and The
United States of America. In the conclusion we give a preview of how the indicators
can be used to form a countercyclical provision.
This chapter is structured as follows. After this introduction, we discuss related
literature in section two. Section three describes the di¤erent business cycle indi-
cators. Section four consists of the di¤erent analyses (lagged OLS regressions and
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out-of-sample forecasts) for The Netherlands. The next section analyzes the US
data. In the nal section of this chapter we summarize our results and draw the
conclusion.
3.2 Related literature
This chapter relates to three strands of literature. The rst strand of literature
concerns nancial indicators that can forecast the downturn and upswing state of
the business cycle. The history of empirical research on indicators of the business
cycle is extensive. The classical techniques were developed by the National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER) and can be found in the articles of Mitchell (1913,
1927), Mitchell & Burns (1938) and Burns & Mitchell (1946). The classical theory
on business cycles is focussed on the identication of the business cycle and the
interaction between the indicators and the business cycle. Another aspect of business
cycles that has been subject of extensive research is the decomposition of business
cycles in a cyclical component and a long term trend. The cyclical uctuations are
referred to as growth cycles (Hodrick & Prescott (1981), Baxter & King (1994)). In
this chapter we use a di¤erent approach and analyze the inuence of the business
cycle on credit risk within the nancial sector. Marcucci and Quagliariello (2009)
nd that the impact of the business cycle on credit risk of banks is higher during a
downturn of the cycle. They also nd that the impact of the business cycle is higher
on banks with more risky portfolios. Bolt et al. (2011) nd that in a recession bank
protability is primarily driven by loan losses. This chapter di¤ers from this strand
of literature because it analyzes the inuence of the business cycle on the amount of
credit risk within the nancial sector by using an ex-post indicator of the amount
of credit risk in the nancial sector. This indicator is the amount of bankruptcies
within a certain time period. Koopman et al.(2009) also use the default data in
relation to the business cycle, to determine the credit cycle.
The second strand of literature concerns provisioning by nancial institutions
and more specic countercyclical provisioning. De Lis et al. (2000) acknowledge the
procyclical behavior of bank lending and provisioning and introduce a new method
of countercyclical provisioning for (Spanish) banks. After the introduction of Basel
II in 2004, the impact of Basel II on the procyclical behavior of banks is discussed by
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Pederzolli & Torricelli (2005) and Repullo & Suarez (2009). Pederzolli & Torricelli
(2005) introduce a new model for time-varying capital requirements to counteract
the procyclical inuence of Basel II, whereas Repullo & Suarez (2009) demonstrate
the procyclical inuence of Basel II in a recession. In 2010 Basel III (2010) was
released with the intention to implement a countercyclical provision. The guidelines2
of Basel III (2010) give more details for national authorities who wish to implement
the countercyclical bu¤er. This guidance suggests to use the business cycle indicator
the credit-to-GDP gap, based on the study by Drehmann et al. (2010). Drehmann et
al. (2010) analyze di¤erent bottom-up (bankspecic) and top-down (countryspecic)
indicators for the business cycle. They use bank charge-o¤s3 and data from Senior
Loan O¢ cer Survey as a proxy for credit conditions. The authors do not use forecasts
to determine the adequacy of the indicators, but use a binomial signal extraction
method (p.e. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)). Drehmann et al. (2010) nd that the
credit-to-GDP ratio seems to be the best business indicator for the build-up phase of
a countercyclical provision by banks. Caprio (2010) shows that even though Spain
and Colombia had installed some form of countercyclical provisioning by banks, this
method was not able to prevent an asset bubble. We disagree with Caprio (2010)
on the goal of a countercyclical provision. A countercyclical provision installed
by a bank is not meant to prevent an asset bubble. The goal of countercyclical
provisioning is to downsize the impact of an exogenous shock and not to prevent the
exogenous shock. Drehmann et al. (2011) conclude that credit spreads are among
the best indicators to determine the release phase of countercyclical provisions.
The third strand of literature concerns that part of the econometric and nance
literature engaged in nding the best method to model credit risk, integrating sys-
temic risk into credit risk models and determining the best indicators for credit risk.
Wilson (1998) develops a model for measuring expected and unexpected losses and
integrates systemic risk conditional on macroeconomic circumstances into the model.
Du¢ e et al. (2005) focus on the dynamics between rm-specic and macroeconomic
variables in determining the maximum likelihood estimators for the conditional prob-
ability of default. McNeil & Wendin (2007) use a sophisticated (Bayesian) econo-
2"Guidance for national authorities operating the countercyclical capital bu¤er", Basel Com-
mittee on Banking Supervision, December 2010, Bank for International Settlements.
3Denition Wikipedia: A charge-o¤ is the declaration by a creditor that an amount of debt
is unlikely to be collected. This occurs when a borrower becomes severely delinquent on a debt.
Traditionally, creditors will make this declaration at the point of six months without payment.
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metric model to specify systemic portfolio credit risk. Figlewski et al. (2006) use
a Cox intensity model to estimate the probability of default. Their model incorpo-
rates rm-specic and macroeconomic variables. Koopman et al. (2009) show that
by adding an unobserved dynamic component to their intensity-based framework,
the economic impact of observed macro-economic variables on default cycles and
rating activity reduces considerably. Koopman et al. (2010) develop a new method-
ological framework to disentangle default stress as a consequence of macroeconomic
variables, frailty4 and (industry-specic) contagion. Koopman et al. (2011) propose
a new framework for estimating and forecasting corporate default rates, where not
only observed but also unobserved risk factors are accounted for.
3.3 Business cycle indicators
Credit risk is perhaps the most essential risk within banking. Credit risk consists of
three risk factors: the probability of default of a borrower, the loss given default on
a loan and the exposure at default5. If the objective is to protect a banking system
against future loan losses, a focus on credit risk seems appropriate. Credit risk is
present in the banking sector long before a nancial crisis sets in. The inuence of
credit risk on the periodic protability in the banking sector does not only depend
on the ability of the bank to mitigate credit risk, but also on their ability to foresee
losses on loans and their provisioning scheme. Using the incurred losses in a banks
prot and loss account as an indicator for the amount of credit risk in the specic
bank might not be justied. A relatively small amount of incurred losses in the prot
and loss account might indicate that the bank has a low risk loan portfolio or it might
indicate a high risk loanportfolio and a better provisioning scheme, that mitigates
the inuence of the credit risk on the prots for that specic period. For both types
of banks the inuence on protability might appear identical in the specic period,
but the credit risk present within the two banks might be very di¤erent.
Using data on bank prots to indicate the amount of credit risk in the nancial
sector does not address this critique. The use of charge-o¤s as an indicator for
credit risk or survey data of bank o¢ cials might be very sensitive to subjectivity.
4Frailty is autonomous default rate dynamics.
5Through the expected loss measure credit risk can be quantied. The expected loss on the
loan consists of the probability of default times the loss given default times the exposure at default.
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Although the presence of credit risk in a nancial banking system is hard to observe,
the result of too much credit risk is not. The number of bankruptcies in a country
can be considered as an ex post indicator of the amount of credit risk present in
the banking sector of this country6. Given the fact that almost 70%-80% of the
liabilities on the balance sheet of non-nancial companies consists of debt to the
nancial sector in Europe7, credit risk in the nancial sector becomes apparent
when companies go bankrupt. Bankruptcies directly impair the capital of banks if
there is no adequate provisioning scheme.
Credit risk is always present in the loan portfolio of a bank, but when the eco-
nomic environment is in an upswing, credit risk is undervalued, while as the economic
environment is in a downturn, credit risk is exaggerated. The outstanding loan has
the same characteristics during this period, but the valuation of its risk di¤ers. The
possible ultimate result of a loan with high credit risk is the default on this loan
by the borrower. The loan loss for the bank as a consequence of the default of the
borrower is not visible from macro-economic data, but the defaults followed by a
bankruptcy of the borrower are. Because bankruptcies are the result of a process
where banks try to keep the borrower on track by applying nancial restructuring
on the loan and the business of the borrower, it is obvious that a bankruptcy of a
borrower is preceded by a certain time-period where credit risk on the loan is already
high. The number of bankruptcies is a lagging indicator of the amount of credit risk
present in the loan portfolio of a bank. When we use a business cycle indicator to
determine the multiplier for the height of the loan loss provisions of banks, we want
this indicator to give a timely signal of the credit risk present in the market. The
business cycle indicator should be a leading indicator.
The academic literature o¤ers many alternative business cycle indicators and
their use depends on the purpose of these indicators. The indicators that can be used
for determining the point in time of the credit cycle are the bottom-up and top-down
indicators. Top-down indicators are indicators that are determined on a system-wide
basis, where bottom-up indicators are bank specic. In this chapter we only consider
top-down indicators for the following reason. A multiplier or other determinant for
a countercyclical provision should not incorporate bank specic characteristics, for
6Koopman et al. (2011) also use this indicator to determine credit cycles.
7Page 48 of Schmidt et al. (1999) concerns data with regard to Germany, France and the
United Kingdom over the period 1981-1996.
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these characteristics are already incorporated in height of the (specic) loan loss
provisions by the banks themselves. The use of the countercyclical provision is to
incorporate the macroeconomic conditions of the business cycle into the provisioning
scheme of banks in order to counteract their credit-risk myopia. We test the following
top-down indicators in their use as a credit risk indicator:
1. Credit-to-GDP gap: Borio & Drehmann (2009) and Drehmann et al. (2010)8;
2. Change in GDP growth: Repullo & Saurina (2011);
3. Change in M2 growth: Roubini & Backus 9;
4. Stock exchange index: Roubini & Backus 10;
5. Change in the unemployment rate: Peersman & Pozzi (2007);
We use these top-down business cycle indicators to forecast the amount of credit
risk in the nancial sector. We adopt the change in the number of bankruptcies as
a percentage of domestic credit as a lagged proxy for the credit risk that is present
in banks11. We apply log-linearization to this proxy, for domestic credit does not
behave linear over time (the log-linearization of the number of bankruptcies as a
percentage of domestic credit, is denoted as BDt12). The business indicators give an
indication of the di¤erent aspects of credit risk. For example domestic credit gives
an indication of the amount of credit banks have supplied to the borrowers. This
indicator therefore points at the exposure at default for banks. The stock exchange
index gives an indication of the stockholders view on the companies. This indicator
therefore signals the probability of default of the quoted companies.
The di¤erent aspects of credit risk can be quantied through the expected loss
measure:
EL = PD  LGD  EAD
8For a more detailed specication of this business cycle indicator we refer to Appendix 3A.
9We used some of the indicators Roubini and Backus mention on their website
http://people.stern.nyu.edu/nroubini/bci/bciintroduction.htm
10We used some of the indicators Roubini and Backus mention on their website
http://people.stern.nyu.edu/nroubini/bci/bciintroduction.htm
11We are aware that a Dutch bank might also be inuenced by the amount of bankruptcies/credit
risk present in the nancial market in the United States of America, for the Dutch bank might also
have US assets on his balance sheet. The lack of data does not allow for corrections in this matter.
We will use the number of bankruptcies as a percentage of domestic credit in The Netherlands as
a lagged indicator for the amount of credit risk in the Dutch nancial sector.
12To determine BDt we rst divide the number of bankruptcies at t by domestic credit at t.
We determine the change in comparison to the previous period: (# bankruptcies at t divided by
domestic credit at t) / (# bankruptcies at t 1 divided by domestic credit at t 1). BDt is the log
of this fraction. BDt gives an indication of the growth or decline of the number of bankruptcies at
t as a percentage of domestci credit in comparison to the previous period.
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where EL is the expected credit loss, PD is the probability of default, LGD is the
loss given default and EAD is the exposure at default13. The theoretical impact the
business indicators have on the expected credit loss14 are shown in Table 3.1.
explanatory variables on the expected loss measure (EL). The abbrevation PD represents the
Explanatory variables Hypothetical
impact on EL
Sign of hypothetical
effect on EL
GDP growth LGD negative
Domestic credit growth EAD positive
Credit to GDP Gap EAD & LGD positive
M2 growth EAD positive
Unemployment rate LGD negative
Stock Exchange index PD negative
Impact of explanatory variables on expected loss measure
The table presents the expected theoretical effect, prior to the regressions, of the different
Probablity of Default, LGD the Loss Given Default and EAD the Exposure at Default.
Table 3.1
We assume that the sign of the theoretical impact of the business cycle indicators
on the expected loss measure, as shown in Table 3.1 is equal to the sign of impact
on our proxy for the amount of credit risk in the nancial sector, (BDt). We use
these business cycle indicators to forecast our proxy (BDt). We have very limited
(yearly) data concerning our proxy (BDt) for the United States of America and
The Netherlands. The limited amount of data has implications for the econometric
tests that can be executed on the residuals of the OLS regressions. Because some
econometric tests for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of the residuals cannot
be used, we assume the residuals of the OLS regressions to be heteroskedastic and
serially correlated. We use Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC,
Newey-West) standard errors in our OLS regressions to counter these problems.
13The introduction of this thesis gives a more detailed view of the di¤erent aspects of credit
risk.
14Domestic credit and M2 determine how much money is supplied by nancial instutions in the
nancial system of a country, this determines primarily the exposure of banks at default. GDP and
the unemployment rate give information about the turnover and costs of borrowers, and indirectly
therefor in the protability of those borrowers. These measures indicate the loss given default for
nancial institutions.
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3.4 The Netherlands
3.4.1 Regressions 1987-2002
For the business cycle indicators of The Netherlands we use data from the World
Bank concerning Gross Domestic Product (on current Local Currency Unit base),
domestic credit to the private sector, money and quasi money M2 (also on Local
Currency Unit base) and the unemployment rate as a percentage of the labour force.
Data on the number of bankruptcies originate from Datastream and the data on the
Dutch stock exchange (AEX on ultimo and average base) stems from the Dutch
Central Bank website. Appendix 3B shows the origin of the used data15, the used
abbreviations and the descriptive statistics for the data of The Netherlands and the
United States of America..
Appendix 3E shows the correlation matrix for the explanatory variables. Ap-
pendix 3F presents the results of the augmented Dickey-Fuller test16, whether or
not the explanatory variables and dependent variable follow a random walk (have
a unit root). For The Netherlands the variables GDPt and AAt fail to reject the
hypothesis of having a unit root. These non-stationary variables cannot be used in
the analysis in their current form17.
We run lagged OLS regressions over the period 1986-2002 to determine the cor-
relation between our proxy for credit risk and the business cycle indicators. We
use the outcome of these regressions for an out-of-sample forecast over the period
2003-2009 and compare this forecast to the actual value of the proxy for credit risk.
15The unemployment rate is shown as a percentage of the total labor force of a country. Because
the labor force in a country has a upgoing trend and does not behave linear, the log-linearization
of the unemployment rate is used as the business cycle indicator.
16Tot allow for serial correlation in the error term we use the augmented Dickey-Fuller test,
contrary to the Dickey-Fuller test.
17We perform a cointegration regression to use a stationary, linear combination of these variables
in our analysis. Even though the linear combination (DIFt = AAt   c   GDPt) of the non-
stationary variables is stationary, according to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test and Ng-Perron
test, we do not have an economic theory to conrm that GDP and the average value of the AEX
follow the same stochastic trend. Therefore we do not include the linear combination of the variables
AAt and GDPt in our regression model.
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The table presents the results of lagged regressions of the business cycle indicators on the proxy (the log-linearisation of the number
of bankruptcies as a percentage of domestic credit) for credit risk in the financial sector in The Netherlands. The HAC (Newey-West)
standard errors are shown in parentheses in the table.
***, **, * denote statistically significant effects at a 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln Bankruptcies % domestic credit (two lags) 0.089
(0.32)
ln Bankruptcies % domestic credit (one lag) 0.638 *** 0.594 **
(0.22) (0.23)
ln Domestic credit growth (two lags) -0.339
(0.49)
ln Domestic credit growth (one lag) 0.014 0.294
(0.18) (0.26)
Credit to GDP Gap (lambda=100) (two lags) 0.718 *
(0.39)
Credit to GDP Gap (lambda=100) (one lag) 1.514 *** 1.925 ***
(0.54) (0.45)
Credit to GDP Gap (lambda=6.25) (two lags) 2.084 1.118 ***
(1.40) (0.43)
Credit to GDP Gap (lambda=6.25) (one lag) 2.730 *** 2.507 ***
(0.66) (0.57)
ln M2 growth (two lags) 1.952
(2.60)
ln M2 growth (one lag) -1.561 -1.235
(2.11) (2.07)
ln Unemployment rate (two lags) 0.473
(0.74)
ln Unemployment rate (one lag) -0.464 -0.447
(0.35) (0.44)
ln AEX ultimo value (two lags) -0.551 *** -0.271 ** -0.314 **
(0.17) (0.11) (0.12)
ln AEX ultimo value (one lag) -0.199 *** -0.129 -0.324 *** -0.293 ***
(0.06) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11)
Constant 0.074 0.051 -0.095 0.010 0.045
(0.14) (0.14) (0.17) (0.03) (0.05)
Regression Lagged Lagged Lagged Lagged Lagged
Number of years 16 16 15 17 17
Adjusted R-squared 0.625 0.434 0.064 0.654 0.582
Standard error of regression 0.093 0.115 0.177 0.108 0.119
Akaike info criterion -1.606 -1.195 -0.317 -1.370 -1.179
Schwartz criterion -1.268 -0.857 0.014 -1.125 -0.934
Table 3.2
Credit risk in The Netherlands 1986 - 2002
Dependent variable: ln number of bankruptcies as a % of domestic credit
Summary statistics
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(6) (7) (8) (9)
ln Bankruptcies % domestic credit (two lags)
ln Bankruptcies % domestic credit (one lag) 0.444 **
(0.18)
ln Domestic credit growth (two lags) 0.524
(0.55)
ln Domestic credit growth (one lag)
Credit to GDP Gap (lambda=100) (two lags)
Credit to GDP Gap (lambda=100) (one lag)
Credit to GDP Gap (lambda=6.25) (two lags) 0.687
(0.43)
Credit to GDP Gap (lambda=6.25) (one lag) 2.912 *** 1.913 ** 1.929 **
(0.55) (0.77) (0.75)
ln M2 growth (two lags)
ln M2 growth (one lag) 0.847
(2.19)
ln Unemployment rate (two lags)
ln Unemployment rate (one lag)
ln AEX ultimo value (two lags) -0.247
(0.19)
ln AEX ultimo value (one lag) -0.159 -0.291 ***
(0.22) (0.07)
Constant -0.084 -0.001 -0.084 ** -0.086 **
(0.15) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Summary statistics
Regression Lagged Lagged Lagged Lagged
Number of years 15 18 19 20
Adjusted R-squared 0.025 0.650 0.285 0.283
Standard error of regression 0.149 0.107 0.154 0.151
Akaike info criterion -0.702 -1.431 -0.764 -0.855
Schwartz criterion -0.466 -1.233 -0.615 -0.755
Summary statistics
Table 3.2 - Continued
Dependent variable: ln number of bankruptcies as a % of domestic credit
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The lagged OLS regressions have the following specication:
BDt = c+ 1BDt j + 2DCt j + 3CG100t j + 4CG625t j + 5M2t j (3.1)
+ 6UNt j + 7AUt j + "t
where BDt is our proxy for credit risk and the abbreviations of the explanatory
variables on the right hand side of the equation can be found in appendix 3B. Because
of missing values (concerning the AEX and M2 data) and the limited number of
observations, we only allow for a two-lagged OLS regression (j = 2). We also check
whether the dependent variable is autoregressive, because literature indicates that
credit events cluster (for example Jorion & Zhang (2007)). We perform regressions
for most combinations of explanatory variables, the best and worst combinations of
these regressions are shown in Table 3.2.
We use the adjusted R
2
, the Akaike information criterion18 (AIC) and the
Schwartz criterion19 (SC) to determine the goodness of t of the regressions and
the number of lags in the regressions. If we compare regression (1) of Table 3.2 with
only one-year lagged explanatory variables to regression (3) of Table 3.2 with only
two-year lagged explanatory variables, all three test statistics20 show that one-year
lagged explanatory variables have more explanatory power than two-year lagged
variables. Regression (1) including the credit-to-GDP gap with  = 6:25 has more
explanatory power than regression (2) with the credit-to-GDP gap with  = 100
according to the same three test statistics. Regression (9) shows the explanatory
power of the credit-to-GDP gap (with  = 6:25), as is suggested in Drehmann et
18The Akaike information criterion can be given as follows:
AIC = ln(
Pb"2
N
) +
2k
N
where
Pb"2 is the sum of the squared residuals. AIC penalizes the addition of right-hand-side
variables more heavily than the adjusted R squared. The lower the AIC the better the explanatory
value of the right-hand side variables (Pindyck & Rubinfeld (1998)).
19The Schwartz criterion can be given as follows:
SC = ln(
Pb"2
N
) +
k lnN
N
where
Pb"2 is the sum of the squared residuals. SC penalizes the addition of right-hand-side
variables more heavily than the adjusted R squared. The lower the SC the better the explanatory
value of the right-hand side variables (Pindyck & Rubinfeld (1998)).
20That is: R
2
is closer to one, AIC and SC are of lower value
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al. (2010) as a variable that can be used to determine the countercyclical provision
for nancial institutions. The explanatory power of regression (9) is very limited in
comparison to the other regressions. According to the adjusted R
2
regressions (4)
and (7) of Table 3.2 have the most explanatory power. These regressions include
combinations of the variables CG100t; CG625t and AUt. The Akaike information
criterion and the Schwartz criterion suggest that regression (1) and (7) have the
most explanatory power. Regressions (1) and (7) are autoregressive and also include
the variables CG625t and AUt. In our analysis some macro-economic business in-
dicators are signicant in the regressions of Table 3.2, research by Koopman et al
(2009) has shown that adding an unobserved dynamic component21 might inuence
the signicance of the macro-economic variables we use, negatively. We are aware
of this omission in our analysis.
3.4.2 Forecasts 2003-2009
From the regressions in previous subsection, we determine the out-of-sample fore-
casts for our proxy BDt and compare these out-of-sample forecasts for the period
2003-2009 to our actual values of BDt. We use an ex post forecast concerning the
period 2003-2009, where the actual values of the dependent variable are already
known. We use a static forecasting model and not a dynamic forecasting model,
because the data are stationary and it concerns an out-of-sample forecast. We test
this forecast by using the root mean squared error of the forecast and the Theil
inequality coe¢ cient22. Table 3.3 shows the test statistics for these forecasts based
on our regressions of Table 3.2. Figure 3.1 shows the forecast graphs, where the
forecasted value of BDt is compared to the actual value of BDt.
The forecasts based on the indicators of regression (3) and (9) perform worst
for our out-of-sample forecast. Again the forecast based on the credit-to-GDP gap
(with  = 6:25), regression (9), as proposed by Drehmann et al. (2010), does not
21This component can be interpreted as an omitted systematic credit risk factor.
22Theils inequality coe¢ cient, U , is used to evaluate forecasts and is given as follows:
U =
q
1
T
PT
t=1(lnBNKDC
s
t   lnBNKDCat )2q
1
T
PT
t=1(lnBNKDC
s
t )
2 +
q
1
T
PT
t=1(lnBNKDC
a
t )
2
where lnBNKDCst is the forecasted value of our dependent variable and lnBNKDC
a
t is the actual
value of our dependent variable. If U = 0 the forecast is a perfect t for the actual values and if
U = 1 the model has no predictive value (Pindyck & Rubinfeld (1998)).
3.4 The Netherlands 61
seem to predict our proxy for the amount of credit risk in the nancial sector very
well. Forecast (9) shows little variance over the course of the time period and in
2009 the forecast based on this estimation appears to have a downward trend, whilst
our proxy still shows an increase in the amount of credit risk in the nancial sector.
The dependent variables of regression (4) and (5) give the best forecasts according
to our test statistics (rms error is closest to zero and the same is true for Theils
inequality coe¢ cient).
The table presents the test statistics of the out-of-sample forecasts based on the regression results show n in
Table (3.2). The forecastnumbers in this table correspond to the regression numbers of Table (3.2).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Root mean squared error 0.192 0.181 0.284 0.121 0.124
Theil's inequality coefficent 0.515 0.532 0.679 0.330 0.318
         Bias proportion 0.277 0.140 0.118 0.123 0.315
         Variance proportion 0.498 0.657 0.015 0.385 0.194
         Covariance proportion 0.226 0.202 0.867 0.492 0.491
(6) (7) (8) (9)
Root mean squared error 0.178 0.162 0.236 0.250
Theil's inequality coefficent 0.554 0.458 0.691 0.718
         Bias proportion 0.246 0.004 0.125 0.110
         Variance proportion 0.614 0.309 0.499 0.382
         Covariance proportion 0.139 0.687 0.376 0.508
Forecast corresponding to regressions Table (3.2)
Forecast corresponding to regressions Table (3.2)
Table 3.3
Test statistics out-of-sample forecasts The Netherlands 2003 - 2009
The forecasts with the best test statistics are generated by a combination of the
business cycle indicators CG625t 1; CG625t 2 or CG100t 1; CG100t 2 and AUt 1
and AUt 2. The negative impact of the explanatory variable AUt is in conformity
with our theoretical assumption (we refer to Table 3.1), as is the positive empirical
impact of the explanatory variables CG625t and CG100t. These explanatory vari-
ables combine the three di¤erent aspects of credit risk (probability of default, AUt,
and exposure at default & loss given default, CG625t). Without further proof, it
might be true that in order to have a fair view on the amount of credit risk in the
nancial sector, one should use indicators that combine all the di¤erent aspects of
credit risk to get the best forecast.
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Figure 3.1 - Forecast graphs The Netherlands 2003 - 2009
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Figure 3.1 - Forecast graphs The
Netherlands 2003 - 2009 (continued)
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3.5 The United States of America
3.5.1 Regressions 1982-2002
For the Unites States of America we use data from the American Bankruptcy Insti-
tute concerning the number of business lings for bankruptcy on a year base. Data
concerning GDP, M2, unemployment and domestic credit originate from the World-
bank. The data concerning the New York Stock Exchange index and the S&P500
listings are from Datastream. The number of business lings for bankruptcy as a
percentage of domestic credit is used as a dependent variable for the amount of
credit risk present in the nancial sector. Appendix 3B shows the origin of the
used data23, the used abbreviations and the descriptive statistics for the data of The
United States of America (hereafter: USA). The correlation matrix24 of the explana-
tory variables is shown in appendix 3E. We use an Augmented Dickey-Fuller test25
to test whether the used explanatory variables have a unit root (follow a random
walk). The results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test can be found in appendix
3F. For the USA the variables CG100t, M2t and SPt fail to reject the hypothesis of
having a unit root. These non-stationary variables cannot be used in the regressions
in their current form26.
We run lagged OLS regressions over the period 1983-2002. We use these regres-
sions to make an out-of-sample forecast for the period 2003-2009 and compare this
forecast to the actual value of the proxy for credit risk.
23The unemployment rate is shown as a percentage of the total labor force of a country. Because
the labor force in a country has a upgoing trend and does not behave linear, the log-linearization
of the unemployment rate is used as the business cycle indicator.
24In order to prevent multicollinearity, if two variables are highly correlated, we only use one of
those variables in the regression.
25Tot allow for serial correlation in the error term we use the augmented Dickey-Fuller test in
stead of the Dickey-Fuller test.
26We perform a cointegration regression to use a stationary, linear combination of these variables
in our analysis. Even though the linear combination (DIFt = SPt   c  M2t   CG100t) of the
non-stationary variables is stationary, according to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test and Ng-
Perron test, we do not have an economic theory to conrm that M2, the credit-to-GDP gap (with
 = 100) and the S&P500 listings follow the same stochastic trend. Therefore we will not include
the variables CG100t, M2t and SPt in our regression model.
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The table presents the results of lagged regressions of the business cycle indicators on the proxy (the log-linearisation of the number of bankruptcies
as a percentage of domestic credit) for credit risk in the f inancial sector in The Netherlands. The HAC (New ey-West) standard errors are show n in
parentheses in the table. ***, **, * denote statistically signif icant effects at a 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln Bankruptcies % domestic credit (two lags) -0.243
(0.21)
ln Bankruptcies % domestic credit (one lag) 0.159
(0.27)
ln GDP growth (two lags) 5.092 *** 3.779 *** 3.458 *** 4.905 ***
(1.10) (1.14) (1.03) (1.25)
ln GDP growth (one lag) 3.774 * 2.312 2.160 *
(2.02) (1.66) (1.26)
ln Domestic credit growth (two lags) -0.675 0.373 0.578 -0.803 **
(0.52) (0.68) (0.55) (0.39)
ln Domestic credit growth (one lag) -0.573 -0.632
(1.38) (0.98)
Credit to GDP Gap (lambda=6.25) (two lags) 1.055 * 1.435 **
(0.62) (0.60)
Credit to GDP Gap (lambda=6.25) (one lag) 0.956 1.053 0.749
(0.98) (0.82) (0.50)
ln Unemployment rate (two lags) 0.272 0.029
(0.30) (0.23)
ln Unemployment rate (one lag) 0.211 0.308 0.395
(0.41) (0.34) (0.29)
ln New York Stock Exchange index movement (two lags) -0.529 ** -0.606 ** -0.601 ** -0.523 ***
(0.24) (0.31) (0.30) (0.19)
ln New York Stock Exchange index movement (one lag) -0.157 -0.438 -0.521 **
(0.24) (0.28) (0.24)
Constant -0.257 -0.322 *** -0.335 *** -0.371 *** -0.282 ***
(0.17) (0.07) (0.12) (0.10) (0.08)
Regression Lagged Lagged Lagged Lagged Lagged
Number of years 21 20 20 20 20
Adjusted R-squared -0.156 0.439 0.468 0.487 0.425
Standard error of regression 0.126 0.088 0.086 0.084 0.089
Akaike info criterion -1.048 -1.754 -1.774 -1.822 -1.754
Schwartz criterion -0.700 -1.405 -1.326 -1.424 -1.455
Dependent variable: ln number of bankruptcies as a % of domestic credit
Summary statistics
Table 3.4
Credit risk in United States of America 1983 - 2002
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(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
ln Bankruptcies % domestic credit (two lags)
ln Bankruptcies % domestic credit (one lag)
ln GDP growth (two lags) 4.004 *** 4.766 ***
(0.51) (0.56)
ln GDP growth (one lag)
ln Domestic credit growth (two lags) 0.957 -0.817 **
(0.77) (0.39)
ln Domestic credit growth (one lag)
Credit to GDP Gap (lambda=6.25) (two lags) 0.826 ** 1.444 ** 0.522
(0.34) (0.58) (0.67)
Credit to GDP Gap (lambda=6.25) (one lag) 0.599 1.029 * 0.277
(0.43) (0.54) (0.36)
ln Unemployment rate (two lags)
ln Unemployment rate (one lag)
ln New York Stock Exchange index movement (two lags) -0.688 *** -0.622 *** -0.525 *** -0.627 **
(0.19) (0.23) (0.17) (0.25)
ln New York Stock Exchange index movement (one lag) -0.422 ** -0.428 -0.461 ***
(0.16) (0.39) (0.16)
Constant -0.236 *** -0.091 ** -0.273 *** 0.002 -0.121 ***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Regression Lagged Lagged Lagged Lagged Lagged
Number of years 20 20 20 20 21
Adjusted R-squared 0.523 0.153 0.463 0.171 -0.042
Standard error of regression 0.081 0.108 0.086 0.107 0.119
Akaike info criterion -1.942 -1.434 -1.853 -1.419 -1.322
Schwartz criterion -1.643 -1.235 -1.604 -1.170 -1.223
Summary statistics
Dependent variable: ln number of bankruptcies as a % of domestic credit
Table 3.4 - Continued
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The lagged OLS regressions have the following specication:
BDt = c+ 1BDt j + 2GDPt j + 4CGP625t j + 2DCt j (3.2)
+ 6UNt j + 7NYt j + "t
where BDt is our proxy for credit risk and the abbreviations of the explanatory
variables on the right handside of the equation can be found in appendix 3B. Because
of the limited number of observations, we only allow for a twoperiod lagged OLS
regression (j = 2). We perform regressions for most combinations of explanatory
variables, the best and worst combinations of these regressions are shown in Table
3.4.
We use the adjustedR
2
, the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Schwartz
criterion (SC) to determine the number of lags of the regressed explanatory variables
and the explanatory power of the regressions. If we compare regression (1) with all
one-year lagged variables to regression (2) with all two-year lagged variables, it is
clearly visible that the one-lagged variables have very little explanatory power for the
USA. The Akaike information criterion and the Schwartz criterion of regression (2)
are of lower value than the test statistics of regression (1). This is a di¤erent result
in comparison to Table 3.2. In The Netherlands the one-year lagged variables have
more explanatory power than the two-year lagged variables. One theory concerning
this result is that this di¤erence might be caused by the di¤erent funding structures
of companies in both countries. Hackethal & Schmidt (1999) nd that German com-
panies are primarily nanced through bank loans, where US companies are primarily
funded through non-bank loans and bonds. When a company goes into default on its
debt, it does not automatically imply that this company will go bankrupt. Perhaps
the debtholders of US companies are less likely to aim at a bankruptcy than are the
debtholders of the German companies (or in our chapter: Dutch companies). Or the
timeline between default and bankruptcy is di¤erent for the di¤erent debtholders
in the US and Germany. We do not have evidence on a possible explanation for
the found di¤erence between the USA and The Netherlands. Regression (10) shows
the explanatory power of the credit-to-GDP gap (with  = 6:25), as suggested by
Drehmann et al. (2010). The explanatory power of solely the credit-to-GDP gap
is in both countries (The Netherlands & The USA) small. If we analyze all regres-
sions of the USA, regression (6) and (8) have the best test statistics. These results
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appear to be quite similar to the regressions in previous section: these regressions
also use the variables CG625t j and NYt j. Another di¤erence in the USA is that
the variable GDPt j has signicant explanatory power. In The Netherlands this
variable could not be used in the regressions because of non-stationarity. In our
analysis some macro-economic business indicators are signicant in the regression,
research by Koopman et al (2009) has shown that adding an unobserved dynamic
component27 might inuence the signicance of the macro-economic variables we use
negatively. We are aware of this omission in our analysis.
3.5.2 Forecasts 2003-2009
From the regressions in previous subsection, we determine the out-of-sample fore-
casts for our proxy BDt. We compare these out-of-sample forecasts for the period
2003-2009 to our actual values of BDt. We use an ex post forecast concerning the
period 2003-2009, where the actual values of the dependent variable are already
known. We use a static forecasting model and not dynamic forecasting model, be-
cause the data are stationary and it concerns an out-of-sample forecast. We test this
forecast by using the root mean squared error of the forecast and the Theil inequality
coe¢ cient. Table 3.5 shows the test statistics for these forecasts and Figure 3.2 the
forecast graphs, where the forecasted value of BDt is compared to the actual value
of BDt.
27This component can be interpreted as an omitted systematic credit risk factor.
3.5 The United States of America 69
The table presents the test statistics of the out-of-sample forecasts based on the regression results show n in
Table (3.4). The forecastnumbers in this table correspond to the regression numbers of Table (3.4).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Root mean squared error 0.413 0.365 0.372 0.393 0.364
Theil's inequality coefficent 0.780 0.637 0.733 0.749 0.667
         Bias proportion 0.104 0.154 0.047 0.039 0.153
         Variance proportion 0.646 0.551 0.669 0.515 0.739
         Covariance proportion 0.250 0.294 0.284 0.446 0.108
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Root mean squared error 0.358 0.392 0.364 0.381 0.413
Theil's inequality coefficent 0.713 0.756 0.665 0.702 0.802
         Bias proportion 0.049 0.025 0.152 0.004 0.105
         Variance proportion 0.747 0.514 0.738 0.419 0.833
         Covariance proportion 0.204 0.460 0.110 0.577 0.062
Forecast corresponding to regressions Table (3.4)
Forecast corresponding to regressions Table (3.4)
Table 3.5
Test statistics out-of-sample forecasts The United States of America 2003 - 2009
The out-of-sample forecast based on the one-lagged variables (1) and the out-of-
sample forecast (10) based on solely the credit-to-GDP gap (with  = 6:25) perform
worst according to our test statistics.
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Figure 3.2 - Forecast graphs United States of America 2003 - 2009
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Figure 3.2 - Forecast graphs United States of America 2003 - 2009 (continued)
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This is in conformity with the explanatory power of these regressions in Table
3.4. The out-of-sample forecasts for the Netherlands (Table 3.3) on average perform
better than those of the USA (Table 3.5). We do not have a clear explanation for this
result. But we are aware that country-specic insolvency laws and the entity type
of businesses inuence our proxy for credit risk. Also the registration of bankruptcy
lings and the reason to le for bankruptcy inuence our proxy for credit risk.
The forecasts with two-lagged variables (2) give a better forecast than those with
one-lagged variables (1) in the USA, this is in conformity with regression results.
The forecasts that include the variables CG625t j, NYt j and GDPt j, forecast (6)
and (8), give the best forecast of our proxy BDt according to the test statistics of
Table 3.5. This result is in conformity with the regressions of (3.4) and the results
of the forecasts in The Netherlands. The positive correlation between the GDP
growth and the number of bankruptcies as a percentage of domestic credit is not in
accordance with our hypothetical impact of Table 3.1. This result would imply that
an increase in GDP correlates with an increase in the number of bankruptcies as a
percentage of domestic credit. We do not have an economic interpretation for this
result. The best forecasts for the USA include the variables concerning the stock
exchange market and the credit-to-GDP gap. These signicant variables do show
the same sign as was theoretically predicted in Table 3.1. The combination of these
variables covers all three aspects of credit risk of the expected loss measure.
The actual data on the proxy for credit risk for The Netherlands (BDt) and the
USA (BDt) di¤er. The Dutch data show an increasing actual value of our proxy
for credit risk from the period 2007 onwards (Figure 3.1), but the actual USA data
show a decreasing proxy (Figure 3.2). If we compare this trend to the known shocks
within the nancial sector during this period in the USA28, it seems quite peculiar
that the proxy for credit risk has a downward trend in the USA. One explanation for
this result might be consistent with the outcome of our analyses, where the proxy
of the USA is more lagged than that of The Netherlands. As a consequence the
known shocks from 2007 onwards, will not appear in the actual data concerning our
proxy before 2009. Another explanation might be that, although the proxy seems
to work well for The Netherlands, it is less applicable to the situation of the USA
28In September 2008 Lehman Brothers Holding Inc. goes bankrupt and in the rst quarter of
2009 the Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index has a decline of 18.9%.
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as a consequence of a di¤erent funding structure of US companies29.
3.6 Conclusion
Basel III imposes the use of a countercyclical provision by nancial institutions. The
goal of the countercyclical provision is to promote a more resilient banking sector and
improve the banking sectors stability. Loan losses as an eventual outcome of credit
risk, have impact on the liquidity, protability and solvency position of banks30.
In order to improve stability in the banking sector, the indicator that is used for
countercyclical provisioning should give a good indication of the amount of credit risk
in the banking sector. This indicator should be determined on a top-down basis and
indicate credit risk without being distracted by the provisioning scheme of a specic
bank. An empirical indicator to determine the height of the countercyclical provision
should be timely, consistent and give an indication of the amount of credit risk in the
nancial sector. We use the change in the number of bankruptcies as a percentage
of domestic credit, BDt, as a proxy of the amount of credit risk in the nancial
sector. We analyze the correlation between BDt and di¤erent top-down business
cycle indicators from literature. We nd that a combination of the credit-to-GDP
gap and the stock exchange rate gives the best forecast of BDt in the Netherlands.
When we include the indicator GDP growth in the forecast for the United States
of America, the forecast improves. The number of lags of the indicators, that best
predict our proxy, di¤er for the United States and The Netherlands. Our proxy
for credit risk BDt appears to be more lagged in the United States than in The
Netherlands. The limited amount of observations for our proxy BDt limits our
analysis. We conclude that the best forecasts combine indicators of all three aspects
of credit risk (probability of default, exposure at default and loss given default). The
forecasts of credit risk in The Netherlands are more accurate than the forecasts of
credit risk in The United States of America. One explanation for this result might be
the di¤erent funding structure of US companies in comparison to Dutch companies,
that are primarily funded by bank loans31. If this explanation is valid, a di¤erent
29Hackethal & Schmidt (1999) nd that German companies are primarily nanced through bank
loans, where US companies are primarily funded through non-bank loans and bonds.
30We refer to Bolt et al. (2011).
31Hackethal & Schmidt (1999) nd that German companies are primarily nanced through bank
loans, where US companies are primarily funded through non-bank loans and bonds.
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proxy for the amount of credit risk in the US nancial sector should be used in the
analysis for the United States of America.
In this chapter we analyze the indicators for the amount of credit risk present
in the nancial sector of a country, with the purpose of using these indicators to
form a countercyclical provision for loan losses. When a policy rule changes, for
example by the implementation of a countercyclical provision, the optimization rule
of the nancial institutions might also change. This could result in a change in the
variables we use in this chapter. This phenomenon is known as the Lucas critique
(1976). We do not have any information or assumptions on how the optimization
rule of nancial institutions might change and inuence our results.
Analysis of the e¤ect of our proposal for countercyclical provisioning is only
possible with detailed information concerning the current loan loss provisions in the
aggregated nancial sector. For The Netherlands we have some empirical data on
the aggregated nancial sector, but the details are very limited. If we would use our
indicators for credit risk from regression (4) from Table 3.2 to determine a multiplier
 2 [0:9; 1:1] from the regression (4) formula:
crt = 0:010 + 1:118  CG625t 2 + 2:507  CG625t 1   0:271  AUt 2   0:324  AUt 1
where crt is our indicator for credit risk and the result of the regression formula. We
choose our multiplier  according to this indicator crt32 and the result is shown in
Figure (3.3):
32According to the formula:
t = min +

crt   crmin
e(cr)

 (max   min)
where t is the multiplier at t, min is the minimum value of the multiplier (in this case we chose
0:9) and max is the maximum value of the multiplier (in this case we chose 1:1). The parameter
crt is the result of our regression formula at t, crmin is the minimum value of the regression result
over the timeperiod (1991-2009 for The Netherlands) and e(cr) is the average value of cr over the
timeperiod (1991-2009 for The Netherlands).
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Figure 3.3 Multiplier for The Netherlands based on regression (4)
We do not have detailed information on the loan loss provisions of Dutch banks,
but Figure (3.3) does show the number of bankruptcies and the risk estimation of
bankers. The risk estimation of bankers is variable that is determined by dividing the
risk weighted assets by the total asset amount on the balance sheet. This variable
gives an indication of the perceived risk prole of the assets by banks.
Figure 3.4 Multiplier for The USA based on regression (8)
For the USA we do not have information concerning the risk-weighted assets
on the aggregated balance sheet of the nancial sector. For future research the
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estimation of the amount of credit risk in the nancial sector could be improved by
a dataset that would have more observations over a longer timeperiod to increase
the predictive value of the forecasts. Also aggregated bank data with concern to
non-performing loans, defaulted loans and loan losses could improve our analysis.
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3.A Appendix - Credit-to-GDP gap
Basel III (2010)33 suggests the credit-to-GDP gap as an indicator variable to deter-
mine where the economy is in the economic cycle. Drehmann et al. (2010) primarily
focus on choosing a variable that signals the time to build up and release capital
bu¤ers. Basel III gives a very detailed description how to determine the credit-to-
GDP gap34. We have to determine the credit-to-GDP trend, that is the sustainable
average of the ratio of credit-to-GDP. This can be done by using a Hodrick-Prescott
lter, the assumption behind this lter is that it divides the original series yt in
a trend ( t) and the cycle (ct). Hodrick and Prescott (1981) obtain the trend by
solving the following optimization problem:
min
X
t=1
(yt    t)2 + 
 1X
t=2
( t+1   2 t +  t 1)2 (3.3)
where the rst term penalizes the variance of the di¤erence between the original
series and the trend (that is the cyclical component ct = yt    t) and the second
term penalizes the growth rate of the trend component (3-period based). Drehmann
et al. (2010) use a  of 1; 600 to determine the trend in the Hodrick and Prescott
lter, because the trend of the credit cycle covers a longer period (according to
Drehmann et al. (2010) a business cycle covers 4 to 8 years and a credit cycle is
three to four times longer than the business cycle). Drehmann et al. (2010) test
di¤erent s. They nd that a  of 125; 000 or 400; 000 (that is approx. 34 or 44
times 1; 600) performs best in determining the trend. We have to adjust the  for
yearly data concerning GDP and credit in stead of quarterly data. Ravn & Uhlig
(1997) suggest to use a  of 6:25 for yearly data where other authors suggest a 
of 100 (Backus & Kehoe (1992)) or a  of 400 (Correia et al. (1992) and Cooley &
Ohanian (1991)). We will use a  of 100 and a  of 6:25 to determine the credit to
GDP gap.
33Annex 1 of "Guidance for national authorities operating the countercyclical capital bu¤er",
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Bank for International Settlements, December 2010
34Annex 1 of "Guidance for national authorities operating the countercyclical capital bu¤er",
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Bank for International Settlements, December 2010
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3.B Appendix - Descriptive statistics
This table presents the used abbreviations, the description of the variables and their calculation (if  applicable). Domestic credit to private sector refers to f inancial resources
provided to the private sector, such as through loans, purchases of nonequity securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable, that establish a claim for
repayment. For some countries these claims include credit to public enterprises. The number of bankruptcies concern only business f ilings in the analysis of this chapter,
not the non-business or consumer f ilings.
Variable
BD Log-linearisation of  the number of bankruptcies as a percentage of domestic credit, ln(BNKDCt/BNKDCt-1)
GDP Log-linearisation of Gross Domestic Product, ln(GDPt/GDPt-1)
M2 Log-linearisation of Money and Quasi-money (M2), ln(M2t/M2t-1)
DC Log-linearisation of Domestic Credit, ln(DOMCRt/DOMCRt-1)
CG100 Credit to GDP Gap with a lambda of 100, appendix 3A
CG625 Credit to GDP Gap with a lambda of 6.25, appendix 3A
UN Log-linearisation of the unemploymentrate, ln(UNEMPLt/UNEMPLt-1)
AA Log-linearisation of the average value of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange Index, ln(AEXt/AEXt-1)
AU Log-linearisation of the ultimo value of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange Index, ln(AEXt/AEXt-1)
NY Log-linearisation of New York Stock Exchange Index, ln(NYSEt/NYSEt-1)
SP Log-linearisation of S&P 500 Index, ln(SPt/SPt-1)
The Netherlands & The United States of America 1981 - 2009
Table 3B.2
Variable description
Descriptive statistics empirical data
Variable description
The table presents the descriptive statistics of the empirical data of the Netherlands and the United States of America.
Variable No. of
observations
Mean Median St. deviation No. of
observations
Mean Median St. deviation
BD 28 -0.061 -0.110 0.191 29 -0.075 -0.081 0.239
GDP 28 0.043 0.045 0.023 29 0.053 0.056 0.022
M2 28 0.075 0.071 0.094 29 0.058 0.072 0.037
DC 28 -0.002 -0.008 0.064 29 0.080 0.086 0.052
CG100 28 0.000 0.001 0.048 29 0.000 -0.005 0.064
CG625 26 0.068 0.065 0.029 29 0.000 -0.002 0.047
UN 28 -0.007 -0.046 0.168 28 0.007 -0.039 0.153
AA 26 0.058 0.124 0.209
AU 26 0.059 0.137 0.281
NY 29 0.075 0.090 0.179
SP 29 0.074 0.122 0.180
Descriptive statistics
The Netherlands 1981 - 2009 The USA 1981 - 2009
Table 3B.3
This table presents the origin of our empirical data. Domestic credit to the private sector refers to f inancial resources provided to the private sector, such as
through loans, purchases of nonequity securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable, that establish a claim for repayment. For some countries
these claims include credit to public enterprises. The number of bankruptcies concern only business f ilings in the analysis of this chapter, not the
non-business or consumer f ilings.
Datatype Origin Datatype Origin
Number of bankruptcies Datastream Number of bankruptcies American Bankruptcy Institute
Gross Domestic Product World Bank Gross Domestic Product World Bank
Money and Quasi-money (M2) World Bank Money and Quasi-money (M2) World Bank
Domestic Credit World Bank Domestic Credit World Bank
Unemploymentrate World Bank Unemploymentrate World Bank
AEX average index value Dutch Central Bank New York Stock Exchange index Datastream
AEX ultimo index value Dutch Central Bank S&P 500 index Datastream
Origin of empirical data
The Netherlands 1981 - 2009 The USA 1981 - 2009
Table 3B.1
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3.C Appendix - Business cycle indicators and BDt
NL (1981-2010)
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3.D Appendix - Business cycle indicators and BDt
USA (1981-2010)
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3.E Appendix - Correlation matrices empirical data
The table presents the correlation betw een the dependent variable and the explanatory variables. For The
Netherlands the correlation betw een the variables GDP and UN is high. For The USA the correlation
betw een GDP, NY, SP and UN is high. The correlation betw een BD, DC, GDP and UN is also high.
CG100 CG625 AA AU BD DC GDP M2 UN
CG100 1.00
CG625 0.94 1.00
AA -0.05 0.08 1.00
AU 0.30 0.43 0.52 1.00
BD 0.04 -0.07 -0.41 0.06 1.00
DC 0.54 0.64 -0.09 0.18 -0.32 1.00
GDP 0.01 0.10 0.49 -0.07 -0.43 0.23 1.00
M2 0.37 0.36 -0.05 0.14 0.14 0.23 0.21 1.00
UN 0.08 0.09 -0.39 0.12 0.45 0.06 -0.56 -0.10 1.00
CG100 CG625 BD DC GDP M2 NY SP UN
CG100 1.00
CG625 0.93 1.00
BD -0.31 -0.29 1.00
DC 0.58 0.66 -0.53 1.00
GDP 0.23 0.15 -0.51 0.47 1.00
M2 0.42 0.27 -0.03 0.31 0.45 1.00
NY 0.31 0.27 -0.28 0.34 0.62 0.32 1.00
SP 0.34 0.31 -0.29 0.35 0.63 0.30 0.97 1.00
UN -0.31 -0.24 0.62 -0.52 -0.87 -0.37 -0.62 -0.64 1.00
The Netherlands
The United States of America
Correlation matrices dependent and explanatory variables
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3.F Appendix - Augmented Dickey-Fuller test
The table presents the results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. The null hypothesis that the
variable has a unit root is tested.
*** is rejection on a 1% level, ** on a 5%-level and * on a 10%-level.
Variables ADF test statistic ADF Critical Value Conclusion
BD -3.64 ** T < CV Rejects H0
GDP 0.73 T > CV Fails to reject H0
DC -4.93 *** T < CV Rejects H0
CG100 -3.69 ** T < CV Rejects H0
CG625 -5.28 *** T < CV Rejects H0
M2 -4.10 ** T < CV Rejects H0
UN -4.01 ** T < CV Rejects H0
AA -2.70 T > CV Fails to reject H0
AU -4.84 *** T < CV Rejects H0
Variables ADF test statistic ADF Critical Value Conclusion
BD -4.26 ** T < CV Rejects H0
GDP -3.72 ** T < CV Rejects H0
DC -3.89 ** T < CV Rejects H0
CG100 -1.72 T > CV Fails to reject H0
CG625 -5.66 *** T < CV Rejects H0
M2 -1.90 T > CV Fails to reject H0
UN -3.46 * T < CV Rejects H0
NY -4.78 *** T < CV Rejects H0
SP -1.76 T > CV Fails to reject H0
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test (Unit Root Test)
The Netherlands
The United States of America
Chapter 4
Mixed strategy equilibria in asset
based lending
Chapter is based on joint work with Casper G. de Vries
4.1 Introduction
Asset based lending is a specic form of transaction based lending. Asset based
lenders supply credit to companies with a high risk prole, based on the collat-
eral they supply. Asset based lenders accept accounts receivable, inventory or other
(short-term) assets as collateral. In The Netherlands asset based lending by banks
is usually done by a separate bank entity, for this activity requires separate skills
and constitutes a di¤erent risk class from standard bank lending. Although asset
based lending is classed as transaction-based lending, during the term of the lending
contract, the asset based lender does gain "soft" information concerning the risk
prole of the borrower. The article of Rajan & Winton (1995) suggests that the
inspection of collateral itself may give the lender additional information about the
borrower. Because asset based lenders use factual information and "soft" informa-
tion to gain a view on the risk prole of their borrowers, asset based lending can
be situated in between relationship lending and transaction-based lending. Rajan
& Winton (1995) also nd empirical evidence that shows that rms deplete their
collateral when they are in trouble, rather than in good times. The asset based
lending market can therefore be characterized as a "lender-of last resort" market
where the companies that apply for asset based lending have very limited access to
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other sources of funding. This causes an inelastic demand for asset based loans.
Asset based lending has not received much attention in academic literature. One
reason might be, because it is situated in between relationship lending and transac-
tion based lending. The asset based lending market is a very specic market with
high risk prole borrowers who are very sensitive to di¤erences in interest rates
between the di¤erent providers of loans. Asset based lenders rely even more than
their banking colleagues on screening and monitoring to distinguish between the risk
proles of their borrowers.
We analyze interest rate setting behavior by asset based lenders in a dynamic
market (with in- and outow of borrowers) with an inelastic demand for loans.
This chapter characterizes the complete set of Nash equilibria in a duopoly with
incomplete information, learning and a dynamic borrowersmarket with the entry
and exit through default. In this dynamic market there are cohorts of borrowers with
a high risk prole and cohorts of borrowers with a low risk prole and two asset based
lenders. The market is characterized by adverse selection of high risk borrowers and
the lack of a pure strategy equilibrium. We nd that the division of borrowers can
be modelled for all phases according to a series. Separate markets arise in which
neither of the asset based lenders has an informational advantage (new borrowers
market) or one of the asset based lenders has an informational advantage (inside
asset based lender). The asset based lender receives positive informational gains on
the low risk borrowers in the market in which he has an informational advantage.
The mixed strategy of the outside asset based lender has stochastic dominance over
the mixed strategy of the inside asset based lender. The average interest rate the
inside asset based lender o¤ers is smaller than the average interest rate the outside
based lender o¤ers over the whole range of interest rates of the mixed distribution.
The mixed strategy equilibria for each new phase depend on the number of borrowers
in the market, their risk prole and the probability of default of these borrowers.
An increase in the amount of high risk borrowers on the market, increases adverse
selection. As a consequence of the increased adverse selection the informational gains
for the inside asset based lender increase (the value of information concerning the
risk prole of the borrowers becomes more valuable). We nd that the probability
of switching for low risk borrowers depends on the relative size and riskiness of
the low risk borrowers in comparison to the total market. We also nd that the
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interest rate o¤ered to low risk borrowers increases when the probability of default
for the high risk borrowers increases. This chapter di¤ers from the current literature
with respect to the game setup where an inelastic demand for asset based loans is
combined with heterogeneous borrowers, learning by lending, a repeated game and
a dynamic borrowersmarket (entry and default to mimic a dynamic market). We
think this game setup ts the practice of asset based lending better than current
literature.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section two we discuss
related literature and section three outlines the framework of the model. From
section four onwards we discuss the di¤erent stages and equilibria in the di¤erent
phases of the game. The rst phase of our model analyzes the symmetric case where
both asset based lenders have no information concerning the borrowers type. The
following phases are characterized by inside information concerning the risk prole of
their borrowers and a lack of information concerning the borrowers of the competing
asset based lender and the new borrowers on the market. The implications for the
asset based lending market are derived in section eight. Conclusions are in section
nine.
4.2 Related literature
The related literature can be divided into two separate strands. The rst strand
of literature concerns small business lending and transaction based lending. The
second strand of literature concerns adverse selection in markets and more specic
in the strategic banking literature.
According to Berger & Udell (2002) and Udell (2008) small business lending
by nancial intermediaries can be categorized into four main distinct lending tech-
nologies: Financial statement lending, asset based lending, credit scoring and rela-
tionship lending. The rst three lending technologies are commonly referred to as
transactions-based lending. Because lending decisions are based on factual informa-
tion that is relatively easily available and does not rely on softdata gathered over
the course of a relationship. Relationship lending primarily focuses on the relation-
ship between the lender (the bank) and her borrower. Transaction-based lending
focuses on arms length lending by banks (Boot & Thakor (2000)). The relationship
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over time between a bank and her borrower can facilitate monitoring and screening
and resolve asymmetric information. But the relationship can also lead to an ex post
information monopoly, where the outside banks are uninformed. This phenomenon
is known as the hold-up or lock-in problem. It places all bargaining power with the
bank and was rst described by Williamson (1975) and Klein et al. (1978).
Boot (2000) shows that relationship banking is vulnerable to soft-budget con-
straint. Relationship lending may lead to perverse ex ante incentives on the part
of borrowers, when the borrower threatens to go into default, if no extra liquidity
is o¤ered. Empirical evidence from Houston & James (2001) and Berger & Udell
(2006) stresses three important determinants of borrowers involved in relationship
lending. The age of a rm, the size of a rm and the type of business are determi-
native for relationship borrowing. Smaller and younger rms and rms that have
more intangible assets are more likely to be involved in relationship banking.
Even though asset based lending is part of transaction based lending, close mon-
itoring does cause asset based lenders to have a steep learning curve concerning
the risk prole of their borrowers (Rajan & Winton (1995)). The combination of
learning by monitoring and short term contracts ensures that asset based lenders
can easily adapt the loan terms based on the information they receive. Contrary to
Boot et al. (1991) we treat the risk prole of borrowers and the value of collateral as
exogenous in this chapter1. We assume that the borrowers of asset based lenders are
more rigid in their investment and nancing opportunities, creating an exogenous
risk prole and a very inelastic demand for asset based loans.
Stiglitz & Weiss (1981), Narasimhan (1988) and Hillman & Riley (1989) are
amongst the rst to explore the consequences of mixed strategy equilibria in mar-
kets with adverse selection (banking game, promotional strategies and politically
contestable rents). Stiglitz & Weiss (1981) show that in a one-period model an
increasing interest rate and an increasing demand for collateral may increase the
riskiness of a bank portfolio. Imperfect information between borrowers and lenders
causes adverse selection. If a credit supplier is unable to distinguish between the
risk proles of borrowers, he will set the interest rate too high and attract the high
risk borrowers. The imperfect information also causes credit rationing, where credit
suppliers keep the o¤ered interest rates high although they still have loanable funds
1In section 4.8 we relax the assumption of exogenous collateral.
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available. Our paper expands this adverse selection problem to a repeated game
with imperfect information regarding di¤erent borrower cohorts, an exogenous risk
prole, entry and default of borrowers and an inelastic demand for loans.
Our analysis also builds on a framework used by von Thadden (2004) to an-
alyze repeated bank lending under asymmetric information. Our framework also
resembles that of Kofman and Nini (2006) to analyze insurance markets. The memo
by von Thadden (2004) corrects a misdirected analysis by Sharpe (1990). Albeit
the fact that the failure of pure strategy equilibria already followed from the Kun-
reather and Pauly (1985) analysis. The di¤erence between our model and that of
von Thadden (2004) and Kofman and Nini (2006) concerns the information bankers
have concerning their clientele. In our model the asset based lender, who supplies
the loan, learns the borrowers type, while the outside asset based lender does not.
In the model of von Thadden (2001) both bankers receive a signal concerning the
quality of the borrower. Kofman and Nini (2006) consider the case where only the
informed insurer receives a signal of the borrowers type. Our model does not include
signals, but there is learning due to repeated interaction. After having observed the
borrower for one period the asset based lender becomes perfectly informed and learns
the borrowers type. Outside asset based lenders do not observe the risk prole of
the borrower.
From the second phase onwards the results resemble those of the model of sales
equilibria of Varian (1980) and Baye et al. (1992). There are mixed strategies
to balance the repelling forces of charging high interest rates versus the loss of
borrowers. Mixed strategy equilibria in a banking environment with adverse selection
have also been studied by DellAriccia et al. (1999), DellAriccia (2000) and Marquez
(2002). These papers focus on the entry of new bankers in the market and the role of
insider information on the structure of the banking industry. Our model di¤ers from
these papers because it takes into consideration the dynamics within the borrowers
market (entry & default) and the inuence of a repeated game setup on the equilibria.
We do not analyze the structure of the banking industry, but we focus on the division
of borrowers on the borrowersmarket instead.
Berger et al. (2011) nd evidence in empirics that bankers use collateral to
mitigate adverse selection. Bester (1985) reaches the same conclusion through a
theoretical model. Ortiz-Molina & Penas (2008) empirically show that the maturity
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of a loan is used to mitigate adverse selection. Boot & Thakor (1994) show in an
innitely repeated credit market game without learning but with moral hazard, that
the costs of borrowing in the later stages of a bank-borrower relationship are lower
than in the early stages. Our model ts the practise of asset based lending better
than current literature, because it combines the specic market characteristics of
asset based lending best (an inelastic borrower demand for loans, the entry and
default of borrowers and an exogenous risk prole of the borrower).
4.3 Preliminaries
Consider two types of borrowers:
1. Low risk (LR) borrowers: these borrowers are startup companies, companies
in a growth market or capital intensive companies. The shortage of liquidity
and/or solvency for these borrowers is usually temporarily and/or is not (yet)
the consequence of a non-protable business model;
2. High risk (HR) borrowers: these borrowers have a high risk prole because
they are active in a declining market, have a declining market share or a
declining protability. A replacement market, mismanagement or other inter-
nal or external factors may cause the low protability, low solvency and/ or
low liquidity position of these borrowers. High risk borrowers have a higher
probability of default than low risk borrowers;
In conformity with relationship banking, asset based lenders initially do not
know the risk prole of the borrower when they enter into a one period-contract
with the borrower. The asset based lender learns the risk prole of the borrower
during the rst contract period. If the borrower switches to another asset based
lender, we assume that this information is lost. For the clientele that remains with
the asset based lender that initially supplied the loan, the asset based lender can
distinguish between the high and low risk borrowers. Hence the asset based lender
may di¤erentiate between the types and o¤er a di¤erent interest rate to the two
types. The borrowers that fail in each period are replaced by new entrants. The
demand for asset based loans is inelastic. This captures the feature that young and
small rms have very little other alternative sources for nancing.
4.3 Preliminaries 91
Adverse selection (hidden information) is of greater importance to asset based
lending than moral hazard (hidden actions), because contracts, collateral and moni-
toring constrain the borrower in exercising moral hazard2. But before contracts are
signed, an asset based lender has to get a clear view of the risk prole of a borrower.
Although there are asset audits and other screening devices, these devices are usu-
ally aimed at determining the value of collateral. The risk prole of a borrower
still remains subjective and is based on information concerning the market of the
borrower, management of the company and the feasibility of budgets and business
plans. In a highly competitive asset based lending market, adverse selection is the
larger of the two problems stemming from asymmetric information.
Consider the strategic choices by two asset based lenders who compete for bor-
rowers. The funding side is left exogenous. There are two type of borrowers, high
risk and low risk borrowers. The high risk borrowers default with probability H and
the low risk borrowers default with probability L, 1 > H > L > 0. Note that this
implies
L
(1  L) <
H
(1 H) (4.1)
Default rates are assumed to be uncorrelated across borrowers. After one period
the asset based lenders (hereafter: ABLs) learn the type of their own clientele. If
borrowers migrate from one lender to the other, this information is lost. Thus once
clients have been with a specic ABL, there is asymmetric information between the
lenders. Borrowers are assumed to always know their type. There exists an adverse
selection issue as lenders know the type of their current borrowers, while they cannot
distinguish between high risk and low risk types that migrate from one ABL to the
other ABL.
Every borrower wants to borrow just one unit of working capital. If the borrower
is successful, the ABL makes gross interest rate R minus its cost of obtaining funding
and providing the loan B. The net return for the ABL in this case is:
t = R B > 0 (4.2)
2Contracts contain covenants that include for example an obligatory check by an auditor, all
sort of restraints on equity, the amount of dividend that can be distributed and also information
obligations like running all transactions exclusively through the bankaccount of the lender.
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The return for the asset based lender if the borrower fails is:
f =  1 + C  B < 0 (4.3)
where C is the value of collateral the asset based lender has secured on the loan. If
the borrower fails, the asset based lender looses the loan amount ( 1) and the costs
for funding the loan (B), but this is partly compensated by the value of collateral
(C). We assume that the costs for lending B are equal for all asset based lenders.
In the rst part of this chapter we assume t is endogenous and can be inuenced by
the asset based lender, while other variables are exogenous. At a later stage we also
investigate how equilibria might be a¤ected if the collateral value C is endogenous.
We consider a duopoly of two asset based lenders, ABL 1 and ABL2. For sim-
plicity, the borrowersmarket consists of cohorts of perfectly divisible low and high
risk borrowers. We ignore the integer problem. This can be easily taken care of,
but complicates notation unnecessarily. For simplicity two divisible cohorts low risk
borrowers and two divisible cohorts high risk borrowers are present in the borrow-
ersmarket. Let K and k be the high risk borrowers of ABL1, where capital letters
denote the number of borrowers whose type is known to the ABL1. The k borrowers
are rst time high risk borrowers who can not be di¤erentiated from rst time low
risk borrowers, denoted as m. The low risk borrowers who are identied as such by
ABL1 are denoted by M: Similarly, the high risk and low risk agents of ABL2 are
denoted by Q, q and W and w respectively.
Consider one of these quantities, say M . After one period the expected number
of low risk rms that survives is (1 L)M . On the basis of the law of large numbers,
we assume that this also equals the actual number of low risk rms of ABL1 that
survive. Similar survival numbers apply for the other rms, i.e. (1 H)Q high risk
rms survive at ABL2. For simplicity we assume that the total number of market
participants is constant. But from the setup above, it is clear that one could easily
cope with changes in the size of the market. The model has the following other
assumptions, in accordance with Von Thadden (2004):
1. there are no long-term contracting possibilities;
2. prots are distributed each period (no retained earnings);
3. the borrower has no own funds, but has to borrow from competing ABLs;
4. one borrower can only receive nancing from one bank.
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These assumptions reect the characteristic that asset based borrowers typically
have few outside nancing options but to go to an ABL. The asset based lenders
can distinguish between the competitors borrowers (switchers) and new borrowers.
We show that the ABLs on the new borrowersmarket follow a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium in the initial phase and use marginal cost pricing. We assume that
the discount factor the asset based lenders use is su¢ ciently di¤erent from one to
ensure that trigger strategies do not impose a tacit collusion equilibrium3. We rst
discuss the initial phase in the asset based lending game, when both asset based
lenders do not yet have information concerning the risk prole of the borrowers.
Then we discuss generically the events in any subsequent period after exit, entry
and switching has taken place. Furthermore we assume that ABLs know whether
a borrower is a rst time borrower in the ABL market or not. The subscripts at
parameters indicate ABL1 or ABL2 and the superscripts at parameters indicate the
subgroup of borrowers that the parameter refers to (where H indicates high risk
borrowers, L low risk borrowers, N new borrowers on the market and C borrowers
of the competing ABL).
4.4 Initial Phase
When the market for asset based lending is initiated, the two ABLs do not possess
any information regarding the clientele quality. Hence we start of with two cohorts
of high risk borrowers, k and q, and two cohorts of low risk borrowers, m and w.
The ABLs cannot di¤erentiate between the borrowers and will therefore o¤er one
interest rate to the complete set of borrowers. Denote by t1 the net interest rate
ABL1 is o¤ering, recall (4.2), and t2 is the interest rate ABL2 is o¤ering. Note that
ABL1 breaks even if
t1 [(1  L)m+ (1 H)k] + f [Lm+Hk] = 0
3The articles of Baye & Morgan (1999) and Fudenberg & Maskin (1986) show that a host of
other equilibria may be maintained by trigger strategies in innitely repeated games according
to the folk theorem. Two asset based lenders in a price setting environment in an innite game
might be quite likely to have a Nash equilibrium known as tacit collusion, but this possibility is
not considered here.
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Solving for t1 then gives:
bt = t1 = t2 =  f [Lm+Hk]
(1  L)m+ (1 H)k > 0 (4.4)
This pure strategy Nash equilibrium where both asset based lenders o¤er the same
interest rate, is the unique equilibrium in the initial phase.
Note that if t1 > t2, then the entire market is captured by ABL2 and vice versa
if t1 < t2. If t1 > bt, then ABL2 has an incentive to raise the interest rate above bt
but below the interest rate ABL1 is charging, say to t1   " > bt. But then ABL1
has an incentive to undercut ABL2 to capture the entire market, while still pricing
above bt to make a prot. Hence, pricing by deviating above bt from equation (4.4) is
not in the interest of the ABLs. Deviating by pricing below bt is also not of interest
to the ABLs, since it would capture the whole market with probability one. But
any price below bt would result in a loss for the ABL. The break even price bt is the
unique symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium with marginal
cost pricing and zero prots is also known as the Bertrand (1883) paradox.
4.5 Division of borrowers
The information asymmetry and the in- and outow of borrowers from phase 2
onwards causes a separation of the borrowers in separate markets:
1. A borrowersmarket where asset based lender 1 is the inside asset based lender
with the information advantage (K & M);
2. A borrowersmarket where asset based lender 2 is the inside asset based lender
with the information advantage (Q & W );
3. The new borrowersmarket with the inow of new borrowers (k;m; q & w
respectively).
The ABLs distinguish between the interest rates they charge on the di¤erent
markets, according to the size of the market and the available information concerning
this market. This also implies that the borrowers in one market cannot use the
o¤ered interest rates on another market. Competition over the borrowers only takes
place within the markets. ABLs use the information asymmetry to make positive
returns. The ABLs have an incentive to di¤erentiate between the di¤erent groups
of borrowers. This phenomenon is known as the lock-in problem, rst described by
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Williamson (1975) and Klein et al. (1978).
From the second phase onwards, three interest rates are o¤ered to the borrow-
ers on the markets with information asymmetry (so excluding the new borrowers
market):
1. tC - this is the interest rate the outside asset based lender o¤ers to the borrowers
from the competitors market;
2. tL - this is the interest rate the inside asset based lender o¤ers his low risk
borrowers on the market in which he has an information advantage;
3. tH - this is the interest rate the inside asset based lender o¤ers his high risk
borrowers on the market in which he has an information advantage.
The inside asset based lender is the asset based lender with the information
advantage on the market. Borrowers switch asset based lender, if the o¤ered interest
rate by the outside asset based lender is less than the interest rate that the inside
asset based lender o¤ers. There are three possibilities:
1. tC < tL - all borrowers switch to the outside asset based lender;
2. tL  tC < tH - only the high risk borrowers switch to the outside asset based
lender;
3. tC  tH - none of the borrowers switches to the outside asset based lender;
These possible combinations of relative interest rates and the specic entry and
default of borrowers in the markets, determine the division of borrowers from the
second phase onwards. The division of borrowers between the asset based lenders
follows a series. This series can be described as follows:
Proposition 1 The division of borrowers amongst the two asset based lenders, after
the default and entry of borrowers, in phases [2;1) can be presented as follows:
B1 B2
High risk borrowers (H) K + k = 1 + ! Q+ q = 1  !
Low risk borrowers (L) M +m = 1 +  W + w = 1  
where ! 2 f0; (1 H)ng and  2 f0; (1  L)ng. If ! = 0 and  = 0, you have
an equal division of the borrowers and a symmetric equilibrium. If n = 1 (that is
! = (1 H) and  = (1 L)), you will have a winner division of the borrowers and
an asymmetric equilibrium. All the other division possibilities of borrowers in the
subsequent stages are combinations of the above mentioned series where n 2 Nnf0g
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(all positive integers excluding zero). These possibilities result in an asymmetric
division of borrowers. When we di¤erentiate between the new borrowers and the
existing borrowers, the division of existing borrowers amongst both asset based lenders
can be represented as follows:
B1 B2
High risk borrowers (H) K = (1 H) + ! Q = (1 H)  !
Low risk borrowers (L) M = (1  L) +  W = (1  L)  
This division of existing borrowers is used by the asset based lenders to determine
their strategy for setting the interest rate for existing borrowers and the borrowers of
the competing asset based lender.
Proof. Proof by induction, appendix 4A
The entry and default of borrowers every period and the equal division of the
new borrowers on the asset based lending market, causes the conguration where
one asset based lender serves all low risk borrowers and the other asset based lender
serves all high risk borrowers to be absent. The amount of borrowers one ABL has
in the following phases is dependent on the outcome of the mixed strategy played in
phase two and the following phases. Regardless of the specic division of borrowers
in a phase, one can determine the equilibrium interest setting strategies.
4.6 Market for entrants k, m, q and w subsequent
periods [2;1)
In any subsequent period, the ABLs have information regarding the previous period
clientele. Recall that existing clientele is denoted by capital letters, lower case letters
refer to entrants on the ABL market. The generic quantities of rms applying for a
loan are K, k and M , m for ABL1 and Q, q and W , w for ABL2. Note that these
quantities refer to the number of rms at the start of a new period after the failing
rms have exited the market. Each period these quantities may be di¤erent. In
the previous section we described in detail how these quantities may develop due to
entry and exit. Note that we do not require symmetric quantities of (K;M;Q;W )
rms across the two ABLs. Due to the entry and exit of borrowers in all phases
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after the rst phase, there will be 2H high risk borrowers and 2L low risk borrowers
in the new borrowersmarket every phase. Given the absence of information, the
market for entrants is characterized by the pricing to entrants in accordance with the
initial phase where both asset based lenders o¤er an interest rate equal to equation
(4.4). This pricing strategy will result in a pure strategy Nash equilibrium where
both asset based lenders will receive an equal part of the new borrowersmarket
(k = q = H and m = w = L).
4.7 Market for surviving borrowers K, M , Q and
W subsequent periods [2;1)
The market for surviving borrowers from the initial phase, can be subdivided in the
inside market for ABL1 with K high risk borrowers and M low risk borrowers and
the inside market for ABL2 with Q high risk borrowers and W low risk borrowers.
The inside market for ABL1 with K high risk borrowers and M low risk borrowers
is the market where ABL1 has an information advantage and ABL2 is the outside
asset based lender who cannot distinguish between the low and high risk borrowers
in the portfolio of ABL1. The borrowersmarket with Q high risk borrowers and
W low risk borrowers has the exact opposite information distribution: ABL1 is
the outside asset based lender on this market and ABL2 has inside information on
the risk prole of the borrowers on this market. The pricing strategy for a high risk
borrower on both markets is identical with only the di¤erentiation in the asset based
lender, which is opposite. For this reason, we will not distinguish between the high
risk borrowers on both markets, but only between the pricing strategy for the high
risk borrowers and the pricing strategy for the low risk borrowers.
4.7.1 Pricing strategy high risk borrowers K and Q
On the market with K high risk borrowers, ABL1 has inside information and can
distinguish the high risk borrowers K from the low risk borrowersM . ABL1 charges
the high risk borrowers an interest rate tH1 at least as large so not to make a loss,
i.e.
tH1 (1 H)K + fHK  0
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or
tH1   f
H
(1 H) > 0 (4.5)
The high risk borrowers of ABL1 will switch asset based lender if they can receive
a lower interest rate at ABL2. The mixed strategy equilibria, as are shown in the
following section, show that the outside asset based lender, here ABL2, will charge
an interest rate to the borrowers of the inside asset based lender, here ABL1, that
is below or equal to tH1 . The strategy of o¤ering an interest rate to your high risk
borrowers of tH1 will always result in zero prot. If t
H
1 =  f H(1 H) ; prot for ABL1
is zero, because the loan is priced at marginal costs. And if tH1 >  f H(1 H) ; prot
for ABL1 is also zero, because the outside asset based lender will receive your high
risk borrowers. Following the strategy of charging tH1 according to equation (4.5) to
your high risk borrowers is a Nash equilibrium, where deviating would result in a
lower than zero return.
On the market with Q high risk borrowers, ABL2 follows the same strategy as
ABL1 concerning her high risk borrowers. Once ABL2 distinguishes its high risk
borrowers, it charges these agents an interest rate tH2 at least so large as not to make
a loss, resulting in the pricing strategy for high risk borrowers equal to:
tH2 = t
H
1   f
H
(1 H) > 0 (4.6)
Following the strategy of charging tH2 according to equation (4.6) to your high risk
borrowers is a Nash equilibrium, where deviating would result in a lower than zero
return. The strategy of ABL2 is identical to the strategy of ABL1 concerning the
high risk borrowers. This strategy is independent of the amount of high risk bor-
rowers on the borrowersmarket.
4.7.2 Pricing strategy low risk borrowers M and W
On the market with M low risk borrowers, ABL1 is in competition with ABL2
who wants to lure away these good quality borrowers. ABL1 has inside information
concerning the risk prole of theM low risk borrowers and ABL2 can only distinguish
between the borrowers from ABL1 and the new entrants in the market. ABL2
cannot distinguish between the risk proles of the borrowers of ABL1. As we will
see, the high risk rms often have an incentive to switch. In practice it is often
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seen that borrowers that come from the opponent are o¤ered a discount vis à vis
existing borrowers. The analysis in this subsection reveals that sometimes there is
a discount for borrowers that switch in our theoretical model and sometimes not.
Two repelling forces determine whether or not there is a discount: more borrowers
(quantity e¤ect) versus higher pricing (price e¤ect). Because of the separate markets,
it su¢ ces to describe one market of existing low risk rms (M). The analysis for the
complementary market (W ) being analogous. The equilibrium is similar in spirit to
the asymmetric equilibrium strategies in Varian (1980), Hillman and Riley (1989)
and Baye et al. (1992) describing the expenditures for winning politically contestable
rent, except that the direction of bidding is downward rather than upward.
Suppose ABL1 uses a mixed pricing strategy for her low risk borrowers M . Let
B1 (t2) denote the pricing strategy of ABL1 concerning her low risk borrowers. The
probability that ABL1 charges her low risk borrowers an interest rate A that is less
or equal to the interest rate ABL2 charges all her borrowers, t2; can be denoted as:
B1 (t2) = Pr fA  t2g :
From the point of view of ABL2, the net interest rate that ABL1 will charge to her
low risk borrowers is the random variable A. If ABL2 sets an interest rate t2 for the
borrowers of ABL1, the low risk borrowers will switch to ABL2 with probability
Pr fA > t2g = 1 B1 (t2) :
As we will see t2   fH= (1 H), it then follows from equation (4.5) that the high
risk rms from ABL1 will always switch. This implies that ABL2 always gets the
high risk borrowers from ABL1. The low risk borrowers also switch over to ABL2 in
the case that t2 undercuts the price that ABL1 charges its existing low risk clientele.
The fact that the high risk borrowers always switch is a case of adverse selection.
Since ABL2 cannot distinguish between the high risk borrowers and low risk
borrowers who switch from ABL1 to ABL2 (it has no informational advantage),
ABL2 is expected to break even on its pricing strategy t2 to lure away borrowers
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from ABL1. This break even condition reads
0 = [1 B1 (t2)] f[HK + LM ] f + [(1 H)K + (1  L)M ] t2g (4.7)
+B1 (t2) fHKf + (1 H)Kt2g :
Note that the payo¤ to winning over the switchers is determined by the proportion
of failures, respectively H and L for the high and low risk borrowers, and the com-
plementary proportion of successes, respectively (1 H) and (1 L). From equation
(4.7) we can solve for the equilibrium mixed pricing strategy of ABL1
B1 (t2) = 1  K [ Hf   (1 H) t2]
M [Lf + (1  L) t2] : (4.8)
At the upperboundary of t, t, the cumulative probability B1
 
t

= 1, which is the
case when
Hf + (1 H) t = 0
or
t =  f H
(1 H) > 0 (4.9)
Note that since H > L, the denominator of equation (4.8) is:
M

Lf + (1  L) t = M fL  f (1  L) H
(1 H)

> 0
whereas M is also larger than zero. At the lower end of the support of t, t, the
cumulative probability B1 (t) = 0. Solving equation (4.8) for t
t =  f HK + LM
(1 H)K + (1  L)M > 0 (4.10)
Check that 0 < t < t
HK + LM
(1 H)K + (1  L)M <
H
(1 H)
which is equivalent to
H(1 H)K + L(1 H)M < H (1 H)K +H (1  L)M
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or
L
(1  L) <
H
(1 H)
which holds by assumption, we refer to equation (4.1). Because f < 0 both t; t > 0,
it also holds that density
b1 (t2) =
K
M
(1 H)
Lf + (1  L) t2  
K
M
Hf + (1 H) t2
(Lf + (1  L) t2)2
(1  L)
=
K(L H)f
M [Lf + (1  L) t2]2
> 0
Hence, B1(t2) is a well dened continuous distribution function.
Next we turn to the pricing strategy by which ABL2 sets its interest rate s for
borrowers that are lured away from ABL1. Thus let U denote the pricing strategy
of ABL2 to lure away existing borrowers of ABL1, i.e. K andM . From the point of
view of ABL1, s charged by ABL2 is a random interest rate S. The pricing strategy
of ABL2 can be denoted as
U2 (t1) = Pr fS  t1g (4.11)
From the point of view of ABL1, the interest rate S that ABL2 charges, captures
his low risk borrowers if ABL1 charges a interest rate t1 to his low risk borrowers
such that the interest rate S is less or equal to t1 as denoted in (4.11). In this case
the return for ABL1 on his low risk borrowers is zero, as they have switched to be
served by ABL2.
The expected payo¤ for ABL1 from charging t1 to his M low risk borrowers is
[1  U2 (t1)] fLMf + (1  L)Mt1g+ U2 (t1) 0
Since ABL1 has an informational advantage over ABL2, his expected payo¤ is pos-
itive, say c > 0. We can then solve for the pricing strategy U2 (t1):
U2 (t1) = 1  c=M
Lf + (1  L) t1 (4.12)
Given the continuous pricing strategy B1(t2) of ABL1, if ABL2 prices at the lower
bound t1 = t, it is sure to receive all theM and K rms, and hence has no incentive
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to undercut since at t from (4.10) ABL2 just breaks even:
[HK + LM ] f + [(1 H)K + (1  L)M ] t = 0
Thus at any a < t, ABL2 would make a loss. It also has no incentive to increase the
lower end of the support of U above t given the strategy B1(t2) by ABL1. Raising
the support by ABL2 does not increase its prots, see (4.7). Thus we can determine
c from equation (4.12) and the fact that U2(t) = 0. If we solve for U2(t) = 0; we can
determine:
Lf + (1  L) t  c=M = 0
or
c = LMf   f HK + LM
(1 H)K + (1  L)M (1  L)M
=
KM(L H)f
(1 H)K + (1  L)M > 0 (4.13)
Note that the density on [t; t) reads
u2(t1) =
K(L H)(1  L)f
[(1 H)K + (1  L)M ] [Lf + (1  L) t1]2
> 0:
At the upper boundary t1 = t, one can show that if one substitutes (4.9) and (4.13)
into (4.12), the outcome of the pricing strategy at the upperboundary is:
U2(t) = 1  c=M
Lf + (1  L) t
=
(1  L)M
(1 H)K + (1  L)M < 1
It follows that with probability
(1 H)K
(1 H)K + (1  L)M
ABL2 bids at the upper boundary t. Note that this is a masspoint. At the other
points on the distribution [t; t), the mixed strategy U2(t1) is continuous and there
is no mass at any particular point. When ABL2 prices at the upper bound, ABL2
only wins over the existing high risk borrowers K from ABL1. This masspoint at
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the upperboundary guarantees ABL1 its informational rents c > 0 on its current low
risk borrowers M .
Proposition 2 The equilibrium mixed strategies for the inside asset based lender
B1 (t2) and the outside asset based lender U2 (t1) on the existing borrowersmarket
with K high risk borrowers and M low risk borrowers can be summarized as follows:
B1 (t) = 1  K [ Hf   (1 H) t]
M [Lf + (1  L) t]
on t 2 [t; t] for the low risk borrowers (inside asset based lender)
U2(t) = 1  K(L H)f
[K(1 H) +M(1  L)] [Lf + (1  L)t]
on t 2 [t; t) for competing ABLs borrowers (outside asset based lender)
and U2(t) = 1
where B1 (t) is the strategy of the inside asset based lender to set the interest rate
for her low risk borrowers and U2(t) is the strategy for the outside asset based lender
to set the interest rate for all borrowers on this market. The informational rents
the inside asset based lender can earn on his low risk borrowers are equal to c =
KM(L H)f
(1 H)K+(1 L)M .
Proof. By induction as shown above.
These mixed strategies are comparable to the strategies from Narasimhan (1988),
DellAriccia et al. (1999) and Marquez (2002). These mixed strategies can be
depicted as shown in Figure 4.1:
B(t), U(t)
1 B(t)
U(t)
0
0 t
Figure 4.1: Mixed strategy equilibrium
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The strategies for the market with Q high risk borrowers andW low risk borrow-
ers where ABL2 is the inside asset based lender and ABL1 the outside asset based
lender, can be analogously analyzed. Without further ado we can state the pric-
ing strategies adopted for the low risk borrowers W . Denote the respective pricing
strategies by ABL1 and ABL2 by G (:) and Z (:). Then in analogy with the above,
one nds
G1 (t) = 1  Q(L H)f
[Q(1 H) +W (1  L)] [Lf + (1  L)t]
on t 2 [t; t) for competing bankers borrowers (outside asset based lender)
Z2(t) = 1 +
Q [Hf + (1 H) t]
W [Lf + (1  L) t]
on t 2 [t; t] for the low risk borrowers (inside asset based lender)
and Z2(t) = 1
The expected informational rents of ABL2 on its advantage of being able to identify
its Q and W borrowers, are:
QW (L H)f
(1 H)Q+ (1  L)W > 0
4.7.3 Uniqueness of the mixed strategy equilibrium
The mixed strategy equilibrium of proposition one is comparable to the unique mixed
strategy equilibria of theorem one from Baye et al. (1992) in the Varian model of
sales. Uniqueness follows by arguments similar to lemmas 12, 15, and theorem 1
in Baye et al. (1992). Both asset based lenders play the same continuous mixed
strategy over the interval [t; t] and randomize their interest rate over this interval
where the outside asset based lender has a mass point at the upper boundary t.
This is in accordance with theorem 1 of of Baye et al. (1992). We have shown that
the condition mentioned in lemma 15 (at least two rms randomize continuously on
[t; t]) is met, because asset based lenders cannot gain return when deviating from
their strategy B1(t) or U2(t). Two repelling forces block a pure strategy equilibrium:
on the one hand the ABLs like to charge a low interest rate to capture the low risk
borrowers (quantity e¤ect), on the other hand a low interest rate implies a loss of
revenue and given a set of borrowers, one likes to maximize revenue by charging
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a high interest rate (price e¤ect). The uniqueness follows from the fact that the
two distributions follow from solving the two prot conditions. One shows these
distributions are the solution of a di¤erential equation and showing that bidding
outside the respective supports yields no gain, this is in conformity with lemma 12
of Baye et al. (1992).
4.8 Implications for asset based lending market
The implications in this subsection for the asset based lending market are presented
from the point of view where ABL1 is the inside asset based lender and ABL2 is the
outside asset based lender (the market with K high risk borrowers and M low risk
borrowers). But these implications are also valid for the existing borrowersmarket
with Q high risk borrowers and W low risk borrowers.
4.8.1 First order stochastic dominance
The outside asset based lender has rst order stochastic dominance on the interval
[t; t]:
B1(t)
U2(t)
=
K(1 H) +M(1  L)
M(1  L) > 1
so that
B1(t) =

1 +
K(1 H)
M(1  L)

U2(t) on the interval [t; t]
It follows that
U2(t)  B1(t) on the interval [t; t] (4.14)
The outside asset based lenders strategy U2(t) stochastically dominates the mixed
strategy of the inside asset based lender B1(t). This implies that over the inter-
val [t; t] a borrower weakly prefers the inside asset based lender over the outside
asset based lender. This is in conformity with the article of Narasimhan (1988),
who shows rst order stochastic dominance in a promotional pricesetting game by
rms. The stochastic dominance also follows from Theorem 2 of Baye et al. (1992).
Furthermore, for the densities one shows that on [t; t)
u2(t) =
(1  L)M
(1 H)K + (1  L)Mb1(t):
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So that except at t
u2(t) < b1(t) on the interval [t; t)
4.8.2 Expected interest rate
The average interest rate the outside asset based lender o¤ers, is (because of rst
order stochastic dominance) over the interval [t; t) higher than the average interest
rate the inside asset based lender is charging. To determine the average interest rate
the outside asset based lender charges the low risk borrowers, we have to take into
consideration the masspoint that is present at the upper boundary of t:
2 =
Z t
t
t  u2(t)dt+

1  U2(t)

t
=  f
24K(L H) ln
 K(1 H)K(1 H)+M(1 L) + (LM +HK)(1  L)
(1  L) [K(1 H) +M(1  L)]
35 > 0:
where K(1 H)
K(1 H)+M(1 L) < 1, ln
 K(1 H)K(1 H)+M(1 L)  < 0 andK(L H) ln  K(1 H)K(1 H)+M(1 L)  >
0 (for (L H) is also smaller than zero). This implies that the numerator is above
zero, as is the denominator, and because f < 0, the average interest rate the outside
asset based lender charges, 2, is always larger than zero. The average interest rate
the inside asset based lender charges the low risk borrowers on the same market is:
1 =
Z t
t
t  b1(t)dt;
=  f
24K(L H) ln
 K(1 H)K(1 H)+M(1 L) + LM(1  L)
(1  L)2M
35 > 0:
The average interest rate the inside asset based lender charges is also always larger
than zero. When we compare the two average interest rates:
1
2
=
[K(1 H) +M(1  L)]
h
(1  L)LM + ln
 K(1 H)K(1 H)+M(1 L) K(L H)i
M(1  L)
h
(LM +HK)(1  L) + ln
 K(1 H)K(1 H)+M(1 L) K(L H)i < 1
1 < 2 (4.15)
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This is in conformity with rst order stochastic dominance4.
4.8.3 Probability of switching
The borrowers of the inside asset based lender will switch if the interest rate the
outside asset based lender (determined according to mixed strategy U2(t)) o¤ers is
lower than the interest rate their current asset based lender (according to mixed
strategy B1(t)) o¤ers. The probability of switching for a low risk borrower can be
determined as follows:
PrfT 2 < T 1g =
Z t
t
U2(t)  b1(t)dt
=
Z t
t
(1  K(L H)f
[K(1 H) +M(1  L)] [Lf + (1  L)t] ) 
K
M
(L H)f
[Lf + (1  L)t]2dt
=
1
2
M(1  L)
K(1 H) +M(1  L)
The masspoint at t = 1  M(1 L)
K(1 H)+M(1 L) is at the upperboundary of t. The proba-
bility of switching Pr(T 2 < T 1) is half the size of one minus this masspoint.
The intuition behind this switching probability can be explained by analyzing
the two extreme cases concerning the di¤erence in the mixed strategies between the
inside and the outside asset based lender. There are two extreme combinations of
the mixed strategies of the outside and inside asset based lender. One extreme case
is that the number of high risk borrowers K is very small relative to M and adverse
selection is very small for the outside asset based lender. In that case both ABLs use
approximately the same distribution to determine their interest rates, B1(t)  U2(t),
we refer to equation (4.14). Thus the probability of the low risk borrowers switching
approaches 50%.
The opposite extreme case appears if the amount of low risk borrowersM in com-
parison to the amount of high risk borrowers K is very small and adverse selection
is very high for the outside asset based lender. The inside asset based lender o¤ers
an interest rate on the interval [t; t] according to B1(t) and the outside asset based
4Proof: [K(1 H) +M(1  L)]
h
(1  L)LM + ln
 K(1 H)K(1 H)+M(1 L) K(L H)i <
M(1   L)
h
(LM +HK)(1  L) + ln
 K(1 H)K(1 H)+M(1 L) K(L H)i, if (L  
H)K
h
(1  L)M + (1 H)K ln
 K(1 H)K(1 H)+M(1 L) i < 0:
This expression is true, because (L H) is always smaller than zero.
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lender has a masspoint close to one at t (almost a pure strategy in which the outside
asset based lender o¤ers t to all the borrowers of ABL1). The outside asset based
lender primarily o¤ers the borrowers in the market an interest rate approximately
close to t. In this extreme case the probability of the low risk borrowers switching
from the inside asset based lender to the outside asset based lender is near zero. The
more the cumulative distribution of the outside asset based lender deviates from the
distribution of the inside asset based lender, the lower the probability of switching of
the low risk borrowers. The probability of switching is determined by the distance
between the distributions of the outside and the inside asset based lender. We arrive
at the following conclusion
Proposition 3 The probability of switching for low risk borrowers is equal to
Pr(T 2 < T 1) =
1
2
M(1  L)
K(1 H) +M(1  L) (4.16)
The probability of switching depends on the adverse selection that is present in the
borrowersmarket. The more adverse selection that is present within the market,
the higher the average interest rate the outside asset based lender will charge and the
lower the probability of switching for low risk borrower. High risk borrowers present
in the market prevent the low risk borrowers from switching.
4.8.4 Inuence of the size of the borrowersmarket on the
strategies of the asset based lenders
Increase in the amount of low risk borrowers M on the market
An increase in the amount of low risk borrowers on the market inuences the in-
terest rates that both asset based lenders o¤er. It also inuences the probability of
switching of the borrowers. The upperboundary of the distribution of interest rates
(t =  f H
(1 H)) is not a¤ected by the size of the market. The lower boundary of the
distribution of interest rates however, is a¤ected by the amount of low risk and high
risk borrowers (t =  f HK+LM
(1 H)K+(1 L)M ). If the amount of low risk borrowers increases
on the market, the lower boundary of o¤ered interest rates moves downwards. Both
asset based lenders will randomize their interest rates over a larger interval. This is
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depicted in Figure 4.25.
B(t), U(t)
1 B(t)
B(t)*
U(t)*
U(t)
0
0 t
if M increases
Mixed Strategy B1 & U2
Figure 4.2: Inuence of an increase in M on
the mixed strategies B1(t) and U2(t)
When the number of low risk borrowers on the market increases, adverse selection
for the outside ABL decreases. Because the overall riskprole of the borrowers
market decreases, the outside ABL charges t with lower probability. The mixed
strategy of the outside asset based lender moves towards the mixed strategy of the
inside asset based lender. The probability of switching therefore increases. The
low risk borrower is more likely to choose the outside asset based lender based
on the interest rates. The informational rents (c = KM(L H)f
(1 H)K+(1 L)M ) on the low
risk borrowers of the inside asset based lender increase, because the quantity e¤ect
dominates the price e¤ect. Ergo the larger amount of low risk borrowers compensates
for the lower margin per low risk borrower.
Proposition 4 If the amount of low risk borrowers on the market increases, the
probability of switching for low risk borrowers increases. Due to the reduction in
adverse selection, the outside ABL can price more competitively. Nevertheless the
informational rents of the inside asset based lender are positively inuenced. An
increase of the amount of low risk borrowers on the market has a positive inuence
on the dynamics on the market (more frequent switching of low risk borrowers). The
quantity e¤ect dominates the price e¤ect and increases the informational rents for
the asset based lender. Ergo the larger amount of low risk borrowers compensates
5Appendix 4B shows the derivatives of the mixed strategies.
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for the lower margin per low risk borrower.
Increase in the amount of high risk borrowers K on the market
An increase in the amount of high risk borrowers on the market has the opposite
e¤ect on the interest rates that are charged by both asset based lenders. The lower
boundary of the charged interest rates (t =  f HK+LM
(1 H)K+(1 L)M ) moves upward. This
upward movement is caused by an increase of total market risk. Because of the
increase in the amount of high risk borrowers, the adverse selection for the outside
ABL increases. This can be depicted as follows6:
B(t), U(t)
1 B(t), B(t)*
U(t)
U(t)*
0
0 t
Mixed Strategy B1 & U2
if K increases
Figure 4.3: Inuence of an increase in K on
the mixed strategies B1(t) and U2(t)
The increase in adverse selection forces the outside ABL to charge the upper-
boundary of the interest rate (t) more often. Because the outside ABL charges on
average higher interest rates, the probability of switching decreases. Low risk bor-
rowers are less likely to switch from the inside asset based lender to the outside asset
based lender. The decrease in the probability of switching of the low risk borrow-
ers has a positive impact on the informational rents the inside asset based lender
receives (c = KM(L H)f
(1 H)K+(1 L)M ).
Proposition 5 When the amount of high risk borrowers on the market increases,
adverse selection increases for the outside ABL. The increased adverse selection
causes the outside ABL to charge on average higher interest rates. The higher inter-
6Appendix 4B shows the derivatives of the mixed strategies.
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est rates charged by the outside ABL, decrease the probability of switching for the low
risk borrowers. As a consequence the informational rents for the inside asset based
lender increase. The relatively smaller amount of low risk borrowers (quantity e¤ect)
is compensated by the higher margin per low risk borrower (price e¤ect), resulting in
higher informational rents for the inside ABL.
4.8.5 Inuence of the probability of default on the strategies
of the asset based lenders
Increase in the probability of default of the low risk borrowers L
An exogenous shock that deteriorates the probability of default for low risk borrowers
inuences the two mixed strategies. If the exogenous shock causes the probability of
default of the low risk borrowers to rise, this inuences the mixed strategies of the
asset based lenders as is depicted in Figure 4.47.
B(t), U(t)
1 B(t), B(t)*
U(t)
U(t)*
0
0 t
Mixed Strategy B1 & U2
if L increases
Figure 4.4: Inuence of an increase in L on
the mixed strategies B1(t) and U2(t)
The increase in the probability of default of the low risk borrowers causes an
overall increase of market risk. This e¤ect brings both asset based lenders to charge
a higher weighted average interest rate (the lower boundary of the interest rate, t,
moves upward). The masspoint on the upperboundary t of the outside asset based
lender becomes larger. The outside asset based lender charges the upperboundary
of the interest rate with higher probability. As a consequence the probability of
7Appendix 4B shows the derivatives of the mixed strategies.
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switching of the low risk borrowers decreases. The increased probability of default
of the low risk borrowers inuences the informational rents of the inside asset based
lender negatively.
Proposition 6 An increase in the probability of default of low risk borrowers causes
both asset based lenders to charge a higher average interest rate. The outside as-
set based lender charges the upperboundary of the distribution of interest rates, t,
more often. As a consequence the probability of switching of the low risk borrowers
decreases. The informational rents of the inside asset based lender are negatively
inuenced by the increase in the default probability.
Increase in the probability of default of the high risk borrowers H
If an exogenous shock increases the probability of default of the high risk borrowers
(H) on the market, the inuence on the mixed strategies of both asset based lenders
can be depicted as shown in Figure (4.5)8.
B(t), U(t)
1 B(t) B(t)*
U(t)*
U(t)
0
0 t
if H increases
Mixed Strategy B1 & U2
Figure 4.5: Inuence of an increase in H on the
mixed strategies B1(t) and U2(t)
The increase in the probability of default of high risk borrowers causes an increase
of the overall risk on the borrowersmarket. The interest rate interval, [t; t] and [t; t),
of the mixed strategies of both asset based lenders moves upward. The low risk
borrowers become more attractive in comparison to the high risk borrowers. The
relative increased attractiveness of the low risk borrowers, causes the outside asset
8Appendix 4B shows the derivatives of the mixed strategies.
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based lender to charge the upperboundary of the interest rate interval, t, with smaller
probability. The di¤erence between the interest rate the inside asset based lender
o¤ers and the interest rate the outside asset based lender o¤ers, becomes smaller.
The mixed strategy of the outside asset based lender approaches the mixed strategy
of the inside asset based lender. Because the outside asset based lender charges
the upperboundary of the interest rate interval, t, with smaller probability, the
probability of switching increases. The increase inH also increases adverse selection.
The increased adverse selection has a positive inuence on the informational rents
of the inside asset based lender.
If an exogenous shock increases the probability of default of high risk borrowers,
for example because of a nancial crisis, the average interest rate for the low risk
borrowers increases. The intuition behind this result is as follows. The outside
asset based lender cannot distinguish between the borrowers on the market. The
outside asset based lender only knows that the probability of default for the high
risk borrowers has increased. This causes the overall risk prole of the borrowers
market for the outside asset based lender to increase. In accordance the outside asset
based lender adapts his strategy and charges higher interest rates to the borrowers
market. The inside asset based lender responds opportunistic and also raises the
interest rate for his low risk borrowers. The inside asset based lender gains higher
informational rents on his low risk borrowers (price e¤ect). The asset based lenders
transfer the costs from the overall increased risk level of the borrowersmarket onto
the low risk borrowers.
Proposition 7 An increase in the probability of default of high risk borrowers causes
an increase of the overall risk on the borrowersmarket. The distribution of interest
rates, [t; t] and [t; t), of the mixed strategies of both asset based lenders moves upward.
The probability of switching increases and the informational rents for the inside asset
based lender are positively inuenced (price-e¤ect). The asset based lenders transfer
the costs from the overall increased risk level of the borrowersmarket onto the low
risk borrowers.
4.8.6 Bargaining power asset based lenders after one period
Rajan (1992) shows that informed banks have bargaining power over the rms
prots, once projects have begun. In this subsection we analyze if implementing
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Rajans (1992) bargaining power of banks onto our theoretical model would e¤ect
our results. In our model Rajans (1992) bargaining power for bankers would apply
to the periods [2;1), because in the rst period the projects have not yet begun. In
our theoretical model the asset based lender uses his bargaining power to improve
his prots. The inside asset based lender has two options to improve his prots.
He can increase the interest rate he charges his borrowers or he can demand more
collateral for the same loan. The option of demanding a higher interest rate was
discussed in previous sections of this chapter. The adverse selection in our model and
the informational advantage of the inside asset based lender forces both asset based
lenders to apply a mixed strategy to their low risk borrowers and the borrowers of
the outside asset based lender.
After learning the type of a borrower in the initial period, the ABL can adjust the
amount of collateral he demands from a borrower. The ABL can demand a higher
amount of collateral from the high risk borrowers in comparison to the low risk
borrowers. Suppose that interest rates are dictated by the market (exogenous), but
the ABLs can set collateral requirements (endogenous). If collateral is endogenous
and the interest rate exogenous, the fair collateral rates would be equal to
H( 1 + cH) + (1 H) t = 0
cH = 1  (1 H)t
H
L( 1 + cL) + (1  L) t = 0
cL = 1  (1  L)t
L
where cH is the fair amount of collateral an ABL would demand from a high risk
borrower and cL is the fair amount of collateral an ABL would demand from a low
risk borrower, where cL < cH .
Adverse selection is still present in the market with endogenous collateral and
exogenous interest rates. The adverse selection of high risk borrowers prevents the
application of a pure collateral setting strategy for the low risk borrowers and the
borrowers on the market of opposite ABL. The inside asset based lender applies the
following mixed collateral setting strategy to his low risk borrowers
B1 (c) = 1 +
K [H( 1 + c) + (1 H) t]
M [L( 1 + c) + (1  L) t] : (4.17)
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At the upperboundary of the collateral distribution, c, the cumulative probability
function B1 (c) = 1, which is the case when
c = 1  (1 H)t
H
(4.18)
At the lower end of the support of c, c, the cumulative probability B1 (c) = 0.
Solving equation (4.17) for c
c = 1  [K(1 H) +M(1  L)] t
[KH +ML]
(4.19)
The mixed collateral setting strategy for the outside asset based lender is
U2(c) = 1  K(L H)( 1 + c)
[K(1 H) +M(1  L)] [L( 1 + c) + (1  L)t] (4.20)
It follows9 that with probability
K(1 H)
K(1 H) +M(1  L)
ABL demands collateral c = 1  (1 H)t
H
at the upperboundary of his mixed strat-
egy. This is exactly the same masspoint in comparison to the model with an endoge-
nous interest rate and an exogenous collateral rate. The bargaining power of asset
based lenders after one period does not change the outcome of the mixed strategy
equilibria of both asset based lenders.
In a theoretical model where both collateral and the interest rate are endogenous,
the mixed strategies for the inside asset based lender (B1 (t; c)) and the outside asset
based lender (U2(t; c)) are
B1 (t; c) = 1 +
K [H( 1 + c) + (1 H) t]
M [L( 1 + c) + (1  L) t]
on t 2 [t; t] and c 2 [c; c] for the low risk borrowers
U2(t; c) = 1  K(L H)( 1 + c)
[K(1 H) +M(1  L)] [L( 1 + c) + (1  L)t]
on t 2 [t; t) and c 2 [c; c) for competing ABLs borrowers
9The collateral setting strategy of the outside asset based lender at the upperboundary is
U2(c) =
M(1 L)
K(1 H)+M(1 L) .
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In a theoretical model where both collateral and interest rates are endogenous, the
mixed strategies remain identical for both asset based lenders. The forces that drive
these mixed strategies remain unchanged (the price and quantity e¤ect). The asset
based lender wants to demand an interest rate or collateral amount that is as high
as possible to his low risk borrowers (price e¤ect). But on the other hand the ABL
wants to demand an interest rate or collateral amount that is as low as possible, in
order to gain as much borrowers as possible (quantity e¤ect). These incentives are
already described in literature. Farrell & Klemperer (2007) and Dub·e et al. (2009)
describe these incentives and refer to these incentives as the harvesting incentive10
and the investing incentive11. Rajans (1992) bargaining power for banks does not
diminish the inuence of these two opposing forces on the mixed strategies in our
model.
4.9 Conclusion
We analyze interest setting strategies of asset based lenders in a dynamic market
(with in- and outow of borrowers) with an inelastic demand for loans. In this
dynamic market there are borrowers with a high risk prole and borrowers with a
low risk prole and two asset based lenders. The market is characterized by adverse
selection of high risk borrowers and the lack of a pure strategy equilibrium. We
use a theoretical model with innite periods, where each period the high risk and
low risk borrowers determine at which asset based lender they wish to borrow one
unit. After one period the asset based lender learns the risk prole of the borrower,
this information is lost if the borrower switches asset based lender. We nd that
the division of borrowers in each subsequent period can be modelled according to
a series. The information asymmetry between the asset based lenders creates sepa-
rate borrowersmarkets. There is a borrowersmarket in which neither of the asset
based lenders has an informational advantage (new borrowersmarket). And there
are borrowers markets in which one of the asset based lenders has an informational
advantage (the inside asset based lender). The inside asset based lender gains posi-
tive informational gains on the low risk borrowers in the market in which he has an
10The switching costs increase the costprice for asset based lenders and therefor increase the
charged interest rate.
11If the asset based lenders would like to increase market share, they will have to decrease the
interest rate.
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informational advantage. The mixed strategy of the outside asset based lender has
stochastic dominance over the mixed strategy of the inside asset based lender. The
average interest rate the inside asset based lender o¤ers is of lower value than the
average interest rate the outside based lender o¤ers over the distribution of interest
rates of the mixed strategies. The mixed strategy equilibria for each new phase de-
pend on the number of borrowers in the market, their risk prole and the probability
of default of these borrowers. An increase in the amount of high risk borrowers on
the market, increases adverse selection. As a consequence of the increased adverse
selection the informational gains for the inside asset based lender increase (the value
of information concerning the risk prole of the borrowers becomes more valuable).
We nd that the probability of switching for low risk borrowers depends on the rel-
ative size and riskiness of the low risk borrowers in comparison to the total market.
We also nd that the interest rate o¤ered to low risk borrowers increases, when the
probability of default for the high risk borrowers increases.
Asset based lending is not a research subject that is very frequently used in the
literature, resulting in multiple future research opportunities. Theoretical research
could be extended by adding a third or fourth asset based lender to the theoretical
model or by inserting the possibility of regular bank nancing into the model.
Empirical research is to be done to determine the inuence of asset based lending on
the funding opportunities of small and medium sized businesses. Also the inuence
of specic insolvency law determinants on the loss given default and the interest
setting by asset based lenders would contribute to the analysis of the inuence of
country-based laws on banking, more specic asset based lending. In the Netherlands
asset based lenders are primarily legally attached to wholesale banks and nance the
high risk clients of those specic banks. The relationship between the asset based
lender and the wholesale bank in combination with interest setting and protable
gains is still theoretically and empirically underexposed. Asset based lenders also
use close monitoring and ex-ante selection instruments (performing a bank audit at
the client for example) to observe and rate their (future) borrowers, this could also
be implemented in the theoretical model.
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4.A Appendix - Proof division of borrowers
The division of borrowers depends on the mixed strategy of both asset based lenders
and the amount of borrowers that will accept the o¤ered interest rate. After the
initial phase the borrowers are equally divided amongst both asset based lenders.
From the second phase onwards the division of borrowers is less obvious. But there
are only three possible combinations of relative interest rates, that follow from the
mixed strategies of the asset based lenders. These possible combinations of relative
interest rates from the perspective of the borrowers are tc  th, tl < tc < th or tc  tl.
The rst combination of relative interest rates, tc  th, states that the interest rate
o¤ered by the outside ABL is higher than the interest rate the high risk borrower
receives from its inside ABL. Even though we do not know the exact interest rate
the ABL is o¤ering, the limited amount of combinations of relative interest rates
determines the division of borrowers.
At the start of the second phase the division of cohorts of borrowers is
B1 B2
High risk borrowers (H) (1 H) (1 H)
Low risk borrowers (L) (1  L) (1  L)
New borrowers (N) H + L H + L
The new borrowers are assumed to always divide equally over the asset based
lenders, due to the unique pure strategy equilibrium in which both asset based
lenders o¤er the same marginal interest rate. Every period the total number of
borrowers that fail (2H high risk borrowers and 2L low risk borrowers) is equal to
the total number of borrowers that enter the market. Hence the total number of
borrowers aggregated across all markets, is constant (due to the law of large numbers
assumption).
We will rst focus on the high risk borrowers. We claim that ABL1 has an
amount of high risk borrowers, #HR1, that is equal to
#HR1 2 f1; 1 + (1 H)ng (4.21)
In that case ABL has an amount of high risk borrowers, #HR2, that is equal to
#HR2 2 f1; 1  (1 H)ng
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We assume that the high risk borrowers switch asset based lender, based on the
relative interest rates the di¤erent asset based lenders o¤er. Assumption 1 is:
if tc < th the high risk borrowers switch (4.22)
if tc  th the high risk borrowers stay at their current asset based lender
There are three di¤erent markets that might consist of high risk borrowers. The
new borrowersmarket always consists of 2H high risk borrowers. The borrowers
market for ABL1 can consist of high risk borrowers in between 0 and 2   2H: The
borrowersmarket for the ABL2 consists of high risk borrowers in between 0 and
2 2H. The high risk borrowers on the new borrowersmarket always divide equally
amongst both ABLs12. There are three situations possible:
1. tc < th for the borrowersmarket of ABL1 and ABL2. This implies that the
high risk borrowers of ABL1 (that is K) switch to ABL2. And the high risk
borrowers of ABL2 (that is Q) switch to ABL1. If tc < th every period, the
amount of high risk borrowers at ABL1 (K + k) is equal to the amount of
high risk borrowers at ABL2 (Q + q) every period, that is K + k = Q + q =
(1   H) + H = 1. Because every period (1   H) borrowers survive and H
(= k = q) new borrowers are captured by both asset based lenders on the new
borrowersmarket. After n periods the division of borrowers is still equal for
both asset based lenders and remains K + k = Q+ q = (1 H) +H = 1.
2. tc  th for the borrowersmarket of ABL1 and ABL2. This implies that every
period the high risk borrowers (K and Q) remain at their current ABL (they
do not switch). If tc  th every period, the amount of high risk borrowers at
ABL1 (K + k) is equal to the amount of high risk borrowers at ABL2 (Q+ q)
every period, that is K + k = Q+ q = (1 H) +H = 1. Because every period
(1  H) borrowers survive and H (= k = q) new borrowers are captured by
both asset based lenders on the new borrowersmarket. After n periods the
division of borrowers is still equal for both asset based lenders and remains
K + k = Q+ q = (1 H) +H = 1.
3. combination of tc < th and tc  th over time and over the di¤erent borrowers
12So both ABLs receive H high risk borrowers from the new borrowers market. The high risk
borrowers that are captured by ABL1 are named k. The high risk borrowers that are captured by
ABL2 are named q, where k = q = H every period.
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markets.
A. First combination: ABL1 o¤ers an interest rate tc < th to the borrowers
of ABL2, while ABL2 o¤ers an interest rate of tc  th to the borrowers
of ABL1. This implies that the high risk borrowers of ABL2 switch to
ABL1, while the borrowers of ABL1 stay at their current asset based
lender. The amount of high risk borrowers as a consequence is for ABL1
K+k = 2(1 H)+H = 1+(1 H) and for ABL2Q+q = H = 1 (1 H).
Assume the next period ABL1 again o¤ers an interest rate tc < th to the
borrowers of ABL2, while ABL2 o¤ers an interest rate of tc  th to the
borrowers of ABL1. The amount of high risk borrowers for ABL1 then
becomes K+k = [1 + (1 H)] (1 H)+H(1 H)+H = 1+(1 H) and
for ABL2 Q+ q = H = 1  (1 H). If both assets based lenders ask the
same relative interest rates the following n periods, the division of high
risk borrowers will not change. The amount of high risk borrowers for
ABL1 will remainK+k = 1+(1 H) and for ABL2Q+q = 1 (1 H) for
ABL2. But if the relative interest rates change, the division of borrowers
will change. Assume the second period ABL1 o¤ers a relative interest
rate of tc < th to the borrowers of ABL2, while ABL2 o¤ers a relative
interest rate of tc  th to the borrowers of ABL1 (same assumption as
before resulting in K + k = 1 + (1   H) high risk borrowers for ABL1
and Q + q = 1   (1   H) high risk borrowers for ABL2). Now assume
that following this period ABL1 and ABL2 both o¤er an interest rate of
tc  th to the borrowers of respectively ABL2 and ABL1. The number
of high risk borrowers ABL1 will have after this period is then equal
to K + k = [1 + (1 H)] (1   H) + H = 1 + (1   H)2 and for ABL2
Q + q = [1  (1 H)] (1   H) + H = 1   (1   H)2. Assume that the
following n periods ABL1 and ABL2 still o¤er the high risk borrowers
a relative interest rate equal to tc  th. After n periods ABL1 has an
amount of K + k = 1 + (1 H)n 1 high risk borrowers and ABL2 has an
amount of Q+ q = 1  (1 H)n 1 high risk borrowers.
B. Second combination: Assume the second period ABL1 o¤ers a relative in-
terest rate of tc < th to the borrowers of ABL2, while ABL2 o¤ers a
relative interest rate of tc  th to the borrowers of ABL1 (same assump-
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tion as before) resulting in K + k = 1 + (1 H) high risk borrowers for
ABL1 and Q+q = 1 (1 H) high risk borrowers for ABL2. Now assume
that following this period both asset based lenders o¤er a relative inter-
est rate of tc  th to the high risk borrowers of ABL1 and ABL2. The
number of high risk borrowers ABL1 will have after this period is then
equal to K+k = [1 + (1 H)] (1 H) +H = 1 + (1 H)2 and for ABL2
Q+ q = [1  (1 H)] (1 H) +H = 1  (1 H)2. Assume the following
n periods the relative interest rates for the high risk borrowers of ABL1
is equal to tc  th and for the high risk borrowers of ABL2 is equal to
tc < th. After n periods the amount of high risk borrowers for ABL1 is
equal to K + k = 1 + (1 H) and the amount of high risk borrowers for
ABL2 is equal to Q+ q = 1  (1 H).
C. Third combination: Assume for x periods ABL1 o¤ers a relative interest
rate of tc < th to the borrowers of ABL2, while ABL2 o¤ers a relative
interest rate of tc  th to the borrowers of ABL1 (same assumption as
before). The amount of high risk borrowers of ABL1 after x periods is
equal to K + k = 1 + (1  H), while the amount of high risk borrowers
of ABL2 is equal to Q + q = 1   (1   H). Now assume that after x
periods both ABL1 and ABL2 start o¤ering the relative interest rate of
tc  th for n periods to both the borrowers of ABL1 and ABL2 (neither
the borrowers of ABL1 nor those of ABL2 will switch). In the period
x+ 1 a change in the division of high risk borrowers is visible. In period
x+ 1 ABL1 has K + k = 1 + (1 H)2 high risk borrowers, where ABL2
has Q+q = 1  (1 H)2 high risk borrowers. After n periods the division
of high risk borrowers is equal to K + k = 1 + (1   H)n x+1 high risk
borrowers for ABL1 and Q + q = 1   (1   H)n x+1 high risk borrowers
for ABL2.
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There are multiple combinations of relative interest rates over time and the dif-
ferent borrowers markets to consider. We have analyzed multiple combinations of
relative interest rates and the consequence of these interest rates for the division of
high risk borrowers in the di¤erent markets. We conclude from this analysis that
the amount of high risk borrowers (and vice versa for low risk borrowers) for one
asset based lender is always an element of the set #HR 2 f1; 1 + (1 H)ng and
for the other asset based lender an element of the set #HR 2 f1; 1  (1 H)ng.
So if the amount of high risk borrowers for ABL1 is an element of K + k 2
f1; 1 + (1 H)ng, than the amount of high risk borrowers of ABL2 is an element of
Q+q 2 f1; 1  (1 H)ng or vice versa. The amount of high risk borrowers of ABL2
is always mirrored relatively to the high risk borrowers of ABL1. For example if
ABL1 has 1  (1 H)3 borrowers, ABL2 has 1 + (1 H)3 borrowers, this is because
the total amount of borrowers on the market always remains 2. The same induction
can be applied to the division of low risk borrowers. We state that the division of
borrowers amongst the two asset based lenders, after the new borrowers are added,
in phases [2;1) in this banking game can be represented as follows:
B1 B2
High risk borrowers (H) K + k = 1 + ! Q+ q = 1  !
Low risk borrowers (L) M +m = 1 +  W + w = 1  
where ! = f0; (1 H)ng and  = f0; (1  L)ng. If ! = 0 and  = 0, you have
an equal division of the borrowers and a symmetric equilibrium. If n = 1 (that
is (1   H)1 = 1   H and (1   L)1 = 1   L), you will have a winner division of
the borrowers and an asymmetric equilibrium. All the other division possibilities
of borrowers in the subsequent stages are combinations of the above mentioned
mathematical series where n 2 N (all positive integers excluding zero) and they
all give asymmetric equilibria. When we di¤erentiate between the new borrowers
and the existing borrowers, the division of existing borrowers can be represented as
follows:
B1 B2
High risk borrowers (H) K = (1 H) + ! Q = (1 H)  !
Low risk borrowers (L) M = (1  L) +  W = (1  L)  
This division of borrowers is used by the asset based lenders to determine their
pricing strategy for existing borrowers. Because of the equal division of the new
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borrowers on the asset based lending market, the conguration where one asset
based lender serves all low risk borrowers and the other asset based lender serves all
high risk borrowers is not possible. The following phases of the game will always
consist of one of the mentioned four congurations where n 2 N. The amount of
borrowers one asset based lender has in the following phases is dependent on the
outcome of the mixed strategy played in phase two and the following phases and the
relative interest rates for that period.
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4.B Appendix - Dynamics on the borrowersmar-
ket
Impact of market size on mixed strategies
# LR borrowers M # HR borrowers K
Masspoint X = KÝ1 ? HÞKÝ1 ? HÞ + MÝ1 ? LÞ
dX
dM =
?KÝ1 ? HÞÝ1 ? LÞ
ßKÝ1 ? HÞ + MÝ1 ? LÞà2
dX
dK =
MÝ1 ? LÞÝ1 ? HÞ
ßKÝ1 ? HÞ + MÝ1 ? LÞà2
Lower boundary t = ?f HK + LM
Ý1 ? HÞK + Ý1 ? LÞM
dt
dM =
ÝH ? LÞfK
ßKÝ1 ? HÞ + MÝ1 ? LÞà2
dt
dK =
ÝL ? HÞfM
ßKÝ1 ? HÞ + MÝ1 ? LÞà2
Upper boundary t = ?f H
Ý1 ? HÞ - -
Probability of switching Y = 12
MÝ1 ? LÞ
KÝ1 ? HÞ + MÝ1 ? LÞ
dY
dM =
KÝ1 ? LÞÝ1 ? HÞ
2ßKÝ1 ? HÞ + MÝ1 ? LÞà2
dY
dK =
?MÝ1 ? LÞÝ1 ? HÞ
2ßKÝ1 ? HÞ + MÝ1 ? LÞà2
Outside asset based lender U2ÝtÞ =
MÝ1 ? LÞ
KÝ1 ? HÞ + MÝ1 ? LÞ
dUÝtÞ
dM =
KÝ1 ? LÞÝ1 ? HÞ
ßKÝ1 ? HÞ + MÝ1 ? LÞà2
dUÝtÞ
dK =
?MÝ1 ? LÞÝ1 ? HÞ
ßKÝ1 ? HÞ + MÝ1 ? LÞà2
Informational rents B1 c = KMÝL ? HÞf
Ý1 ? HÞK + Ý1 ? LÞM
dc
dM =
ÝL ? HÞÝ1 ? HÞK2 f
ßKÝ1 ? HÞ + MÝ1 ? LÞà2
dc
dK =
ÝL ? HÞÝ1 ? LÞfM2
ßKÝ1 ? HÞ + MÝ1 ? LÞà2
Impact of the probability of default on mixed strategies
Prob default HR H Prob default LR L
Masspoint X = KÝ1 ? HÞKÝ1 ? HÞ + MÝ1 ? LÞ
dX
dH =
?KMÝ1 ? LÞ
ßKÝ1 ? HÞ + MÝ1 ? LÞà2
dX
dL =
KMÝ1 ? HÞ
ßKÝ1 ? HÞ + MÝ1 ? LÞà2
Lower boundary t = ?f HK + LM
Ý1 ? HÞK + Ý1 ? LÞM
dt
dH =
?ÝM + KÞfK
ßKÝ1 ? HÞ + MÝ1 ? LÞà2
dt
dL =
?ÝM + KÞfM
ßKÝ1 ? HÞ + MÝ1 ? LÞà2
Upper boundary t = ?f H
Ý1 ? HÞ
dt
dH =
?f
Ý1 ? HÞ2
-
Probability of switching Y = 12
MÝ1 ? LÞ
KÝ1 ? HÞ + MÝ1 ? LÞ
dY
dH =
1
2 MKÝ1 ? LÞ
ßKÝ1 ? HÞ + MÝ1 ? LÞà2
dY
dL =
? 12 MKÝ1 ? HÞ
ßKÝ1 ? HÞ + MÝ1 ? LÞà2
Outside asset based lender U2ÝtÞ =
MÝ1 ? LÞ
KÝ1 ? HÞ + MÝ1 ? LÞ
dUÝtÞ
dH =
MKÝ1 ? LÞ
ßKÝ1 ? HÞ + MÝ1 ? LÞà2
dUÝtÞ
dL =
?MKÝ1 ? HÞ
ßKÝ1 ? HÞ + MÝ1 ? LÞà2
Informational rents B1 c = KMÝL ? HÞfÝ1 ? HÞK + Ý1 ? LÞM
dc
dH =
?KMfÝ1 ? LÞÝK + MÞ
ßKÝ1 ? HÞ + MÝ1 ? LÞà2
dc
dL =
KMfÝ1 ? HÞÝK + MÞ
ßKÝ1 ? HÞ + MÝ1 ? LÞà2
Sign of impact on mixed strategies
# LR borrowers M # HR borrowers K Prob default HR H Prob default LR L
Masspoint X = KÝ1 ? HÞKÝ1 ? HÞ + MÝ1 ? LÞ negative impact positive impact negative impact positive impact
Lower boundary t = ?f HK + LM
Ý1 ? HÞK + Ý1 ? LÞM
negative impact positive impact positive impact positive impact
Upper boundary t = ?f H
Ý1 ? HÞ no impact no impact positive impact no impact
Probability of switching Y = 12
MÝ1 ? LÞ
KÝ1 ? HÞ + MÝ1 ? LÞ positive impact negative impact positive impact negative impact
Outside asset based lender U2ÝtÞ =
MÝ1 ? LÞ
KÝ1 ? HÞ + MÝ1 ? LÞ positive impact negative impact positive impact negative impact
Informational rents B1 c = KMÝL ? HÞf
Ý1 ? HÞK + Ý1 ? LÞM
positive impact positve impact positive impact negative impact
Chapter 5
The bounded distribution of bond
recovery rates
Chapter is based on joint work with Casper G. de Vries1
5.1 Introduction
The current nancial crisis shows the importance of risk management for nancial
institutions and the application of adequate risk models for their asset portfolios.
One of the key items of measuring the expected loss is the modelling of the loss
given default by nancial institutions. The probability of default has received a
lot of attention in academic literature2, whereas the loss given default has received
remarkably less attention. Even though the loss given default is as much of inuence
on the expected loss of a loan portfolio for nancial institutions as is the probability
of default and the exposure at default. Recent academic literature expands the
traditional focus on the probability of default to include the analysis of the loss
given default. The loss given default is equal to one minus the recovery rate of a
defaulted loan.
In this chapter we analyze which bond characteristics inuence the distribution
of recovery rates. We model the di¤erent subsamples, according to these charac-
1We would like to thank Alex Koning, Rex Wang, André Lucas and other participants of the
Marie Curie Workshop on Financial Risk and EVT for their valuable comments on an earlier
version of this chapter.
2Literature concerning the probability of default (PD) dates back to Wilcox (1971) with a failure
framework and Scott (1981), who analyzes the probability of bankruptcy based on cashows.
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teristics separately. We use the bond prices of all publicly available bond data of
defaulted companies in the period 1981-2011 as proxies for the recovery rates of these
bonds. We analyze whether the empirical subsamples are best modelled through a
theoretical Beta distribution, a truncated normal or a truncated Weibull distribu-
tion. We test the goodness of t of the theoretical distributions to the empirical data
with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic and Cramer-von Mises test statistic. In
accordance with Schuermann (2004) we nd that a bond with a default date in a
NBER recession period has a signicant di¤erent recovery rate than a bond with a
default date in a NBER non-recession period. Contrary to the analysis of Schuer-
mann (2004) our analysis shows that collateral does not appear to be of signicant
inuence on the bond recovery rate. We also analyze the percentage lifetime of the
bond, this characteristic gives an indication of the timeperiod of the bond between
issue date and default date in comparison to the duration of the bond (the numer-
ator of this variable corresponds to the time to default). The percentage lifetime of
a bond is always in between 0 and 1. A defaulted bond with a very low percentage
lifetime is a bond that defaulted quite soon after it was issued in comparison to
its duration. The percentage lifetime is of signicant inuence on the bond recov-
ery rate. We subsample the recovery rates according to their bond characteristics
(NBER recession default date, percentage lifetime and collateral). We use the di¤er-
ent subsamples to determine the goodness of t of the theoretical distributions. We
nd that the di¤erent subsamples of the distribution of recovery rates of defaulted
bonds are best modelled as a truncated Weibull distribution. The goodness of t
of the empirical data to the Weibull distribution increases, if the empirical data is
separated according to the signicant bond characteristics3.
Our analysis contributes to current literature in two aspects. The rst aspect
concerns the percentage lifetime characteristic of a defaulted bond that is included
in our analysis. This characteristic is of signicant inuence on the distribution
of recovery rates. This result implies a (signicant) correlation between the time
to default in comparison to duration and the loss given default of bonds. To our
knowledge this correlation is not yet been analyzed in literature. The second aspect
of our analysis that contributes to current literature is the result that the recovery
3Prof.dr. Lucas brought to our attention that the other option would be to have regressors in
the mean parameter of the theoretical distributions to deal with the di¤erent bond characteristics.
This option is not exploited in this chapter, but could be a better alternative than the alternative
presented in this chapter.
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rates of defaulted bonds are best modelled through a truncated Weibull distribution.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. After this introduction we discuss
related literature. In section three we give a description of the empirical data and
in section four we describe the theoretical framework. In section ve the results of
the simulations of random draws of the theoretical distributions are analyzed and
section six concludes.
5.2 Related literature
The related literature concerning this chapter can be divided into two strands: gen-
eral default literature and recovery rate literature.
The rst strand of related literature regarding defaults of bonds and loans can
be divided into two categories: structural form models and reduced form models.
Structural form models are based on the work of Merton (1974). Merton (1974)
regards a default as an event that occurs when the market or book value of the
assets of a company fall below the threshold of the face value of the debt. The rst
generation structural models (amongst others Black and Cox (1976), Geske (1977)
and Vasicek (1984)) consider this threshold to be applicable when debt reaches ma-
turity date, this would imply that companies would only default at the maturity
date of debt. Second generation structural models relax this empirical di¢ cult con-
dition and assume default can occur between the issue date and the maturity date of
debt (amongst others Kim et al. (1993), Hull & White (1995)). In structural form
models the recovery rate is endogenously based on the value of the rms assets at
the time of default. Reduced form models consider a default to be exogenous to the
specic features of a company or the market it is active in. In these models default
is considered to behave as a stochastic variable, that is driven by an exogenous non-
observable random variable (p.e. Litterman & Iben (1991), Madan & Unal (1998),
Jarrow & Turnbull (1995), Chiang & Tsai (2010)). Default and default probabilities
behave as unpredictable Brownian motions in reduced form models. Covitz & Han
(2004) analyze theoretically and empirically the reduced form models for recovery
rates and they nd empirical evidence of non-linearities (jumps) in recovery rates,
supporting the use of reduced form models to model recovery rates.
The second strand of related literature covers the topic of recovery rates. A clear
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distinction should be made between the recovery rates of defaulted bank loans or
the recovery rates of defaulted bonds. Banks have informational advantages and in-
centives and means to screen and monitor their loans, whereas bondholders usually
have no other information than is present in the public domain. Another distinction
in this matter is that bank loans usually have a higher seniority than commercial
bonds. Altman et al. (2006) nd that the price behavior in secondary markets of
bank loans also di¤ers from the price behavior in de secondary markets of defaulted
bonds. In this chapter we use the price of publicly traded defaulted bonds as a
proxy for the recovery rate of these bonds in order to model the distribution of
recovery rates. Current literature does not only take into account the correlation
between the probabilities of default of di¤erent companies (Zhou (1997)), but also
the correlation between the probability of default of a specic portfolio of assets
and the loss given default of these assets ((Altman et al. (2003), Hillebrand (2006)
and Bade et al. (2011)). The correlation between the loss given default on loans
and borrower specic characteristics has been studied by Gupton et al. (2000) for
bank loans and by Gupton & Stein (2002) concerning loan specic characteristics
and macroeconomic conditions. Schonbucher (2003)4 and Gupton & Stein (2002)
use a Beta distribution to approximate the defaulted debt prices, recovery rates, of
defaulted bonds. Schuermann (2004) shows that recovery rate distributions (with-
out distinction in characteristics) are bimodal. Partly in contrast to our analysis,
Schuermann (2004) also nds that seniority and the business cycle are of signi-
cant inuence on the recovery rate distribution. To model dependency and systemic
risk in loss given default distributions, generalized beta regression models (Huang &
Oosterlee (2011), Bruche & Gonzalez-Aguado (2008)), single-factor models (for the
dependency between default and loss given default, we refer to Witzany (2009)) or
Bernouilli mixture models (Frey & McNeil (2002) and Frey & McNeil (2003)) are
used.
5.3 Empirical data description
We do not have any data on the actual recovery rates of defaulted commercial bonds.
Accordingly we use the quoted prices of defaulted bonds as a proxy for the recovery
4On page 147 Schonbucher (2003) refers to beta distributions being used for modelling recovery
rates in credit risk models.
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rates of these bonds5. We use the quoted prices of defaulted bonds 112 days after
the default date. We use the prices of the defaulted bonds several months after the
default date in order to get a more reliable proxy. The prices still show variance after
the default date, but the variance declines as time elapses. If we choose our proxy to
distant from the default date, data are lost. We balance the variance of the proxy and
the loss of data and choose the quoted prices 112 days after default6. The empirical
data originate from Datastream, Bloomberg7 and the NBER website8. We use the
quoted prices of straight bonds with xed interest coupons, that defaulted between
1981 and 2011 from Datastream. We combine the Datastream data with the data
from the Bloomberg database to obtain more characteristics of the defaulted bonds.
We do not include the defaulted bonds of governments and municipalities in our
analysis. The defaulted commercial bond data we use primarily concern developed
countries9.
Bruche and González-Aguado (2008) also use the post-default prices divided by
the face value of the loan as the historical recovery rate. But in contrast to Bruche
and González-Aguado (2008), we use a di¤erent approach concerning the recovery
rates that are present in the data that have a value that is larger than one.
A recovery rate is more than hundred percent, if debtholders claim a larger
amount than the face value of the specic bond (Calabrese and Zenga (2008)). The
reason for the height of this claim can be found in the externalities concerning the
default of debt. The legal representation after default is costly for the bondholder
and he demands a larger amount of interest, because of the delayed payment. Bruche
and González-Aguado (2008) scale the recovery rates with a factor .9 in order to get
the recovery rate between zero and one.
5Schuermann (2004) refers to this method of measuring the loss given default (LGD) as the
market LGD.
6Because only weekdays contain quoted prices of bonds, we use 112 days after default. This is
exactly 16 weeks after the default date (also a weekday) and balances the variance and the loss of
data best.
7We use the name of the company, the ISIN code, the issue date, the bond type, the coupon
type and coupon interest and the quoted prices from the Datastream database. The ISIN code,
the maturity and default date, the country code, currency and the collateral type originates from
the Bloomberg database.
8Website of NBER: http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html.
9Of the defaulted bonds that could be matched between Datastream and Bloomberg (N=659
excluding Lehman), 457 bonds originate from the US, 63 from Europe, 38 of Canada, 29 of Iceland
and 27 of Britain.
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Figure 5.1 The empirical cumulative distribution function and probability
density function for the samples including and excluding Lehman
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Figure 5.2 The cumulative distribution functions of the di¤erent
subsamples.
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Figure 5.3 Probability density functions of the di¤erent subsamples.
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We use the technique Calabrese and Zenga (2010) also use, to ensure that the
recovery rate is in between zero and one. If the quoted price of a defaulted bond,
px, divided by the face value of the bond (equal to 100) is above one, we consider
the recovery rate, x, to be equal to one
if
px
100
2 [0; 1] , then x 2 [0; 1] :
if
px
100
> 1, then x = 1:
We use the same approach as Calabrese and Zenga (2010), because we analyze
the recovery rate and not the loss given default. The loss given default gives an
indication of the loss the bondholders make, this loss should include the costs for legal
representation and delayed payment. The recovery rate is the return bondholders
have on their defaulted bonds, costs for externalities caused by the default are not
part of the recovery rate10.
Recovery rate distribution full sample
The full sample of recovery rates of defaulted, straight bonds with a xed interest
coupon, that defaulted between 1981-2011 consists of 1135 observations. The full
sample shows the impact the default of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 had
on the bond market. Of the 1135 bonds that defaulted between 1981-2011, 185
bonds originate from Lehman Brothers. Figure 5.1 shows the cumulative distribution
function for the sample including Lehman and excluding Lehman. The recovery
rates including Lehman have rst order stochastic dominance over the recovery rates
excluding Lehman, but not for the full distribution. The average recovery rate
including Lehman bonds is of lower value than the average recovery rate excluding
Lehman for the bonds with a recovery rate larger than 0:1. In order to avoid bias we
do not include the Lehman observations (N = 185) in our simulations and analysis.
The sample of recovery rates used in our analysis excluding Lehman consists of
N = 950 observations and the descriptive statistics of this sample are in Table 5.3.
The average recovery rate is 39%. The standard deviation is quite large (34%).
The large standard deviation is caused by clustering of the probability mass at 0:1
10This means that the recovery rate is not always one minus the loss given default, because
of externalities. The loss given default with costs for legal representation can for example be 1.2
minus the recovery rate. So the externalities increase the loss given default, but not the recovery
rate.
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and 0:9, as can be seen in Figure 5.1 and is also in accordance with research of
Schuermann (2004).
Of the 950 defaulted bonds in Datastream, only 659 (excl. Lehman, 823 incl
Lehman) could be linked to Bloomberg through the ISIN number. The defaulted
bonds that could not be linked to Bloomberg do not show the default date. We ana-
lyze which characteristics of the defaulted bonds are of inuence on the recovery rate
distribution. We test the following hypotheses concerning our bond characteristics:
Hypothetical
effect
NBER recession dummy (1 = default date in recession) negative
Percentage lifetime bond positive
Secured dummy (1 = secured bond) positive
Seniority variable (1 = secured bond - 3 = junior bond) negative
Interest rate bond coupon negative
Bond characteristic
Table 5.1
Hypothetical effect of bond characteristics
The table presents the expected theoretical effect, prior to the regressions of the different
explanatory variables on our dependent variable, the recovery rate of the defaulted bonds.
The NBER recession dummy denotes whether or not a bond defaults in a NBER
recession period or a NBER non-recession period11. If a bond defaults in a NBER
recession period, the recovery rate is most likely of lower value. In a NBER recession
period the (re-)sale of assets results in a lower return in comparison to a non-
recession period, thus resulting in lower recovery rates. This hypothesis is conformity
with research by Pulvino (1998) and Schuermann (2004). The percentage lifetime
of a bond gives an indication of the timeperiod of the bond between issue date
and default date in comparison to the duration of the bond. We use the data
concerning the issue date (= I), default date (= D) and the maturity date (= M)
of the defaulted bond to calculate the percentage lifetime: (D   I)=(M   I). The
percentage lifetime (the numerator of this variable is known as the time to default)
is always in between 0 and 1. A defaulted bond with a very low percentage lifetime
is a bond that defaulted quite soon after it was issued in comparison to its duration.
We would expect short lifetimebonds to have a lower recovery rate: the companies
that issue bonds with a short lifetime do so in a period when they already have
going-concern problems and a high credit risk prole. They issue bonds to gain
liquidity on the short term, but that does not solve their going-concern problems
11National Bureau of Economic Research website, http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html;
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and they default shortly after the issue date of the bonds. The secured dummy and
the seniority dummy show some overlap, they both give an indication of collateral
and the seniority of a bond. We expect the secured dummy to have a positive e¤ect
on the recovery rate, for collateral should have a positive inuence on the return
after default. We expect the seniority dummy to have a negative inuence on the
recovery rate, because a junior bond is lower in ranking when the returns after a
default are distributed amongst the creditors. A high coupon interest rate should
correspond to a company with a high credit risk prole, resulting in a lower recovery
rate at default.
We run OLS regressions of these characteristics on the recovery rate. The results
of the OLS regressions are in appendix 5A. Because we only have some characteristics
of the bonds, but no characteristics of (for example) the company that issued the
bonds, the adjusted R squared is very low. The adjusted R squared is however of
minor interest, since we only use the regressions to determine which subsamples
might have di¤erently shaped recovery rate distributions.
In conformity with Schuermann (2004) the variable NBER recession at default
is of signicant inuence on the distribution of the recovery rate. The coe¢ cient is
negative, in conformity with our hypothesis. Another characteristic of the defaulted
bonds that is of signicant inuence on the recovery rate distribution is the per-
centage lifetime of a bond. The positive sign of the coe¢ cient is in conformity with
our hypothesis. But if short lifetime bonds indeed have a higher credit risk prole
at issue date, because of going concern problems, we should be able to nd this
in the data. Bondholders that invest in bonds of companies with a higher (credit)
risk prole, demand a higher coupon interest rate and / or a lower issue price to
compensate for the higher risk prole. Table 5.2 presents the regression results on
the lifetime of bonds with the bondprice at issue date and the coupon interest rate
as explanatory variables. Both explanatory variables are signicant on a 1% level
and conrm our hypothesis that bonds with a shorter lifetime indeed seem to have
a higher risk prole at issue date.
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(1) We divided the bond price 28 days after the issue date by it's face value (F = 100)
(1) (2)
Bondprice at issue date +28 days (1) 0.461 *** 0.440 ***
(0.10) (0.09)
Coupon interest rate -1.400 *** -2.200 ***
(0.44) (0.47)
Constant 0.054 0.171
(0.11) (0.10)
Regression Incl. Lehman Excl. Lehman
Number of observations 439 366
Adjusted R-squared 0.078 0.122
Standard error of regression 0.238 0.223
Durbin Watson statistic 1.388 1.623
Summary statistics
Table 5.2
Lifetime of defaulted bonds at default date
The table presents the regression results of the bond price at issue date + 28 days and
the coupon interestrate on the lifetime of defaulted bonds at default date.  The standard errors
are show n in parentheses in the table.
***, **, * denote statistically signif icant effects at a 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
Dependent variable: lifetime of defaulted bond at default date
As already mentioned before, the regressions in appendix 5A also show that
whether or not a bond originates from Lehman is signicant for the recovery rate.
A result that is in contrast with the analysis of Schuermann (2004) is, that secured
and senior bonds do not have a signicant higher recovery rate than unsecured or
more junior bonds. Schuermann (2004) uses data from the Moodys Default Risk
Service Database. This database includes information on all defaulted corporate
debt instruments of corporations primarily domiciled in the US. Our data only con-
cerns defaulted bonds, our limited scope might be of inuence on the signicance of
seniority. Apparently collateral or a senior position in default does not result in a
signicant higher recovery rate for a defaulted bond.
We use the results of the regressions to analyze and model the distribution of
recovery rates. The di¤erent subsamples of secured and unsecured bonds, bonds
with a default date in a NBER recession or non-recession period and bonds with a
short or long lifetime period are analyzed separately12. The descriptive statistics of
12We will use the data without Lehman to analyze these subsamples to minimize bias. The rst
three regressions in Appendix 5A show the impact of Lehman on for example the current crisis
dummy and seniority. We do not analyze subsamples with recovery rates with di¤erent industry
codes separately (eventhough they have some signicance in the regression), because of limited
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the full sample and the subsamples are in Table 5.3.
bonds and the different subsamples. The number of observations for the full sample of
Number of Standard
(Sub) sample observations Mean Median deviation
Full sample 950 0.391 0.264 0.343
Secured bonds 273 0.343 0.210 0.319
Unsecured bonds 386 0.333 0.203 0.304
NBER recession 304 0.282 0.154 0.305
NBER non-recession 355 0.384 0.280 0.308
Short % lifetime 316 0.312 0.186 0.305
Long % lifetime 339 0.363 0.230 0.314
defaulted bonds differs from the aggregated number of observations of the subsamples,
because some bonds in Datastream could not be linked to the data in Bloomberg. The defaulted
bonds could then not be separated according to the characteristics of the different subsamples.
Table 5.3
Descriptive statistics
The table presents the descriptive statistics of the full sample of recovery rates of defaulted
Recovery rate distribution subsampled by collateral type
We divide our empirical data in a subsample with secured bonds (with collateral)
and a subsample with unsecured bonds (without collateral). The descriptive statis-
tics of these subsamples are shown in Table 5.3. In accordance with the regressions
in appendix 5A, the mean of the di¤erent subsamples with or without collateral
does not di¤er much. This implies that collateral on average does not generate a
higher revenue in default (higher recovery rate) for bondholders. The distribution
of recovery rates of secured bonds is not very di¤erent from the distribution of re-
covery rates of unsecured bonds. The probability density functions of the recovery
rate subsamples of Figure 5.3 support this result. We do not have an explanation for
this result. One hypothesis might be that the collateral of bondholders is of inferior
quality in comparison to, for example, the collateral of bank loans. We have no
information on the characteristics of the collateral of bondholders to further analyze
this hypothesis.
Recovery rate distribution subsampled by default date
We split the dataset of recovery rates into a subsample with a default date in a
NBER recession period and a subsample with a default date in a NBER non-recession
period. The descriptive statistics of the subsamples are shown in Table 5.3. These
subsamples do not include data concerning the Lehman bonds to prevent bias. The
amount of data.
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mean of the recovery rates of a bond that defaulted in a NBER non-recession period
(38%) is substantially higher than the mean of a bond that defaulted in a NBER
recession period (28%). Figure 5.2 shows that the subsampled distributions of NBER
non-recession defaulted bonds have rst order stochastic dominance over the NBER
recession defaulted bonds.
Recovery rate distribution subsampled by percentage lifetime at de-
fault
We use the median lifetime of our observations to divide the full sample of re-
covery rates into two subsamples with a short percentage of lifetime at default and
a long percentage of lifetime at default. We dene a short lifetime as a percentage
smaller or equal to 40% and a long lifetime as a percentage larger than 40%. The
descriptive statistics of these subsamples are shown in Table 5.313. The mean recov-
ery rate of a long lifetime bond is substantially higher (36%) than the mean recovery
rate of a short lifetime bond (31%). Figure 5.2 and (5.3) show rst order stochastic
dominance of the long lifetime bonds over the short lifetime bonds.
5.4 Theoretical framework
This section describes the theoretical framework we use to analyze the distribution
of recovery rates. Subsection one gives a specication of the theoretical distributions
and the truncation form we use to model the recovery rates. The next subsection
describes the maximum likelihood estimates of the theoretical distributions. The
goodness of t tests to compare the theoretical distributions and the empirical data
are introduced in the last subsection.
5.4.1 Theoretical distributions
Beta distribution
Schonbucher (2003)14 mentions that the standard choices to model recovery rates
would be the Beta distribution or transformations of the "standard" normal distri-
bution. Other academic literature also suggests the Beta distribution (Gupton &
13Four observations are left out in comparison to the other subsamples, because these bonds did
not have a maturity date, but were perpetual bonds.
14Chapter 6.1.6, page 147.
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Stein (2002) and Credit MetricsTM) or transformed normal distributions15. The
Beta distribution has probability mass between zero and one and therefore ts the
range of the empirical recovery rates. The probability density function of the Beta
distribution reads
gf(x) =  (a+ b)
 (a) (b)
xa 1(1  x)b 1 if x 2 [0; 1]
where  ( > 0) is referred to as the "center" parameter and  ( > 0) is referred
to as the "shape" parameter while x is the recovery rate. Outside the interval [0; 1]
the Beta distribution has zero mass. We use maximum likelihood estimation to
determine the shape and scale parameters of the Beta distribution,  and .
Normal distribution
The normal distribution is an unbounded distribution, while the recovery rate
distribution is bounded between zero and one. Truncation of the theoretical normal
distribution is necessary in order to determine the goodness of t to the empirical
distribution. One form of truncation is Mood et al. (1974) truncation, where the
probability density function is divided by the di¤erence in the cumulative probability
function at truncation points (for recovery rates that is zero and one). If x is the
recovery rate with a probability density function f(x) and a cumulative distribution
function of F (x), the truncated density of this variable truncated on the left at a
and truncated on the right at b is given by Mood et al. (1974):
b^(x)M =
b(x)
B(b) B(a) where x 2 [a; b]: (5.1)
Truncation in this form shifts the entire distribution upwards and divides the proba-
bility mass of the distribution f(x) that is beyond the truncation points equally over
the distribution of gf(x) in between [a; b]. Applying the truncation form of Mood et
al. (1974), depicted by using the subscript M , to the density function of the normal
distribution reads
g^(x)M =
1p
2
e (x )
2=22
G(1) G(0) where x 2 [0; 1]: (5.2)
Our empirical distribution of recovery rates has primarily mass at or close to the
15Probit or logit distributions are suggested.
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truncation points, as can be seen in gures (5.1) and (5.3). Because of the mass
close to or at the truncation points, we use a di¤erent form of truncation to truncate
the theoretical normal (and Weibull) distribution. Another form of truncation is
to place the probability mass beyond the truncation points, as mass points on the
truncation points a and b. This form of truncation creates the mixed distribution:
b^(x)N =
8>><>>:
B(a) if x = a
b(x) if x 2 (a; b)
1 B(b) if x = b
9>>=>>; : (5.3)
The truncation points have masspoints and the distribution is not continuous at these
truncation points. This form of truncation takes into consideration the possibility
of more probability mass at the endpoints of the distribution. We transform the
normal distribution to this new form of truncation, depicted by the subscript N .
This form of truncation results in the following mixed density function:
g^(x)N =
8>><>>:
G(0) if x = 0
1p
2
e (x )
2=22 if x 2 (0; 1)
1 G(1) if x = 1
9>>=>>; : (5.4)
Weibull distribution
In medicine, information technology and biology16 the Weibull distribution is
used for modelling recovery rates of survival rates. The Weibull distribution is also
one of the three extreme value distributions to model the behavior of the maxima
of a sample from a distribution with an endpoint.
We analyze whether the empirical data of recovery rates ts a truncated Weibull
distribution. The Weibull distribution is a partly bounded distribution, that only
exists on [0;1). In order to compare this theoretical distribution to our bounded
recovery rate data, it has to be truncated at one. Applying the Mood et al. (1974)
truncation form to the Weibull distribution gives the following density function
h^(x)M =
k
s
(x
s
)a 1e (x=s)
a
e (1=s)a
where x 2 [0; 1]: (5.5)
16AWeibull distribution is commonly used to model the failure and recovery data of software and
hardware (Matz et al (2002)), recovery rates in medicine (Reid (1997)) and survival distributions
in nature (Pyke and Thompson (1986)).
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where s (s > 0) is the shape parameter, a (a > 0) is the scale parameter and x is
the recovery rate. We determine the parameters of the Weibull distribution through
a maximum likelihood estimation on the empirical data. Applying our new form
of truncation as in equation (5.4), to the Weibull distribution leads to the mixed
density function:
h^(x)N =
8<: as (xs )a 1e (x=s)
a
if x 2 [0; 1)
e (1=s)
a
if x = 1
9=; : (5.6)
5.4.2 Maximum likelihood estimates
We use maximum likelihood to determine the parameters of the theoretical dis-
tributions. We estimate the parameters of the truncated normal, Beta and trun-
cated Weibull distribution for the di¤erent (sub)samples according to this estimation
method.
5.4.3 Goodness of t tests
The chi-square test of Pearson (1900) is probably the best known goodness of t
measure17. One of the disadvantages of the chi-square test is that it uses arbitrary
classes to subdivide the data. Each class of the chi-square test has to have at least
ve observations. Because we have only samples with relatively small amounts of
observations (the subsamples consist of approximately 300 observations) and the
data cluster around 0:0   0:2 and 1, the chi-square test will aggregate the data
in very few classes, losing a good deal of the information. The chi-square test
statistic will become unreliable with few observations and few classes. To counter
this disadvantage we use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and the Cramer - von Mises
goodness of t measures.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for goodness of t
17The chi-square test statistic is given by:
Tc =
k=kmaxX
k=1
(bnk   nk)2
nk
;
where bnk is the empirical number of observations at class k and nk is the theoretical number of
observations at class k:
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The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (1933) test measures the maximum vertical distance
between the empirical distribution function F (x) and the theoretical distribution
function F (x), in order to determine if the theoretical distribution is a reason-
able approximation of the unknown true distribution function. The two sided test
statistic for Kolmogorov-Smirnov test reads
TK = max jF (x)  F (x)j
where TK is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic, F (x) is the empirical distribu-
tion function and F (x) is the theoretical distribution function. The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test statistic is used to test the null hypothesis that the empirical distrib-
ution function originates from the theoretical distribution function
H0 : F (x) = F
(x) for all x from  1 to +1
H1 : F (x) 6= F (x) for at least one value of x
if the T test statistic TK > Ts we reject the null hypothesis, if TK  Ts we accept
the null hypothesis. The threshold Ts (decision rule) is determined according to
Ts =
xp
n+
p
n=10
 1
2
(5.7)
where n is the number of observations present in the data and xp is the value from
the standardized normal distribution18.
Cramer - von Mises test for goodness of t
The Cramer-von Mises (1928) test measures the sum of the vertical distance
between the empirical distribution function F (x) and the theoretical distribution
function F (x), in order to determine if the theoretical distribution is a reason-
able approximation of the unknown true distribution function. The two sided test
statistic for Cramer - von Mises test reads
W 2 =
Z 1
0
[F (x)  F (x)]2 dF (x)
whereW 2 is the Cramer - von Mises test statistic, F (x) is the empirical distribution
18For p = :90 this value is 1:22, for p = :95 this value is 1:36 and for p = :99 this value is 1:63.
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function and F (x) is the theoretical distribution function. If the sample values are
arranged in increasing order, the Cramer-von Mises test statistic reads
W 2 =
1
12n2
+
1
n
nX
1

F (xv)  2v   1
2n
2
whereW 2 is the Cramer - von Mises test statistic, F (x) is the theoretical cumulative
distribution function, n the number of observations and v is the number of sample
values  x. The Cramer - von Mises test statistic is used to test the null hypothesis
that the empirical distribution function originates from the theoretical distribution
function
H0 : F (x) = F
(x) for all x from  1 to +1
H1 : F (x) 6= F (x) for at least one value of x
if the test statistic W 2 > Ws we reject the null hypothesis, if W 2  Ws we accept
the null hypothesis. The threshold Ws (decision rule) is determined according to
E(Ws) =
1
6n
(5.8)
where n is the number of observations present in the data.
We determine the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Cramer-von Mises test statistic for
our empirical data in comparison with the (truncated) theoretical distributions. We
use the new truncation forms for the theoretical normal and Weibull distribution.
We simulate 10,000 random draws from the theoretical distributions and compare
these draws to the theoretical cumulative distribution functions. We determine the
goodness of t test statistics (Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Cramer-von Mises) for each
random draw. We determine the 95% condence interval for the distribution of
the test statistics (10,000 observations). And use this 95% condence interval to
determine whether the empirical data originate from a Beta, truncated normal or
truncated Weibull distribution.
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5.5 Empirical analysis
5.5.1 Maximum likelihood estimates
The maximum likelihood estimates of the truncated normal, the Beta and the trun-
cated Weibull distribution of the full sample and the di¤erent subsamples are in
Table 5.4.
the different subsamples and the full sample of the recovery rates of bonds. The maximum likelihood estimations were computed
Distribution Parameter
Full
sample
Secured
bonds
Unsecured
bonds
NBER
recession
NBER non-
recession
Short %
lifetime
Long %
lifetime
Beta distribution Alpha 0.246 0.266 0.305 0.268 0.313 0.282 0.294
Beta 0.145 0.187 0.269 0.264 0.206 0.249 0.210
Normal distribution Mean 0.391 0.343 0.333 0.282 0.384 0.312 0.363
St Dev 0.343 0.319 0.304 0.304 0.308 0.305 0.313
Weibull distribution s 0.378 0.333 0.324 0.253 0.398 0.295 0.363
a 0.916 0.934 0.935 0.805 1.115 0.881 1.002
Subsamples
Table 5.4
Maximum likelihood parameter estimation
The table shows the maximum likelihood estimations of the parameters of the beta, normal and Weibull distribution of
using the sample data in M atlab.
The NBER non-recession and the long lifetime subsample of bonds in contrast
to all other estimations, have a scale parameter a of the Weibull distribution that
is larger than one. A scale parameter a > 1 has a large impact on the theoretical
Weibull distribution close to zero. If the scale parameter of the Weibull a < 1 ; the
Weibull density tends to go to innity, close to zero. If the scale parameter of the
Weibull a > 1; the Weibull density tends to go to zero, close to a recovery rate of
zero.
5.5.2 Analysis of the test statistics
We use the maximum likelihood parameters to construct the theoretical normal, Beta
and Weibull distributions for the full sample and di¤erent subsamples. We randomly
draw n observations from these theoretical distributions, where n is equal to the
observations in the empirical distribution. We simulate these random draws 10,000
times, compare the observations from the draws from the theoretical distributions
to the empirical observations and calculate the goodness of t test statistics. Each
simulation gives a new value of the goodness of t test statistic (Kolmogorov-Smirnov
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and Cramer - von Mises) and the distribution of test statistics (n = 10; 000) can be
analyzed.
Full distribution of recovery rates
The results of the simulations for the full distribution of recovery rates (n =
950 observations) are shown in Table 5.5. The average value of the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test statistic is highest for the theoretical Beta distribution and least for the
truncatedWeibull distribution. If we compare the empirical value of the test statistic
with the 95% condence interval of the critical value, all of the null hypotheses that
the empirical data originate from the specied theoretical distributions are rejected.
Recovery rate subsampled by default date
The results of the simulations for the subsamples with a default date in a NBER
recession period or a default date in a NBER non-recession period are shown in Table
5.5. The null hypothesis that the empirical data of bond recovery rates with a default
date in a NBER recession period originate from a truncated Weibull distribution is
accepted for both the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic and the Cramer-von Mises
test statistic. The null hypothesis that the empirical data of bond recovery rates
with a default date in a NBER non-recession period originate from a truncated
Weibull distribution is accepted only for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic. If
we compare the lowest value of the Cramer-von Mises test statistic of Table 5.5,
0:006, to the lowest Cramer-von Mises test statistic of the full sample data of Table
5.5 (of which the Cramer-von Mises test statistic of the truncated Weibull, 0:0013, is
the lowest), an improvement of the test statistics is visible. Modelling the recovery
rates of bonds that defaulted in a NBER recession period separately from the bonds
that defaulted in a non-NBER recession period improves the goodness of t of the
distribution of recovery rates. The recovery rates of these subsamples, according to
our analysis of the test statistics, are best modelled using a Weibull distribution.
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These tables present the simulation results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Cramér-von Mises test statistics. We simulate 10,000 random draw s from the theoretical
distributions and calculate the test statistics of these random draw s in comparison to their theoretical cumulative distribution function to determine the 95% confidence
interval of the test statistics. The critical value of the test statistic is determined on a 5% signif icance level according to the formulas show n in equation (5.7) and (5.8).
KS CvM KS CvM KS CvM
Value test statistic 0.345 0.040 0.151 0.008 0.086 0.001
Critical value test statistic 0.044 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.044 0.000
Number of simulations critical value 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000
Mean critical value test statistic 0.039 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.039 0.000
Standard deviation critival value 0.012 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.012 0.000
95% confidence interval critical value 0.015-0.063 0.000-0.001 0.016-0.062 0.000-0.001 0.015-0.062 0.000-0.001
Null hypothesis Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected
KS CvM KS CvM KS CvM
Value test statistic 0.305 0.031 0.190 0.013 0.056 0.001
Critical value test statistic 0.077 0.001 0.077 0.001 0.077 0.001
Number of simulations critical value 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000
Mean critical value test statistic 0.067 0.001 0.067 0.001 0.067 0.001
Standard deviation critival value 0.021 0.001 0.021 0.001 0.021 0.001
95% confidence interval critical value 0.026-0.108 0.000-0.002 0.026-0.108 0.000-0.002 0.025-0.109 0.000-0.002
Null hypothesis Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected Accepted Accepted
KS CvM KS CvM KS CvM
Value test statistic 0.357 0.040 0.151 0.006 0.075 0.001
Critical value test statistic 0.072 0.000 0.072 0.000 0.072 0.000
Number of simulations critical value 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000
Mean critical value test statistic 0.063 0.001 0.062 0.001 0.063 0.001
Standard deviation critival value 0.020 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.020 0.000
95% confidence interval critical value 0.0243-0.1011 0.0000-0.0013 0.0241-0.1005 0.0000-0.0013 0.0243-0.1007 0.0000-0.0013
Null hypothesis Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected Accepted Rejected
KS CvM KS CvM KS CvM
Value test statistic 0.361 0.040 0.166 0.008 0.058 0.001
Critical value test statistic 0.082 0.001 0.082 0.001 0.082 0.001
Number of simulations critical value 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000
Mean critical value test statistic 0.071 0.001 0.071 0.001 0.071 0.001
Standard deviation critival value 0.022 0.001 0.022 0.001 0.022 0.001
95% confidence interval critical value 0.028-0.114 0.000-0.002 0.028-0.114 0.000-0.002 0.027-0.114 0.000-0.002
Null hypothesis Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected Accepted Accepted
Beta distribution Normal distribution Weibull distribution
Recovery rates of defaulted bonds with default date in NBER recession period (N = 304)
Beta distribution Normal distribution Weibull distribution
Recovery rates of defaulted bonds with default date in NBER non-recession period (N = 355)
Full sample of recovery rates of defaulted bonds (N = 950)
Beta distribution Normal distribution Weibull distribution
Table 5.5
Simulation results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Cramér-von Mises test statistics
Recovery rates of defaulted secured bonds (N = 273)
Beta distribution Normal distribution Weibull distribution
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KS CvM KS CvM KS CvM
Value test statistic 0.288 0.031 0.175 0.010 0.068 0.001
Critical value test statistic 0.069 0.000 0.069 0.000 0.069 0.000
Number of simulations critical value 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000
Mean critical value test statistic 0.060 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.060 0.000
Standard deviation critival value 0.019 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.019 0.000
95% confidence interval critical value 0.024-0.097 0.000-0.001 0.0232-0.097 0.000-0.001 0.023-0.097 0.000-0.001
Null hypothesis Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected Accepted Accepted
KS CvM KS CvM KS CvM
Value test statistic 0.312 0.033 0.170 0.009 0.050 0.000
Critical value test statistic 0.076 0.001 0.076 0.001 0.076 0.001
Number of simulations critical value 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000
Mean critical value test statistic 0.066 0.001 0.066 0.001 0.066 0.001
Standard deviation critival value 0.021 0.001 0.021 0.001 0.021 0.001
95% confidence interval critical value 0.025-0.106 0.000-0.002 0.025-0.106 0.000-0.002 0.025-0.108 0.000-0.002
Null hypothesis Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected Accepted Accepted
KS CvM KS CvM KS CvM
Value test statistic 0.340 0.038 0.168 0.008 0.075 0.001
Critical value test statistic 0.073 0.000 0.073 0.000 0.073 0.000
Number of simulations critical value 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000
Mean critical value test statistic 0.064 0.001 0.064 0.001 0.064 0.001
Standard deviation critival value 0.020 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.020 0.001
95% confidence interval critical value 0.025-0.102 0.000-0.001 0.025-0.103 0.000-0.001 0.025-0.102 0.000-0.001
Null hypothesis Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected Accepted Accepted
Table 5.5 - Continued
Recovery rates of defaulted unsecured bonds (N = 386)
Beta distribution Normal distribution Weibull distribution
Recovery rates of defaulted bonds with a short lifetime (N = 316)
Beta distribution Normal distribution Weibull distribution
Recovery rates of defaulted bonds with a long lifetime (N = 339)
Beta distribution Normal distribution Weibull distribution
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Recovery rates subsampled by collateral type
The characteristics of the simulation of the critical value for the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov and Cramer-von Mises test statistic of the subsamples of secured and un-
secured bonds are shown in Table 5.5. These test statistics show the same results
as for the subsamples according the default date: the goodness of t between the
theoretical distributions and the empirical data improves, if not the full sample of
recovery rates is modelled, but the sample of secured bonds and unsecured bonds
separately. The null hypothesis that the empirical data originate from a truncated
Weibull distribution is accepted for both the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic and
the Cramer-von Mises test statistic. Because both test statistics are in the 95%
condence interval of the critical value.
Recovery rates subsampled by lifetime
The specications of the critical value of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Cramer-
von Mises test statistics for the 10,000 simulations can be found in Table 5.5. These
test statistics show the same results as for the subsamples according the default
date: the goodness of t between the theoretical distributions and the empirical
data improves, if not the full sample of recovery rates is modelled, but the sample
of short lifetime bonds and long lifetime bonds separately. The null hypothesis that
the empirical data originate from a truncated Weibull distribution is accepted for
both the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic and the Cramer-von Mises test statistic.
Both test statistics are in the 95% condence interval of the critical value.
Appendix 5B shows the QQ-plots19 of the empirical data and the theoretical
distributions. Both the QQ-plots of the full data sample and the QQ-plots of the
subsamples show that using a Beta distribution to model empirical recovery rates
tends to overestimate the probability of having a recovery rate close to 100% and
underestimate the probability of having a recovery rate close to 0%. Modelling
recovery rates of defaulted bonds as a Beta distribution according to our analysis
overestimates the expected recovery rate and might result in unexpected losses. The
use of a truncatedWeibull gives a better representation of the distribution of recovery
rates of defaulted bonds.
19A QQ-plot compares the empirical quantiles with the quantiles of the theoretical distributions.
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5.6 Conclusion
The distribution of recovery rates of defaulted bonds, according to our analysis, can
best be modelled using a truncated Weibull distribution and taking into account
the bond characteristics. The bond characteristics concerning a default date in a
NBER recession period and the bond lifetime at default are of signicant inuence
on the distribution of recovery rates. We nd that in contrast to Schuermann (2004)
the impact of collateral on the recovery rate of defaulted bonds is not signicant.
Whereas there seems to be correlation between the time to default in comparison to
duration of a bond and the recovery rate.
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5.A Appendix - Regressions on the recovery rate
The table presents the results of regressions of bond and market characteristics on the recovery rates of defaulted bonds. The explanatory variables bond seniority and
secured bond dummy are correlated, so only one of these explanatory variabes can be used in each regression. The explanatory variables US market dummy & US dollar
dummy, NBER recession dummy & current crisis dummy are also correlated and only one of these variables is used in each regression. The standard errors are shown
in parentheses in the table. ***, **, * denote statistically significant effects at a 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Interest rate coupon -0.256 -0.092 0.045 0.463 0.332 0.261
(0.47) (0.46) (0.45) (0.50) (0.51) (0.51)
Industry -0.001 ** -0.000 * -0.000 * -0.001 * -0.000 * -0.000 *
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Lehman dummy -0.094 *** -0.077 ** -0.077 **
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Percentage lifetime at default 0.252 *** 0.243 *** 0.245 *** 0.200 *** 0.198 *** 0.195 ***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Current crisis dummy -0.074 ***
(0.02)
NBER recession at default dummy -0.096 *** -0.095 *** -0.096 *** -0.098 *** -0.100 ***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Secured bond dummy 0.013 0.009
(0.02) (0.02)
Bond seniority -0.033 ** -0.029 * -0.024 -0.023
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
US Market dummy 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.008 0.009
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
US Dollar dummy 0.034
(0.03)
Constant 0.374 *** 0.354 *** 0.287 *** 0.282 *** 0.337 *** 0.322 ***
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Regression Incl. Lehman Incl. Lehman Incl. Lehman Excl. Lehman Excl. Lehman Excl. Lehman
Number of observations 818 818 818 655 655 655
Adjusted R-squared 0.107 0.116 0.113 0.051 0.053 0.054
Standard error of regression 0.286 0.284 0.285 0.303 0.302 0.302
Durbin Watson statistic 1.248 1.258 1.256 1.249 1.249 1.253
Dependent variable: recovery rate of defaulted bond
Summary statistics
Recovery rates and market & bond characteristics
Appendix 5A
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5.B Appendix - Empirical quantile and theoreti-
cal quantile plots (QQ-plots)
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Samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
Introductie
Kredietrisico is het risico van een nancieel verlies als gevolg van het in gebreke bli-
jven van een tegenpartij inzake de nakoming van contractuele verplichtingen20. Deze
denitie legt de nadruk op een aantal afzonderlijke aspecten van kredietrisico. Een
afzonderlijk aspect van kredietrisico is het risico dat de tegenpartij in gebreke blijft.
Dit risico wordt ook wel counterpartyrisk of defaultrisk genoemd en wordt uitge-
drukt in een percentage dat de waarschijnlijkheid van ingebrekestelling weergeeft
(ook wel de probability of default genoemd). Het tweede afzonderlijke aspect van
kredietrisico betreft de regresmogelijkheid van de schuldeiser om voldoening van de
contractuele verplichting te eisen bij het in gebreke blijven van de schuldenaar. Dit
risico wordt ook wel recovery risk genoemd en wordt gekwanticeerd door middel van
een percentage dat het verlies of de uitkering in vergelijking met het geïnvesteerde
bedrag na ingebrekestelling weergeeft. Het percentage verlies na ingebrekestelling
wordt ook de loss given default genoemd. De tegenhanger van de loss given de-
fault wordt de recovery rate genoemd21. Het risico ten aanzien van de hoogte van
de vordering op het moment van ingebrekestelling, ook wel credit exposure risk ge-
noemd, vormt het laatste aspect van kredietrisico. Dit laatste risico wordt gekwan-
ticeerd aan de hand van een geldbedrag, waarbij de kredietlimiet het openstaand
bedrag begrensd. Financiële (kredietverlenende) instellingen nemen maatregelen
om het kredietrisico te mitigeren. Eén van de maatregelen betreft het contractueel
20Dit is een Nederlandse vertaling van de denitie van kredietrisico zoals deze door Jorion (2007)
wordt gehanteerd.
21Waarbij de recovery rate één minus de loss given default is.
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vastleggen van onder andere het interestpercentage, informatieverplichtingen van de
schuldenaar, onderpand en de kredietlimiet. Het volledig afwenden van kredietrisico
door nanciële instellingen is niet mogelijk vanwege de asymmetrische informatie
tussen de schuldeiser en de schuldenaar en de onvolledigheid van convenanten. De
asymmetrische informatie tussen schuldeiser en schuldenaar veroorzaakt hiaten in de
informatieverstrekking (adverse selection) en aangepast keuzegedrag bij de schulde-
naar (moral hazard). Het toepassen van een selectieprocedure voorafgaand aan het
verstrekken van de lening (screening) draagt zorg voor het verstrekken van een lening
op basis van een grotere informatieset. De convenanten tussen nanciële instellingen
en kredietnemers worden door de nanciële instelling op naleving gecontroleerd door
toezicht uit te oefenen (monitoring). Op deze wijze proberen nanciële instellingen
het zicht op en de beperking van kredietrisico te waarborgen. De doelstelling van
dit proefschrift is te onderzoeken op welke wijze nanciële instellingen omgaan met
kredietrisico in drie specieke situaties. In hoofdstuk twee en drie onderzoeken we de
mogelijkheid voor nanciële instellingen om tegengesteld aan de macro-economische
cyclus verlies voorzieningen te vormen voor de leningenportefeuille. De perceptie
van kredietrisico door nanciële instellingen kent een verloop dat meebeweegt met
de macro-economische cyclus22. De gevolgen van deze perceptie zijn direct merk-
baar in de kredietverlening en versterken de macro-economische cyclus. In hoofdstuk
vier analyseren we op welke wijze asset based lenders de interest bepalen in een dy-
namische markt met asymmetrische informatie aangaande het risicoproel van de
kredietnemers. In hoofdstuk vijf voeren we een empirisch onderzoek uit naar de
distributie van recovery rates van in gebreke zijnde commerciële obligaties.
Accounting perspectief op kredietrisico
Hoofdstuk twee introduceert een nieuwe methode van verlies voorzieningen vor-
men voor nanciële instellingen waarbij rekening wordt gehouden met de macro-
economische cyclus. Op basis van de perceptie van het kredietrisico in de lenin-
genportefeuille van nanciële instellingen, wordt door een nanciële instelling een
inschatting gemaakt van de te verwachten verliezen welke nog in de portefeuille aan-
wezig zijn. Deze inschatting wordt gemaakt op basis van historische gegevens, macro
22Wanneer de macroeconomische omstandigheden gunstig zijn, is de perceptie van kredietrisico
laag. Echter wanneer een recessie waarneembaar wordt, verhoogt dit de perceptie van kredietrisico.
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economische data en recente marktkennis23. Voor de te verwachten verliezen in de
leningenportefeuille wordt een verliesvoorziening getro¤en. De door ons voorgestelde
methode van een verliesvoorziening vormen, zorgt voor een directe link tussen de
liquiditeitspositie van een nanciële instelling en de hoogte van de verliesvoorziening.
Indirect wordt op deze wijze het risicoproel van de activa van de nanciële instelling
gekoppeld aan de liquiditeitspositie van deze nanciële instelling. De literatuur kent
reeds methoden om verliesvoorzieningen te vormen waarbij rekening wordt gehouden
met de macro-economische cycli, waaronder de methoden van de Lis et al. (2000)
en Burroni et al. (2003). De (Spaanse) methode van de Lis et al. (2000) stelt de
cyclische invloed van verliesvoorzieningen vormen naar beneden bij. De methode
van Burroni et al. (2003) werkt acyclisch, waarbij ongeacht de macro-economische
cyclus een zelfde percentage worden gedoteerd aan de verliesvoorziening. De door
ons voorgestelde methode van verliesvoorzieningen vormen, beweegt tegen de macro
economische cyclus in. De voorgestelde methode hanteert een multiplier bij het vast-
stellen van de verliesvoorziening om optimaal gebruik te maken van de kennis binnen
nanciële instellingen ten aanzien van het risicoproel van hun leningenportefeuille.
De multiplier is gestoeld op macro-economische variabelen (hoofdstuk 3) en wordt
vastgesteld door de toezichthouder. Op deze wijze wordt de subjectiviteit van de
vorming van verliesvoorzieningen verkleind. Dit komt de verieerbaarheid van de
hoogte van de verliesvoorziening ten goede en beperkt de invloed van de cyclische
perceptie van kredietrisico. De in dit hoofstuk voorgestelde methode van verlies
voorzieningen tre¤en, stelt de hoogte van de verliesvoorziening naar beneden bij in
een recessie24 en naar boven in een voorspoedige periode. De multiplier die wordt
voorgesteld in dit hoofdstuk wijkt af van de multiplier die Repullo et al. (2010)
voorstellen. Repullo et al. (2010) stellen een multiplier voor ten behoeve van de
kapitaalvereisten van Basel III, waarbij de multiplier dient te worden gebaseerd op
de afwijking tussen de stand van het bruto nationaal product en de lange termijn
trend van deze variabele. De methode, die in dit hoofdstuk wordt geïntroduceerd,
stelt voor een gedeelte van de verliesvoorziening van de specieke nanciële instelling
af te storten bij een Financiële Markten Stabiliteitsfonds (FMSF). Het beheer van
het FMSF wordt verricht door de nanciële toezichthouder (centrale bank). Op deze
23In sommige gevallen wordt deze inschatting ook gemaakt op basis van forecasts.
24Om op deze wijze de kredietverlening te verruimen. Op deze wijze wordt de invloed van een
creditcrunch verkleind.
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wijze wordt de correlatie tussen de solvabiliteit en de liquiditeit van een nanciële
instelling, welke in de literatuur onderkend wordt door bijv. Diamond & Rajan
(2005), ook daadwerkelijk toegepast in de praktijk. Het gebruik van een FMSF is
een beleidsmaatregel om er zorg voor te dragen dat de nanciële toezichthouder
invloed kan uitoefenen op de omvang van de kredietverlening, de omvang van ver-
liesvoorzieningen en de geldhoeveelheid. Zowel Basel III als ook IFRS laten de ruimte
voor aanvullende maatregelen door nanciële toezichthouders. Wanneer de nanciële
toezichthouder het gebruik van een multiplier en een FMSF bestendigt via wetgev-
ing, is opname op de balans van de voorgenoemde methode van verliesvoorzieningen
vormen naar onze mening wel mogelijk volgens de voorwaarden van IFRS.
Macro-economisch perspectief op kredietrisico
De vorming van verliesvoorzieningen door nanciële instellingen tegen de macro-
economische cyclus in, behoeft een indicator die aangeeft of dat de perceptie van
kredietrisico door de nanciële instellingen wordt overgewaardeerd of ondergewaardeerd.
Kredietrisico is altijd aanwezig in een leningenportefeuille van nanciële instellingen,
echter de perceptie van het risico verschilt. Wanneer de economische omstandighe-
den voor een nanciële instelling gunstig zijn, wordt het kredietrisico onderschat.
Wanneer de economische omstandigheden voor een nanciële instelling negatief zijn,
wordt het kredietrisico overschat. Deze subjectiviteit in de perceptie van kredi-
etrisico is één van de oorzaken van het cyclisch gedrag van nanciële instellingen.
Ondanks dat de perceptie van kredietrisico subjectief is, is het uiteindelijke resultaat
van een hoge mate van kredietrisico dat niet: een hoge mate van ingebrekestellingen
van kredietnemers. Het verlies dat nanciële instellingen maken als gevolg van in-
gebrekestellingen van kredietnemers is niet zichtbaar in de macro-economische data.
Maar de hoeveelheid ingebrekestellingen van kredietnemers die gevolgd worden door
een faillissement zijn wel zichtbaar op landniveau. Voorafgaand aan een faillissement
van een kredietnemer, is er een periode waarin de nanciële instelling probeert de
kredietnemer naar een veilige haven te loodsen. Het kredietrisico op de lening is
gedurende deze periode reeds hoog. Het aantal faillissementen is dan ook een ver-
traagde indicator van de hoeveelheid kredietrisico in de nanciële sector. We analy-
seren in dit hoofdstuk in hoeverre de business cycle indicators, uit de bestaande
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literatuur, onze vertraagde indicator van kredietrisico kunnen voorspellen voor de
nanciële sector in Nederland en de Verenigde Staten van Amerika. We gebruiken
vertraagde, autoregressieve OLS regressions om de correlatie tussen de business cycle
indicators en onze proxy voor kredietrisico vast te stellen. Vervolgens analyseren we
via een out-of-sample forecast welke indicatoren geschikt zijn om het aantal faillisse-
menten als percentage van het uitgezette krediet te voorspellen. Ondanks het kleine
aantal observaties van de analyse, zijn de resultaten van regressies signicant. De
out-of-sample forecasts tonen dat een combinatie van de indicatoren credit-to-gdp
gap en de stand van de aandelenbeurs met een vertraging van één en twee perioden
voor Nederland de beste voorspelling van onze proxy weergeeft. De voorspellingen
van onze proxy voor de Verenigde Staten zijn minder nauwkeurig en de beste voor-
spelling is gebaseerd op GDP growth, domestic credit growth, credit-to-gdp gap en
de stand van de aandelenbeurs met twee perioden vertraging. Wij denken dat de
mogelijke verklaring van de slechtere voorspelling voor de Verenigde Staten is gele-
gen in de navolgende reden. In Europa worden veel niet-nanciële ondernemingen
genancierd door bankleningen25, echter in de Verenigde Staten is dit niet het geval.
Hackethal & Schmidt (1999) geven aan dat dit onderscheid is gelegen in het ver-
schil tussen een bank-based en een capital-market based nanciëel systeem. Dit zou
tot gevolg hebben dat de door ons gekozen proxy van het aantal faillissementen als
percentage van domestic credit, niet een correcte indicator is voor de hoeveelheid
kredietrisico in de nanciële sector van de Verenigde Staten.
Micro-economisch perspectief op kredietrisico
De asset based lending markt is niet een frequent onderwerp van academisch onder-
zoek. Asset based lending is een term die wordt gebruikt voor het verstrekken van
krediet op basis van onderpand in de vorm van werkkapitaal. De asset based lend-
ing markt wijkt af van de reguliere bancaire markt ten aanzien van het verstrekken
van bankleningen doordat voornamelijk leningen worden verstrekt aan hoog risico
kredietnemers. De asset based lending markt kent ook een vrij inelastische vraag
naar leningen. Wij analyseren in dit hoofdstuk de asset based lending markt waar
25Zie Hackethal & Schmidt (1999). De schulden van niet-nanciële ondernemingen in Duitsland
(in guur 2 pagina 8) bestaan voor ongeveer 50% uit bankleningen, waar dit percentage voor the
US ongeveer 15% betreft.
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twee asset based lenders leningen aanbieden aan cohorten laag en hoog risico krediet-
nemers. De markt kent iedere periode een verloop waarbij zowel hoog als ook laag
risico kredietnemers failliet gaan en nieuwe kredietnemers zich voor het eerst op de
markt begeven. In deze dynamische markt verkrijgt een asset based lender na één
periode inzicht in het risicoproel van de kredietnemer. Wij analyseren in hoofdstuk
vier op welke wijze de asset based lenders de interest vaststellen voor de verschil-
lende groepen kredietnemers en de wijze waarop kredietnemers zich verdelen over
de twee asset based lenders. We geven de volledige set van Nash evenwichten weer
in deze markt. De verdeling van de kredietnemers over de twee asset based lenders
kan in iedere periode worden weergegeven door een wiskundige reeks. De markt
wordt gekenmerkt door adverse selection van hoog risico kredietnemers. De asset
based lenders onderscheiden separate markten met kredietnemers als gevolg van de
asymmetrische informatie over het risicoproel van de kredietnemers. Ten aanzien
van de kredietnemers die niet failliet zijn gegaan en welke de asset based lender
reeds één periode in de portefeuille heeft, heeft de asset based lender informatie
over het risicoproel van de kredietnemer. Ten aanzien van de nieuw toetredende
kredietnemers en de kredietnemers van de concurrerende asset based lender heeft hij
geen informatie over het risicoproel. De asset based lender verkrijgt een positieve
marge op de interest over de leningen die hij verstrekt aan de laag risico krediet-
nemers in zijn eigen portefeuille. De gemengde strategie van de concurrent asset
based lender heeft stochastische dominantie ten opzichte van de gemengde strategie
van de asset based lender met het informatievoordeel. Dit heeft tot gevolg dat de
gemiddelde interest die de asset based lender met het informatievoordeel aanbiedt
lager is dan de gemiddelde interest die de concurrerende asset based lender (zonder
informatievoordeel) aanbiedt over het volledige bereik van de interest. De gemengde
strategie van de asset based lenders hangt af van de hoeveelheid hoog en laag risico
kredietnemers in een specieke markt en de waarschijnlijkheid van een faillissement
van de kredietnemers. Een toename in de hoeveelheid hoog risico kredietnemers op
een markt zorgt voor een toename in adverse selection. Als gevolg van de toename
in adverse selection kan de asset based lender met het informatievoordeel een hoger
positief resultaat op zijn laag risico kredietnemers verkrijgen, immers de waarde van
informatie over het risicoproel van de kredietnemers is toegenomen. We stellen vast
dat de kans dat een laag risico kredietnemer van asset based lender wisselt, afhangt
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van de relatieve omvang en de kans op faillissement van de laag risico kredietne-
mers ten opzichte van de totale markt. Tevens stellen wij vast dat de interest die
wordt aangeboden aan de laag risico kredietnemers toeneemt, wanneer de kans op
faillissement voor de hoog risico kredietnemers toeneemt.
Finance perspectief op kredietrisico
Hoofdstuk vijf analyseert de recovery rates van beursgenoteerde obligaties, welke in
gebreke zijn gebleven in de periode 1981-2011. We analyseren welke obligatiekarak-
teristieken van invloed zijn op de distributie van recovery rates. We hanteren de
prijzen van beursgenoteerde obligaties enkele maanden na ingebrekestelling als indi-
cator voor de recovery rate. Een obligatie met een ingebrekestellingsdatum in een
NBER recessie periode heeft signicant andere recovery rate dan een obligatie met
een ingebrekestellingsdatum in een NBER niet-recessie periode. Het resultaat dat
onderpand geen signicante invloed heeft op de distributie van recovery rates is niet
alleen tegen onze verwachting in, het is eveneens in tegenstelling tot de uitkomsten
van reeds aanwezig onderzoek van Schuermann (2004). Onderpand zou in geval van
een ingebrekestelling voor meer comfort in de uitwinning van de schuld moeten zor-
gen (en dus een hogere recovery rate tot gevolg moeten hebben), echter blijkt dit
niet uit onze analyse. Wij veronderstellen dat deze uitkomst wordt veroorzaakt door
de kwaliteit van het onderpand van obligaties (echter hebben wij daar geen verder
bewijs van). We bestuderen eveneens een obligatie karakteristiek die wij "percent-
age lifetime" noemen. Percentage lifetime geeft een indicatie van de tijdsperiode
tussen de uitgave van de obligatie tot aan de ingebrekestellingsdatum in vergelijking
met de beoogde looptijd van de obligatie. Een obligatie met een korte percentage
lifetime is relatief gezien, kort na de uitgave van de obligatie in gebreke geraakt. We
modelleren de empirische data van de gehele distributie van recovery rates, maar ook
de distributie van obligaties met verschillende obligatiekarakteristieken volgens ver-
schillende theoretische verdelingen. We gebruiken de Beta verdeling, de afgeknotte
normale verdeling en de afgeknotte Weibull verdeling voor het modelleren van de
recovery rate distributies. Om vast te stellen of dat de empirische recovery rate data
afkomstig zijn van één van de theoretische verdelingen gebruiken we de Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test statistic en de Cramer-von Mises test statistic. In de huidige literatuur
wordt voorgesteld een Beta verdeling te gebruiken voor het modelleren van de re-
covery rate distributie. Echter uit onze analyse blijkt dat het onderverdelen van de
distributie naar de verschillende obligatie karakteristieken en het gebruik van een
afgeknotte Weibull distributie voor het modelleren van de recovery rates de beste
weergave van de empirische data geeft.
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